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This dissertation examines how commercially successful military-themed video games 
produced after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks are crafted, marketed, and played 
with the goal of understanding the interlocking technological, cultural, and social 
practices that contribute to their interactive pleasures.  The systematic inquiry into the 
production and experience of media pleasure carries with it vexing questions about how 
such affect is created and how it is situated within broader cultural fields.  This 
interdisciplinary project accordingly utilizes multiple methods including close textual 
readings of seminal games, a critical discourse analysis of marketing materials, and an 
ethnography and focus group of a war gaming fan community to track how these sites of 
practice give post-9/11 military-themed gameplay its distinctive experiential character 
and cultural import.  The case studies examined herein reveal that the affective 
dimensions of militarized gameplay are intimately linked to the political and cultural 
forces undergirding their production, marketing, and reception, and that the games 
industry mobilizes anxieties about terrorism to entice gamers into virtually striking back 
against foreign aggressors. 
 x 
Table of Contents 
List of Figures ...................................................................................................... xiii!
INTRODUCTION: WELCOME TO LUDIC WAR .........................................................1!
Space Invaders and 9/11 (or, why gameplay matters) ....................................1!
Taking Aim at the “Military Shooter” ............................................................5!
Studying Militainment’s Ludic Imaginary......................................................9!
Introducing Ludic War..................................................................................15!
Studying Ludic War Pleasures......................................................................21!
Convergences as Practices & Practices as Play ............................................27!
The Trouble with Pleasure ............................................................................31!
Reclaiming Interactivity................................................................................34!
Invaders!, Ludic Displeasure, & Politicizing the Magic Circle....................40!
Political Despair and Mediated Renewal ......................................................46!
Structure of Feeling Redux ...........................................................................55!
About This Book...........................................................................................58!
SECTION I: TEXTUALITY OF LUDIC WAR.............................................................63 
Chapter One: Nintendo War 2.0: Towards a New Modality of Ludic War Play ..64 
Introduction...................................................................................................65!
Postmodern War and its Discontents ............................................................72!
Media Modality and Playing with Reality ....................................................82!
Media Modality and Textual Transport ........................................................91!




Towards a New Modality of Ludic War Play .............................................112!
 xi 
Chapter Two: The First-Personal Shooter: Narrative Subjectivity & Sacrificial 
Citizenship in the Modern Warfare Series..................................................118!
Introduction.................................................................................................118!
The Narrative Subjectivity of Counterinsurgency ......................................120!
Sacrificial Citizenship in the Modern Warfare Series ................................126!
Closing the Perspectival Distance in “No Russian” and “Second Sun” .....133!
Closing Historical Distances in “All Ghillied Up” & “One Shot, One Kill”139!
Playing with the Modality of History in “End Credits” & “Museum” .......144!
Conclusion: Narrating Counterinsurgency, Becoming Counterinsurgency151!
Chapter Three: Fighting the Good, Preemptive Fight: American Exceptionalism in 
Tom Clancy’s Military Shooters.................................................................156!
Introduction.................................................................................................157!
Tom Clancy’s Branded Warfare .................................................................160!
The Gameplay Modality of the “Good Fight” ............................................166!
How We Fight: Visualizing Technological Exceptionalism in Ghost Recon: 
Advanced Warfighter .........................................................................169!
Why We Fight: Navigating Political Exceptionalism in Rainbow Six: Vegas179!
Society Must Be Defended – Preemptively: Clancy Games as Games of 
Exception ...........................................................................................189!
SECTION II: SELLING LUDIC WAR .....................................................................192!
Chapter Four: Marketing Military Realism: Framing Modality in Call of Duty 4 ...193!
Introduction.................................................................................................193!
“Standoff” and Simulation Fever................................................................194!
Realism vs. “Realisticness” ........................................................................199!
The Political Economic Utility of Video Game Paratexts ..........................202!
“…[Call of Duty 4 is] gonna make a weak gamer soil himself…” ............208!
“…moments [in Call of Duty 4] are almost too real and painful to bear…”213!
“Very fun game, American Scum.” ............................................................219!
Conclusion ..................................................................................................224!
 xii 
SECTION III: PLAYING LUDIC WAR ...................................................................227!
Chapter Five: “F*ck You, Noob Tube!”: Learning the Art of Ludic LAN War .228!
Introduction.................................................................................................228!
Studying Video Game Communities ..........................................................230!
The Lay of the LANopolis ..........................................................................233!
Lessons from the Virtual Trenches .............................................................237!
Ludic Collaboration ...........................................................................238!
Techno-Ludic Literacy.......................................................................240!
Discourse of Domination ...................................................................245!
“Friendly Fire” ............................................................................................251!
Chapter Six: The Promotion of Self in Everyday Strife: Gaming Capital of the Ludic 
Soldier .........................................................................................................253!
Introduction.................................................................................................253!
What’s So “Hard” about the Hardcore Game/r?.........................................255!
“Getting Hard”: Fighting for Gaming Capital ............................................261!
The Pleasurable “Lessons” of Ludic War (Textual Modality) ..........264!
The Pleasurable Omissions & Conflations of Ludic War (Contextual 
Modality)...................................................................................268!
From “Griefing” to Support: Play Styles of the Ludic Soldier ..........274!
Conclusion: “Consolidate the Community”................................................279!
CONCLUSION: THE LUDIFICATION OF WAR CULTURE......................................283!
An Army of Pwn .........................................................................................283!
The Ludification of War Culture ................................................................289!
Appendix A ..........................................................................................................300!





List of Figures 
Figure 0.1: The WTC is under alien attack in Stanley’s art piece, Invaders!..........2!
Figure 0.2: Interacting circuits of ludic war culture ..............................................21!
Figure 0.3: Kline et al.’s “Circuitry of Interactivity” (2003) .................................23!
Figure 0.4: du Gay et al.’s similar “Circuit of Culture” (1997) .............................24!
Figure 0.5: Nitsche’s Five Analytical Planes of Gaming Space (2008, p.15) .......25!
Figure 0.6: The Techno-Cultural Circuitry of Ludic War .....................................26!
Figure 0.7: A gamer defends the Twin Towers in Invaders! .................................43!
Figure 0.8: A horrifying promotional poster for Modern Warfare 3 depicts a 
decimated New York City on the iconic Time magazine .................54!
Figure 1.1: Global Box Office Receipts for Hollywood’s Top-grossing Combat Films, 
2001-2009 (in millions of US $) (Source: Box Office Mojo, 2010) 66!
Figure 1.2: The top-selling military-themed shooters, 2002-2010 (in millions of units 
sold for the Xbox/Xbox 360, and Playstation2/Playstaion3)............68!
Figures 1.3 and 1.4: The player fires the BFG 9000 in Doom (L), and rests with a 
Thompson machine gun in Medal of Honor: Allied Assault ............87!
 Figure 1.5: Mapping Militainment’s Modality Vectors........................................89!
Figures 1.6 and 1.7: A military video of a “smart” bomb striking its target (L);a 
player aims at an opposing tank in Battlezone (R) ...........................93!
Figures 1.8 and 1.9: Bombs rain over Baghdad during the first Persian Gulf War (L); 
a player shoots incoming rockets in Missile Command (R) .............94!
Figures 1.10 and 1.11: War media utilize the same visual lexicon. Soldiers and 
gamers breach doorways in the real world (L) and in Medal of Honor 
(R) .....................................................................................................95!
 xiv 
Figures 1.12 and 1.13: Missile Command (L), and Call of Duty 4 (R)..................99!
Figures 1.14 and 1.15: The player-character’s views of death during their televised 
execution (L), and from nuclear fallout (R) in Call of Duty 4 ........109!
Figure 1.16: Differing design technics and degrees of personalized gameplay 
modalities in Call of Duty 4 and Missile Command .......................115!
Figure 2.1: The player participates in an airport massacre in Modern Warfare 2 135!
Figure 2.2: The terrorist leader Makarov kills the player at the conclusion of Modern 
Warfare 2’s “No Russian” level .....................................................137!
Figure 2.3: An exploding rocket demolishes a space station and knocks the player’s 
character into space in Modern Warfare 2’s “Second Sun” level ..138!
Figures 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7: Call of Duty 4’s rendering of Prypiat (L) and photos of 
the abandoned city (R) ....................................................................143!
Figures 2.8 and 2.9: Heroes and villains are memorialized on stage in Modern 
Warfare 2’s “End Credits”..............................................................146!
Figure 2.10:  The gamer battles soldiers of history in Modern Warfare 2’s bonus 
“Museum” level ..............................................................................150!
Figure 3.1: A third-person view of a firefight in Advanced Warfighter 2 ..........167!
Figure 3.2: A first-person view of the hectic action in Vegas 2 .........................167!
Figure 3.3: A 2005 rendering of the U.S. Army’s modernized & networked force 172!
Figure 3.4: The U.S. Army’s Future Combat System (as of 2006) .....................173!
Figures 3.5: Loading screen from Advanced Warfighter I ..................................173!
Figure 3.6: Information is mapped over elements in Advanced Warfighter II ....175!
Figure 3.7: An overhead schematic for Vegas 2’s arena-like Convention Center 184!
Figure 3.8: The player’s team fails to rescue the stadium of civilians in Vegas 2 185!
Figure 3.9: Avatars fight in an exhibition hall hosting a MLG event..................187!
 xv 
Figure 3.10: The stage at a 2007 MLG competition in Charlotte, North Carolina188!
Figure 3.11: Iconic photograph of Pres. Obama and his staff in the Situation Room 
monitoring SEAL Team Six’s raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound191!
Figure 4.1: Travelers size one another up in Microsoft’s “Standoff” ad .............196!
Figure 4.3: Soldiers complain about poor phone reception in The Onion’s fictional 
Modern Warfare 3...........................................................................216!
Figure 4.4: Castro playing Call of Duty 4............................................................223!
Figure 4.5: “Anti-Tea-bag” Perk from Ahmadinejad’s World Leaders Video....224!
Figure 6.1: The “hardcore” gamer in South Park’s “Make Love, Not Warcraft” 256!
Figure 6.2: A revealing print ad of the connection between technology and war play 
appearing in the March 2009 issue of Wired magazine ..................272!
Figures 7.1 and 7.2: A crowd watches as gamers compete in a 2011 MLG event ..284!
Figures 7.3 and 7.4: Professional gamers play in teams (L), while announcers narrate 
play-by-play commentary for online spectators (R) .......................285!
Figures 7.5 and 7.6: Attendees line up to try their hand at virtual war at the traveling 
“Virtual Army Experience” ............................................................292!
Figures 7.7 and 7.8: National Infantry Museum visitors take their best shot on the 




WELCOME TO LUDIC WAR 
 
SPACE INVADERS AND 9/11 (OR, WHY GAMEPLAY MATTERS)  
Standing side by side, the World Trade Center towers were again under aerial 
attack.  But this time, the world-famous buildings were not in lower Manhattan.  And it 
was not the morning hours of September 11, 2001. Most notably, the assailants this time 
were not international terrorists armed with hijacked passenger planes but were instead 
two-dimensional rows of pixilated space invaders armed with overwhelming numbers 
and firepower. At the 2008 Leipzig Games Convention in Germany, artist Douglas Edric 
Stanley’s interactive installation Invaders! beckoned players to defend the WTC against 
the iconic “space invaders” co-opted from the 1978 eponymously titled arcade classic.1 
Following three days of virulent public criticism, Stanley permitted convention officials 
to terminate the installation (although the artist maintains the organizers did not pressure 
him into doing so), bringing an end to the aliens’ relentless digital offensive on the twin 
monuments of western civilization and global capitalism. 
                                                
1 Invaders! had actually debuted the year before at the Laboral Art Center in Gijón, 
Spain, and is only the most recent iteration of a project that Stanley has been working on 
since the 9/11 attacks.  It (and he) hadn't come under severe criticism or garnered the 
attention of the popular press until its short-lived exhibition in Leipzig. 
 2 
 
Figure 0.1: The WTC is under alien attack in Stanley’s art piece, Invaders!2 
 
This book critically examines military-themed “shooter” video games produced 
during the first decade of the twentieth-first century with the goal of understanding the 
technological, cultural, and social factors that contribute to these games’ pleasurable 
gameplay experiences.  The systematic inquiry into the production of media pleasure 
carries with it vexing questions about how such affect is engineered and how it is situated 
within broader cultural fields.  One reason why the Invaders! art piece – which will be 
examined in greater detail later this chapter – is emotionally jarring is because it only 
seemingly provides the opportunity of saving the Twin Towers.  Stanley’s “game,” if it 
can be rightly called such, cannot be won; there is no way to save the landmarks from the 
descending alien horde.  In lieu of offering escapist fun, the exhibition critiques the 
                                                
2 From: http://cache.kotaku.com/assets/images/kotaku/2008/08/originalspace_01.jpg 
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mediated pleasures that commercial military-themed video games trade in. This book 
assumes a less polemical but no less a critical tack when it interrogates: these games’ 
depiction of the U.S.’s war policies and national imaginary; the marketing strategies used 
to sell these controversial titles during a time of international conflict; and how avid 
gamers play with and against one another on these virtual battlefields. The topics of video 
game design, marketing, and reception are examined together because these practices 
give video gameplay – or the mediated experience of playing through an electronic game 
– its distinctive experiential character and cultural import.3  This book treats gameplay 
seriously because the driving research presumption – which is evident in Stanley’s 
provocative artwork, just as it is in the everyday play practices of millions of gamers – is 
simple: gameplay matters.   
Video gameplay matters because these mediated experiences give us the freedom 
and license to experiment with future possibilities and potential states of being in near-
real scenarios and in wholly fictional settings and abstracted spaces.  One can imagine the 
amateur pilot honing her flying skills during a lunch break on Microsoft Flight Simulator 
X (2006); the elementary student in an afterschool computer program risking his frontier 
party’s health as he pushes west without enough supplies in The Oregon Trail (1985); 
                                                
3 I have elected to use the compound word “gameplay” instead of the separated “game 
play” partly because that is how it commonly appears in industry and journalistic 
publications.  I also prefer the former construction because it suggests that the mediated 
experience is the fusion of the gaming device and the gamer playing it.  As digital culture 
scholar Sherry Turkle (1984) observes, games cannot wield their experiential “holding 
power” if one does not actually play the game.  Moreover, there “is no game without a 
player” (Ermi and Mäyrä, 2005, p. 1), and thus no game without play.  
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and the football fan replaying a critical scoring drive in a classic playoff matchup in 
Madden 10 (2009).  
But gamers exercise choice and agency as fantastic characters in imaginary 
realms as well.  Every day, motley bands of explorers attempt different raiding strategies 
in the massively, multiplayer online game, World of Warcraft (2004).  At the local strip 
mall, the classic game enthusiast feeds quarter after quarter into the Ms. Pac-Man (1981) 
arcade cabinet, struggling to beat her previous high score and the game’s four multi-
colored ghosts – Inky, Blinky, Pinky, and Sue. And playing from living rooms time zones 
apart, eight friends furiously lay waste to one another in the sci-fi, first-person shooter, 
Halo 3 (2007).  Irrespective of its fictional or factual content, video games and gameplay 
matter because they grant players opportunities to make meaningful choices alone and 
together in virtual worlds that operate according to unique rule sets.   
Yet gameplay experiences are not determined exclusively by in-game prompts 
and cues.  Gameplay is likewise colored by all those practices that precede and surround 
these human-game interactions.  For instance, the professional development activities that 
crafted the gaming artifact (i.e., its production history), those discursive and rhetorical 
practices that determine its place in the public consciousness (e.g., advertising 
campaigns), as well as the social norms dictating how games ought to be taken up by 
players (e.g., issues of fandom and media reception) all “play” a part in determining how 
a game should be played and, as importantly, why it might be enjoyed. When thinking 
about what makes a game pleasurable – with all of the subjective messiness that that 
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entails – it is necessary to unpack the gaming artifact while situating it within its broader 
industrial, cultural, and play contexts.   
If gameplay matters for electronic games, then it certainly matters in the case of 
military-themed video games.  War games engage issues ranging from militarism, to 
terrorism and torture, to the efficacy of preemptive military interventions. Moreover, 
there is no sub-grouping or genre of games that more vividly and viscerally explores the 
political and cultural values central to the U.S.’s national imaginary in the new century 
than the “military shooter” games produced after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.   
Finally, video gameplay matters because the matters of gameplay are not 
restricted to individual play sessions. Virtual game worlds and the physical world exist in 
a co-evolving dialectic. If we are to understand what makes playing war fun – i.e., how 
ludic war culture operates generally – then we must understand how such pleasures are 
created by forces inside and outside of these war-torn gamespaces. By examining the 
complementary practices that make these games commercial successes, we can discern 
what gives these games such widespread cultural popularity and why they resonate so 
powerfully with players during the early years of the twenty-first century. 
TAKING AIM AT THE “MILITARY SHOOTER” 
This book makes the argument throughout that game culture is the emergent and 
fluctuating result of overlapping processes of production, marketing, and play.  A 
player’s gameplay experiences are shaped by the titles they play (i.e., specific gaming 
text), and when, where, and how they play them (i.e., their historical location and the 
terms of their social engagement).  Given these textual variables and situational 
 6 
contingencies, gameplay experiences are not qualitatively equivalent events. This fact 
also holds for war games.  The focus of this project is on commercially successful 
military “shooter” games played from first- and third-person perspectives that immerse 
gamers in virtual firefights.  “Shooter” is a term of convenience, adopted from game 
industry discourse.  It is not without its shortcomings, however. 
 The admittedly loose “military-themed” and “military shooter” descriptors, 
which have been invoked thus far and which will continue to be used, illustrate the 
definitional challenges of categorizing a diverse set of media texts that change over time.  
Military-themed, for instance, is used to distinguish between games that represent real or 
near-real conflicts (past, present, or future) from wholly fantastic genres like science 
fiction or survival horror.  In the former, the player must eliminate human threats on 
behalf of one’s country.  In the latter, the gamer must eliminate monstrous, or alien 
threats in a patently fictional world, even if that world is an overtly militarized one: 
consider the space marines in the sci-fi shooters Doom (1993), Halo (2001), and Gears of 
War (2006), or the special operations team that combats super-natural threats in the 
survival horror game, F.E.A.R. (2006).  These are not mere cosmetic distinctions.  Rather, 
these differences represent meaningful issues of media modality that determine how 
games are understood as relating to the real world or not (a point that is taken up in 
Chapter One, and which informs the project’s handling of gameplay pleasure). 
The military-themed and shooter labels do not, however, denote additional 
aesthetic differences.  Neither label is a rigid generic category.  Even the games that are 
scrutinized in the following chapters illustrate the taxonomical difficulties posed by the 
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multiplicity of gaming technologies and gameplay mechanics of military titles crafted in 
a contemporary, realist aesthetic. For instance, the Tom Clancy-brand titles (some of 
which are examined in Chapter Three) encompass a diversity of game styles including 
stealth action (Splinter Cell: Conviction [2009]), squad-based shooters (Rainbow Six: 
Vegas [2006]), real-time strategy (Endwar [2008]), and aerial combat (H.A.W.X. 
[2009]). Furthermore, military shooters are often produced for a variety of hardware with 
diverging technological demands. One can play Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare 
(examined in Chapter Two) on the Xbox 360 and Playstation 3 consoles, on a PC or Mac, 
and on mobile devices such as the Nintendo DS and mobile phones.  Not surprisingly, the 
Call of Duty experience varies considerably across these platforms.  And “realistic” 
military-themed games often represent conflicts across time, from ancient battles (Rome: 
Total War [2004]), to current conflicts (Kuma\War [2004]), and near-future warfare (Tom 
Clancy’s Ghost Recon: Advanced Warfighter [2006]).  
Finally, military-themed shooters are not necessarily “military brand” games.4  
The government takes a central and public role in the production of its military brand 
games since these titles carry their imprimatur and are often used for recruitment or 
training purposes (e.g., America’s Army [2002], Full Spectrum Warrior [2004]).  Posed 
differently: all military brand games are military-themed games, but not all military-
themed games are military brand games.  And while the U.S. military benefits 
considerably from having complementary depictions of its fighting men and women on 
computer and television screens, the American government sanctions few military-
                                                
4 See Payne (2009b) for an examination of Defense Department-produced games. 
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themed games, a fact that holds true for most world governments.  Far more often game 
studios hire military subject matter experts to advise them on tactics, protocols, and 
battlefield behaviors so their games possess sufficient detail to engender an authentic 
military experience without having to submit their design choices to the scrutiny of the 
Defense Department’s exacting review process (see, Chapter Four).    
A variety of combat games, powered by technologies young and old, located in 
disparate play sites, concerning real and fictional conflicts across human history can 
generate any number of pleasurable virtual war experiences – something I am calling the 
ludic war experience.  Ludic war’s experiential variability is a conceptual strength and a 
weakness. The sheer diversity of games that deal with realistic or near-realistic war 
scenarios and the number of gaming platforms that have facilitated virtual, commercially-
available combat since the 1970s underscore a guiding premise of this book: namely, if 
we want to understand what video games and their gameplay pleasures mean at any one 
moment, we must read them critically as texts, understand their marketing ephemera, and 
make sense of their play sites.  One can easily imagine how feeding quarters into an 
arcade version of the Cold War-inspired city defense game Missile Command (1980) is a 
different experience from play-training with soldiers on the modified Marine Doom on 
networked computers in Quantico, Virginia during the mid-1990s.  And these strategic 
firefights are not the same battles taking place on home consoles as friends lay waste to 
one another via high-speed Internet connections in Modern Warfare 2 (2009).   
The question of what constitutes a military-themed “shooter” game is a 
consequential one because, as a practical research matter, it determines the titles that will 
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be examined from those that will not.  Such definitional wrangling likewise reminds us 
that military gaming events and experiences enjoy their own historically distinct 
resonances.  The pleasures of playing post-9/11 military shooters are commensurate with 
and differ in consequential ways from previous war games’ pleasures (see, Chapter One).  
Having a clearer idea of the kinds of games that will be examined, this book moves 
toward posing tougher questions about the cultural import of everyday gaming practices, 
questions like, how are ludic pleasures produced; what do these pleasures say about the 
political anxieties of a nation at war; and how and why do gamers wage virtual war?    
STUDYING MILITAINMENT’S LUDIC IMAGINARY 
Media entertainment concerning the U.S. military’s conflicts and interventions – 
both fictional and historical – must be viewed in light of how such texts shape the popular 
imaginary about the world’s mightiest military force, and the nation and citizenry it 
protects.  Nationalism scholar Benedict Anderson (1991) reminds us that the stories we 
tell one another about our nations and their intertwined histories shape how we view our 
place in the world and the constituency of our national and shared “imagined 
communities.”  According to Anderson, a nation is necessarily imagined “because the 
members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet 
them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” 
(1991, p. 6).  Cultural historians and theorists like Anderson pay particular attention to 
the power of narrating a national history, and the manifold ways that social technologies 
and media calcify ideas of the nation (1991, Chapter 10).  
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A nation’s collective identity and its mythological destiny find powerful 
expression across numerous media, old and new.  Commenting on the ontological power 
of the moving image’s single-frame ancestor, Anderson remarks:  
The photograph, fine child of the age of mechanical reproduction, is only the most 
peremptory of a huge modern accumulation of documentary evidence (birth 
certificates, diaries, report cards, letters, medical records, and the like) which 
simultaneously records a certain apparent continuity and emphasizes its loss from 
memory.  Out of this estrangement comes a conception of personhood, identity 
(yes, you and that naked baby are identical) which, because it can not be 
“remembered” must be narrated. (emphasis in original, 1991, p. 204) 
 
Photographs, films, radio programs, documentary series, web sites, and – yes – video 
games are the disparate forensic evidence and cultural building blocks for our collective 
national memory. And these shared stories about the nation, be they true or not, unify 
groups of people across vast distances and eras (Smith, 2001, p. 60).  The culture 
industries’ twentieth and twenty-first century entertainments are especially powerful 
vessels for communicating a national identity because they tell us what is worth 
commemorating, and they give us opportunities for empathizing with others’ sacrifices 
on behalf of the state (a point I take up in Chapter Two).  Cultural historian George 
Lipsitz (1990) observes: 
Time, history, and memory become qualitatively different concepts in a world 
where electronic mass communication is possible. Instead of relating to the past 
through a shared sense of place or ancestry, consumers of electronic mass media 
can experience a common heritage with people they have never seen; they can 
acquire memories of a past to which they have no geographic or biological 
connection. (p. 5)  
 
As manifestly constructed as entertainment commodities about military endeavors are – 
be they depicted on cinema’s flickering celluloid, TV’s interlaced fields, comic books’ 
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paper panels, or in video games’ electronic code – they explain how men and women 
should understand war and conflict, and why they should ever sacrifice themselves for 
fellow citizens who they can only hope to imagine.  They are, in effect, a form of secular 
mythology of the state that shape the public consciousness about matters which few 
Americans experience directly.  Critical political economist Vincent Mosco (2004) 
reminds us of the credibility and persuasive powers that popular myths wield, stating:  
…myths are not just a distortion of the reality that requires debunking; they are a 
form of reality. They give meaning to life, particularly by helping us to 
understand the seemingly incomprehensible, to cope with the problems that are 
overwhelmingly intractable, and to create in vision or dream what cannot be 
realized in practice. (pp. 13-14) 
 
But while military entertainments, or “militainments,” may perpetuate nationalistic 
fantasies, they differ with how they convey and deliver their myths.  
As the nexus of state power and commercial entertainment, militainment provides 
critics with valuable insights into contemporary attitudes about war, how popular culture 
envisions what martial power looks and feels like, and the processes by which defense 
firms and entertainment interests create their collaborative works.  Roger Stahl (2010) 
defines this neologism as, “…state violence translated into an object of pleasurable 
consumption. Beyond this, the word also suggests that this state violence is not of the 
abstract, distant, or historical variety but rather an impending or current use of force, one 
directly relevant to the citizen’s current political life” (p. 6).  The various instantiations of 
militainment (e.g., sports, reality TV, video games, and toys), according to Stahl, 
transform the citizen-soldier into the citizen-spectator – from a citizenry that gains its 
political legitimacy from national service and sacrifice, to one that gains legitimacy 
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through the consumption of war spectacle.  But this is not the whole picture either; or, at 
the very least, it is less the case during the early twenty-first century.   
Stahl argues that we are transitioning from an epoch of war spectatorship to one 
of interactive war where the citizen-spectator is giving way to the “virtual citizen-soldier” 
who actively engages in the co-production of interactive conflict.  He observes:  
[Spectacle and interactive war] feature distinct pleasures. The spectacle offers 
those of distraction, bedazzlement, and voyeurism, pleasures driven by a kind of 
alienated looking.  In contrast, the pleasures of the interactive war are predicated 
on participatory play, not simply watching the machine in motion but wiring 
oneself into a fantasy of a first-person, authorial kinetics of war. (2010, p. 42) 
 
And herein lies the greatest insight of Stahl’s critique for this project: rather than 
deactivating and depoliticizing the citizen through distraction (i.e., conceiving of 
militainment as media spectacle that distances the citizen from the state), interactive war 
engages the citizen-consumer by creating play opportunities that absorbs the “citizen 
identity into the military-entertainment matrix” (2010, p. 16).  This is not the top-down 
power of war spectacle which is thought to overwhelm viewers, but is instead a series of 
personalized interpellations that hail citizens to action, imbricating these war players in 
the varied processes of militainment. Stahl makes his case by examining militainment’s 
breadth of expression across a diverse set of contemporary media formats and artifacts, 
including news programming, sporting events, video games, and toys.  
In a similar philosophical and methodological vein, Nick Dyer-Witheford and 
Greig de Peuter (2009) posit that vdieo games are a crystallization of Empire 
(specifically, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s formulation [2000]), and that this 
paradigmatic media form offers the most powerful articulation of the reigning techno-
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capitalist logic even as it carries with it opportunities for escape and the reimagining our 
social arrangements.  The authors note: 
Just as the eighteenth-century novel was a textual apparatus generating the 
bourgeois personality required by mercantile colonialism (but also capable of 
criticizing it), and just as twentieth-century cinema and television were integral to 
industrial consumerism (yet screened some of its darkest depictions), so virtual 
games are media constitutive of twenty-first-century global hypercapitalism and, 
perhaps, also of lines of exodus from it. (2009, p. xxix) 
 
Like Stahl, Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter see video war games as occupying one critical 
node of Empire’s cultural and economic logic.  And as paradigmatic as they are, war 
games are but one singular piece in these scholars’ larger arguments.  This project does 
not contest these emphases but uses their analyses as a jumping off point. I wish to 
extend these superlative analyses by examining in greater detail how game design 
choices, advertising campaigns, and gameplay communities all contribute to the creation 
of a ludic war culture that brings the hegemonically pleasurable “virtual citizen-soldier” 
subject position into being (a subject position I call the “ludic soldier”), and why – more 
than any other piece of war media – the military shooter can claim its rightful place as the 
apotheosis of post-9/11 militainment. 
Although this project focuses on the military shooter, ludic war culture is not 
necessarily coterminous with any specific genre or subgenre of combat games (e.g., first-
person shooter, flight simulator, real-time or turn-based strategy), or gaming platform 
(e.g., console, PC, or mobile) for all the slippery reasons listed earlier.  Rather, this 
project views commercial gaming culture as an interconnected techno-cultural field of 
social practices structured around video gameplay interactions in and out of mediated 
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gamespaces. The social meanings and pleasures of video games are never dictated solely 
by users’ interactions with these “algorithmic cultural objects” – to borrow Alexander 
Galloway’s (2006, p. 6) nifty phrase – but are likewise shaped by elements and forces 
extrinsic to games’ programming code and mechanics.   
Like the gameplay pleasures, the competencies developed during the gamers’ 
intense play sessions are not limited to those digital worlds.  As I explore in this book’s 
later chapters, the processes of gameplay generate techno-cultural capital that gamers 
then use to mark themselves as experts within their communities of play.  Instead of 
standing apart from society in isolation, the oft-lauded experiential remove – i.e., the the 
magic circle – of video gaming is, in fact, inextricably connected to extant social forces 
(political, economic, cultural, etc.) and gamers’ understanding of their non-gaming 
pursuits.  Ludic war culture is thus but one techno-cultural formation of commercial and 
leisure practices embedded within a larger system of late capitalism and commercial war 
play (i.e., see Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter [2009], and Stahl [2010], respectively), but 
one that possesses medium-specific pleasures and practices that marks it as a unique 
leisure activity. 
This project’s initial research question is a fairly mechanistic one: how do 
commercially successful military shooters produced in the West after the 9/11 attacks 
engender pleasure for gamers? To answer this question I examine the interlocking 
practices that come to bear on, and constitute the social fabric of, what this book is 
calling ludic war culture.  The more challenging questions that follow – and which I 
arrive at in the Conclusion – are: what does this ludic war play mean for our 
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understanding of U.S. and its citizenry in the early twenty-first century, and how does 
this war play reconfigure our shared ludic imaginary?  We know that the simulated wars 
are nothing like actual battles, and that the ludic mythology propagated in these 
interactive wars is categorically not reality.  But this obvious and tired observation misses 
a bigger point – a point that the systematic inquiry into media pleasure hopes to answer.  
As Mosco (2004) notes, myth is “a political term that inflects human value with 
ideology” and “the accuracy of a myth is not its major test. Rather, myths sustain 
themselves when they are embraced by power” (p. 39).  Let us begin working towards 
answering these questions of pleasure and social power by first defining the project’s 
titular concept. 
INTRODUCING LUDIC WAR 
Invaders!’s decidedly mixed reception usefully illustrates a convergence of topics 
of perennial interest to media studies: representation, technology, remediation, play, 
pleasure, interactivity, and power.  Indeed, shooters are rich objects of study for those 
interested in understanding this nexus of media technologies, militarism, politics, and 
economic power because these cultural artifacts fuse the conventions of moving image 
war entertainment with computational algorithms to produce interactive combat play 
experiences, i.e. ludic war.   
This book defines ludic war as the pleasurable experience of playing war or 
military-themed video games alone or with others.  Ludic war (or ludic warring) is a 
better term for my purposes than the typical wargame (or its verb, wargaming) for several 
reasons.  First, the word “ludic” (derived from the Latin “ludus” meaning game or play) 
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emphasizes the foundational play activity of the player-game relationship, as well as the 
liminal and bifurcated quality of the mediated gameplay experience (i.e., a gamer’s 
actions and experiences unfold concurrently in both off- and on-screen worlds; play is 
and is not what it purports to be).  Or, as narratologist Marie-Laure Ryan (2001) 
observes,  “…while one body slays dragons, flirts with a used-car salesman who poses as 
a hooker, or explores an enchanted forest, the other one types on a keyboard or squeezes 
a joystick” (p. 307).5  
The term ludic also carries connotations of fun, which alludes to the pleasurable 
dimensions of video gameplay, and connects the experience with – as Sherry Turkle 
(1984) notes – our increasingly broader culture of simulation. This is why, despite its 
combat-oriented content, the purposeful production of displeasure in Invaders! and 
similar “countergames”6 disqualifies them from contributing to a true ludic war 
experience (although they certainly contribute to a critique of that experience). 
Finally, I am opting to use ludus, or the rule-based notion of play, and not 
“paidia,” the unbounded and frolicsome idea of play, because the experience of playing 
digital war games is at all times mediated by some rule structure (even if said rules are 
                                                
5 Ryan defines a “successful game” broadly as, “a global design that warrants an active 
and pleasurable participation of the player in the game-world – the term world being 
taken here not as the sum of imagined objects but in a non-figurative sense, as the 
delimited space and time in which the game takes place” (2001, p. 181). 
6 See, Alexander Galloway (2006, Chapter 5) for an examination of countergames and 
countergaming, which can engender intellectual responses by drawing players’ attention 
to media form and showcasing computational artifice. Galloway analogizes the formal 
difference between games and countergame, in part, to the split between classical 
Hollywood filmmaking with its continuity editing that hides artifice, and experimental 
films that destroy cinematic illusions by drawing attention to the filmmaking apparatus. 
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fairly open-ended).7  Rules delimit the game’s actionable field (i.e., rules solicit and 
prohibit actions), and shape the “possibility space,” engendering subsequent pleasures 
and/or frustrations.8  Ludic war play is, thus, the player’s exploration of a title’s affecting 
rules of combat, its possibility spaces, and its nationalistic narratives.  
Ludic war owes its conceptual genesis to two markedly different works.  The first 
is game scholar Jesper Juul’s (2005) thesis that video games enjoy a “half-real” status 
because they engender an experiential liminality that combines real game rules with a 
fictional game universe.  Truly engrossing games, according to Juul, are those where the 
fictional diegesis effaces the game’s operational rules.  Fictional, in this case, does not 
mean that games only represent unreal or fantastic topics or genres (e.g., fantasy, science-
fiction), but that the game experience is itself a manufactured fiction (not unlike Mosco’s 
definition of mythology).  In fact, many players find video games to be compelling and 
pleasurable, including the combat-oriented titles examined herein, precisely because they 
replicate historical facts, use photo-realistic imagery, and model physical processes.    
Ludic war’s other inspirational building block is Robin Luckham’s (1984) notion 
of “armament culture.”  According to Luckham, this cultural complex is based “on the 
fetishism of the advanced weapons system” and it “arises out of interlinked developments 
in advanced capitalism, the state and the modern war system” (p. 1).  Weapon systems, 
which Luckham defines broadly, are not merely represented in or by popular culture, but 
                                                
7 French philosopher and influential play theorist Roger Caillois (2001) makes the 
important distinction in his work between “ludus” and “paidia,” which he positions at 
opposite poles of the play spectrum. 
8 Ian Bogost (2007, p. 43) describes a game’s “possibility space” as that which we 
explore when interacting with a game’s controls and its rules. 
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are imbricated in all manner of cultural production – as product and as producer.  
Armament culture is rightly thought of as an ideological apparatus that not only 
interpellates consumers as sympathetic comrades-in-arms, but transforms civilians into 
“passive targets” that “stress their isolation and powerlessness” (p. 4).   
If the idea of armament culture rings familiar, it is because Luckham’s concept 
predates the more fashionable “military-entertainment complex” critique that gained 
traction in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  This latter economic and cultural matrix 
(which enjoys no shortage of hyphenated titles) describes the web of associations – 
technological, aesthetic, ideological, human resources, etc. – connecting defense interests 
with entertainment firms.  For a brief synopsis of these cognate conceptualizations, see 
Appendix A; and for a brief production history on early video games’ place in this 
production web, see the Introduction to my co-edited collection Joystick Soldiers: The 
Politics of Play in Military Video Games (2009).  
I want to return briefly to a shortcoming in Luckham’s argument, but not one that 
is limited to his critique.  The author oversells armament culture’s power in assuming an 
unproblematic (and, indeed, unsubstantiated) automatic ideology transfer from military 
text to media user: “Armament culture lulls [consumers] into accepting their status as 
passive targets of weapons.  And their subordination is reinforced by ideologies that 
stress their isolation and powerlessness” (p. 4). I am reticent to accept this claim since 
scholars have largely jettisoned this version of false consciousness – the idea of the 
wholly passive media consumer – and any related “hypodermic needle” model of media 
reception. Luckham’s deterministic framing also presumes an ideological uniformity on 
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the textual front as well.  Video games, even popular military shooters, rarely suggest 
singular readings.  Indeed, countergames (to be discussed shortly) are perhaps the clearest 
evidence of designers’ and players’ skepticism of the commercial imperatives and 
ideological presumptions of armament culture.  It is far more likely that because video 
gameplay is a recreational experience engaged primarily in leisure contexts, that it 
operates hegemonically and not strictly ideologically (Gramsci, 1971).   
Luckham’s otherwise adept analysis errs in granting too much power to 
militainment to penetrate and colonize users’ minds, and not nearly enough to 
consumers’ disparate use practices.  It is my hope that by moving away from the 
militainment-as-spectacle model and by focusing instead on militainment-as-play 
(involving the disparate practices of players, designers, and marketers), we can arrive at a 
more nuanced view of how interactive war creates, in the words of technology and 
communication scholars Les Levidow and Kevin Robins (1989), its own “attractions as 
well as their horrors” (p. 176).  Despite its problematic determinism, Luckham’s 
“armament culture” remains a generative concept because it enables us to consider how 
cultural goods and leisure pursuits can conform to a military logic even when there are no 
strong ties linking entertainment products with government or defense firms, or when 
such entertainment activities do not unfold within militarized spaces. 
Ludic war combines rule-dependent video gameplay with armament culture’s 
politically charged symbolic regime.  The analytical utility of ludic war is that it 
acknowledges the active production of a shared and emergent fiction by gamers, while 
simultaneously recognizing that extant institutions, such as the cultural industries and 
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defense interests, wield considerable force in circulating ideologically-rich messages and 
values in contemporary society.  The ludic war experience is hence a co-creation of 
gamer and game, of user and of media text.  But this is not the whole picture either. 
Ludic wars are played in real-world spaces, and in specific techno-social 
configurations.  In fact, video gameplay – military-themed or otherwise – rarely unfolds 
in identical social settings.  Video gaming’s varied play arenas (e.g., work, home, arcade, 
etc.) also demand appropriate recognition and contextualization in any comprehensive 
cultural critique.  The where (i.e., social setting) and the how (i.e., social relations and 
technologies) must be considered alongside the what (i.e., textual gameplay), as well as 
its connection to any culturally dominant symbolic regimes (i.e., armament culture, in 
this case) which are themselves located within particular modes of cultural production.   
For these reasons it becomes necessary to situate ludic war play in its social 
setting, while also parsing the development discourses and marketing efforts around top-
selling games.  Expanding the analysis beyond the games proper discloses how the video 
game’s experiential “magic circle” is co-produced by gamers and marketing professionals 
plying their trade.  This project examines the manifold pleasures of ludic war by 
attending to the texts, reception, and marketing efforts of military shooters because this 
tripartite juncture of forces creates an affective experience that makes playing virtual war 
fun, and showcases the manifold ways in which ludic warring – borne of the military-
entertainment complex, armament culture, or whatever heading one ultimately backs – 
reconfigures citizens’ relationship to the state and the wielding of its military power.  
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STUDYING LUDIC WAR PLEASURES 
To best examine how military shooters and their attendant social practices 
engender interactive pleasures, this project studies ludic war’s instantiation across three 
media categories – text, paratext, and context – for top-selling franchises produced during 
the first decade of the twenty-first century.  The following chapters analyze game design 
choices (text), marketing efforts (paratext), and how war play unfolds at a computer 
gaming center (context). Viewed in toto, these separate case studies reveal how gaming 
pleasure is broadly produced through a range of complementary and mutually reinforcing 
practices along textual, paratextual, and contextual fronts. One might imagine the ludic 
war experience at the center of a Venn diagram depicting these categories of practice.  
 
 
Figure 0.2: Interacting circuits of ludic war culture 
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It bears noting that these interlocking groupings do not represent wholly discrete aspects 
of media culture; rather, the tripartite concept is a generative heuristic for thinking about 
how diverse practices coalesce to create historically specific gaming pleasures.   
Thinking of military gaming culture in terms of converging social practices draws 
broadly on the media convergence literature (e.g., Gray [2009], Jenkins [2006], Marshall 
[2004], and Ruggill [2009]) and media studies research that re-conceptualizes and 
reframes media interactions as meaning-making activities that extend beyond theater, 
television, and computer screens (see, Bird [2003] Cauldry [2004]; Wilson [2009]).  The 
current project is particularly in debt to the “circuitry of interactivity” concept introduced 
by Stephen Kline, Nick Dyer-Witheford, and Greig de Peuter in their excellent Digital 
Play: The Interaction of Technology, Culture, and Marketing (2003). The scholars’ 
“circuitry of interactivity” schema fuses a critical political economic understanding of 
market forces and institutional history with cultural studies’ insights about audiences’ 
interpretive abilities to present a holistic framework for thinking about how gaming 
culture comes into being.  
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Figure 0.3: Kline et al.’s “Circuitry of Interactivity” (2003) 
 
Their work resembles previous efforts that have attempted to account for economic and 
cultural forces (e.g., du Gay et al. below [Fig. 0.4]), despite the challenges inherent in 
bringing together cultural studies and political economic approaches that may have 
differing epistemological foundations and critical commitments.9 
                                                
9 Of course, raising this point risks reproducing the false dilemma that has long plagued 
media studies.  See Hesmondhalgh (2002) for more on this divisive history and attempts 
to circumvent it. 
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Figure 0.4: du Gay et al.’s similar “Circuit of Culture” (1997)10 
 
Reimagining these holistic schemas for the study of gaming culture is neither intended to 
enter into the long-standing debate between these camps, nor is it about privileging one 
approach over another.  Rather, these efforts are cited as evidence of the desire to 
overcome these divides by explaining how an appreciation of texuality in concert with 
economic, industrial, and cultural forces all bear on users’ mediated pleasures. 
In the realm of game studies, video game scholar Michael Nitsche (2008) 
proposes a comprehensive schema for assessing how gaming’s multiple planes of 
interaction inform how games are experienced as space.   
                                                
10 Image from: http://www.users.muohio.edu/wilmsce/circuit_culture.jpg 
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Figure 0.5: Nitsche’s Five Analytical Planes of Gaming Space (2008, p.15) 
 
Nitsche states of his approach: “None of these layers alone is enough to support a rich 
game world. That is why the argument will concentrate not on a separation between these 
layers but on their interconnections and overlaps to understand how they work in 
combination” (2008, p. 17). Similarly, the current investigation sees the interactive 
pleasures of military gaming as a consequence of engaging with commercialized ludic 
war culture inside and outside of military shooters. The circuitry of ludic war’s 
interactive pleasures can be mapped over Nitsche’s spatial schema as follows (Fig. 0.6).    
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Figure 0.6: The Techno-Cultural Circuitry of Ludic War 
 
In 9/11 Culture, Jeffery Melnick asserts that, “9/11 is a language.  It has its own 
vocabulary, grammar, and tonalities” (2009, p. 6).  The attacks of that day – understood 
broadly as the tragedy’s discursive legacy, its psychic trauma, and innumerable media 
representations – have since concretized as a distinct cultural formation. Following the 
lead of cultural studies, Melnick defines a cultural formation as “a site where important 
social and political institutions, rhetorical practices, and personal behaviors overlap and 
combine to create a threshold level of cultural energy that comes to define its historical 
moment in some significant manner” (2009, p. 6).  If 9/11 is a cultural formation, then the 
post-9/11 military shooter represents a ludic or gamic articulation of that formation.  
These video games not only present researchers with novel artifacts for examining how 
9/11 is commemorated and repackaged for sale; they likewise evidence how war games 
have transmogrified the horrific events of that day into pleasurable opportunities for play. 
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CONVERGENCES AS PRACTICES & PRACTICES AS PLAY 
To unwind and unpack the interactive pleasures of ludic war culture is, in effect, 
to enter into longstanding debates about the contours of media convergence. Journalists, 
bloggers, and media scholars have published a spate of columns, web posts, articles, and 
books throughout the 1990s and 2000s chronicling new media convergence, or how the 
mass digitization of media content and the increased connectivity, interoperability, and 
mobility of information and communication technologies continue to reshape global 
mediascapes.  Although a certain amount of technologically determinist language 
pervades trade press accounts (and to a lesser degree some academic reflections) about 
the generational upgrades in media convergence, the critical scholarship largely 
underscores the need for establishing the historical context for talking about the uses of 
media technologies, dispelling determinist discourses that equate hardware and software 
upgrades with inevitable social change (both the Utopianist and moral panic varieties), 
and expanding the technology-centered definition of media convergence to encompass 
interpersonal and cultural agents.11   
A key proponent of this redefinition is public intellectual and media scholar 
Henry Jenkins.  In his popular Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide 
(2006), Jenkins remarks: “Convergence occurs within the brains of individual consumers 
and through their social interactions with others. Each of us constructs our own personal 
                                                
11 Competent introductory collections of twentieth and early twentieth-first century media 
convergence include: Caldwell and Everett’s New Media: Theories and Practices of 
Digitextuality; Kackman et al.’s Flow TV: Television in an Age of Convergence; Harries’ 
The New Media Book; Spigel and Olsson’s Television After TV: Essays on a Medium in 
Transition; and Staiger and Hake’s Convergence Media History. 
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mythology from bits and fragments of information extracted from the media flow and 
transformed into resources through which we makes sense of our everyday lives” (pp. 3-
4). As global a phenomenon as it is, media convergence remains a personal and quotidian 
event that is difficult to pin down because it represents, at any one time, a dynamic, 
emergent, and momentary nexus of forces and social acts; media convergence “refers to a 
process, not an endpoint” (Jenkins, 2006, p. 16). Ludic war culture likewise represents a 
state of techno-social affairs at a given moment (I return to this point next chapter when I 
compare two popular video war games from different gaming eras). 
Jenkins rightly highlights social interactions as the key, driving force behind 
convergence culture’s emergent processes of being.  Other scholars have made similar 
arguments that critical media analyses need not begin or end with the media text or with 
the culture industries’ structural economies.  Instead, this third group of scholars contend 
that media ought to be theorized as practice.  Nick Couldry’s (2004) practice-based 
research (taking cues from the sociology of knowledge tradition) is one such means of 
avoiding the tendency in media studies to reproduce the either/or cultural studies versus 
political economy dichotomy (again, see Hesmondhalgh, 2002, for a good summation of 
this reductive but pervasive division).  Instead, Couldry “starts not with media texts or 
media institutions, but with practice – not necessarily the practice of audiences, but 
media-oriented practice, in all its looseness and openness. What, quite simply, are people 
doing in relation to media across a whole range of situations and contexts?” (emphasis in 
original, 2004, p. 119).  Or, reframed for the current project, the question becomes: what 
social practices bring ludic war culture into being?  The book’s triangulated case study 
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design answers this question by focusing attention on how the computational actions of 
gaming texts, the marketing efforts of advertising paratexts, and the social environments 
of gaming contexts engender converging user pleasures that represent complementary 
interactions between the varied agents and elements of a post-9/11 military gaming 
culture.  Studying what ludic war means demands studying what it is people do when 
they interact with war games; or, as Couldry notes, “we need the perspective of practice 
to help us address how media are embedded in the interlocking fabric of social and 
cultural life” (2004, p. 129).  
Bridging the study of social practice and gameplay is Antoni Roig et al.’s (2009) 
examination of play’s centrality in the gaming experience.  Like Nick Couldry and Henry 
Jenkins, Antoni Roig et al. argue the need to understand game interactions as media 
practice because such a move “would imply not only attending to video game 
consumption (or the practice of playing games), but also to how the gaming practice is 
related to other media practices and how it is socially organized” (p. 91).  Understanding 
video games as practice has at least three implications for researchers: first, it “allows 
locating video games in the context of other practices related to the cultural industries and 
media consumption”; second, games can be understood as their own media activity that is 
“characterized by hybridizing audiovisual representational practices and game cultures”; 
and third, games should be situated with respect to larger social actions and formations 
for players and non-players alike (Roig et al., 2009, p. 100).  Understanding games as 
media practice highlights the processes by which gamers construct their play 
communities (a point I take up in Chapter Five), and the manner in which their social 
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worlds (with their values, norms, and representations) are reproduced and have impacts 
that extend beyond a single gaming community.   
I need to briefly contest one of Roig et al.’s final points.  The authors contend that 
media practice means scrutinizing what people do with games instead of pursuing textual 
readings of the games proper. They note: “we must analyze public observable activities 
instead of searching for meanings ‘in the text’ or in the video game as an object itself” (p. 
101).  This is an over-correction that results in two problems: first, it unnecessarily limits 
the definitional parameters of media practice; and second, it forecloses the critic’s ability 
to make knowledge claims based on their gameplay experiences.  To the first point, if 
gameplay falls under the definitional umbrella of media practice, why cannot the game 
researcher’s own play activities be the subject of reflection?  There is a rich tradition of 
close textual analyses in media studies, and auto-ethnographic projects in anthropology 
and sociology.  There is no compelling reason why game researchers should be 
prohibited from reporting on their own gaming experiences provided that it is reported as 
such.  And to the second point, the critical analysis of gaming ideology and the 
hegemonic pleasures of gameplay structures, narratives, marketing ephemera, et cetera, 
demands a critic who has been trained to assess those elements.  It is unreasonable to 
expect most gamers to include such criticism in their gameplay reports, or that these 
points will emerge from the study of “public observable activities.”  Media practices 
should not mean setting aside the textual meanings of games. Rather, the point of 
focusing on media practices writ large is to emphasize how similar and disparate 
activities by a host of actors and social forces produce varied states of play.  Because the 
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gaming apparatus’ textual machinery demands inputs to produce outputs, the critical 
analyst must be free to analyze his or her own gameplay as well as the practices of others.   
THE TROUBLE WITH PLEASURE  
One of the guiding rationales for taking a case study approach to understanding 
contemporary gaming culture is due to the uneven way that communication and media 
studies has handled the question of user pleasure over the years.  Scholars have assessed 
audience pleasure from a number of perspectives and traditions with no systematic 
approach dominating the literature.  Media-related pleasure has meant different things to 
different discourses (Fiske, 1987), mirroring in effect how human play has been 
conceptualized and studied by research traditions (Sutton-Smith, 1997).  It is, in all 
likelihood, impossible to reduce pleasure to a singular, all-encompassing theory because, 
as Simon Frith (1982) observes, it is a socially embedded concept that “refers to too 
disparate a set of events, individual and collective, active and passive, defined against 
different situations of displeasure / pain / reality.  Pleasure, in turn, is not just a 
psychological effect but refers to a set of experiences rooted in the social relations of 
production” (emphasis added, qtd. in O’Connor and Klaus, 2000, p. 371).  It is no 
surprise, then, that competing definitions about media pleasure reveal diverging beliefs 
about its cultural implications, which stimuli or prompts give rise to pleasurable affect – 
elements like “control, immersion, performance, intertextuality, and narrative” (Kerr et 
al., 2006, p. 69) – and those that do not.  This topic also plays host to disciplinary turf 
wars where epistemological and methodological divisions determine how pleasure is 
deployed by academics of different stripes. 
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Discourse histories by O’Connor and Klaus (2000) and Kerr et al. (2006) narrate 
the persistent challenges of reaching a definitional consensus regarding pleasure even 
within media studies. In their comprehensive literature review, Barbara O’Connor and 
Elisabeth Klaus (2000) argue that there are two dominant trends in the literature 
concerning user or audience pleasure.  The first is the “public knowledge” tradition out of 
the Birmingham School of cultural theory that focuses on media’s ideological power 
from mainly Marxist and neo-Marxist perspectives.  The second group is the “popular 
culture” tradition, which attempts to rescue and validate pleasure, and to demonstrate that 
it operates as a form of resistance to political and cultural power.  O’Connor and Klaus 
(2000) state of this dichotomy: “The ‘public knowledge’ strand has focused on audience 
readings of non-fiction media texts and has paid little attention to the concept of pleasure, 
whereas the ‘popular culture’ project has been concerned centrally with ‘tastes’ and the 
pleasures of fictional genres and less with questions of ideology” (pp. 378-379).  
Fortuitously for this project, war games – both the patently fictional and the near-real 
“ripped-from-the-headlines” variety – speak to issues of state power (public knowledge) 
and mediated play (popular culture), and are potential research objects for both 
orientations. The authors suggest that a comprehensive analysis of meaning-making 
processes is one viable path of linking user pleasure with questions of ideology and 
hegemony for media analyses, stating: 
Emotion and cognition, entertainment and information, pleasure and ideology, 
fact and fiction all seem to be intimately linked in the process of sense-making. 
Pleasure directs cognitive processes and determines attention and selective 
awareness. It is the emotional, sensual and imaginative feeling that leads 
audiences to actively turn to and process a given content. This is a pre-requisite 
 33 
for understanding – without selective attention no cognition would be possible – 
but at the same time it limits the scope of people’s interpretive practices because 
pleasure is socially embedded and intimately linked to social relations of 
dominancy and cultural hegemony. (O’Connor and Klaus, 2000, p. 381) 
 
Media pleasures are affective, personal responses to a range of mediated interactions, 
reflecting the formal affordances of communication technologies and their social capital.  
That is, “The pleasurableness of a media event is not arbitrary, but is linked to social 
positionings and contexts of media use” (O’Connor and Klaus, 2000, p. 382).  
Understanding the manner in which ludic war pleasures are created and experienced 
demands a multi-faceted analytical perspective that can make sense of how an affecting 
media technology operates within its contexts of use and is situated in popular discourse. 
Aphra Kerr, Julian Kücklich, and Pat Brereton (2006) narrate a similar historical 
schism regarding pleasure in the media studies literature.  Like Simon Frith (1982) and 
O’Connor and Klaus (2000), Kerr et al. see these concepts as emerging from historically 
situated, material processes.  “Pleasure is a relative term, always constructed in relation to 
displeasure and with multiples (sic) sources, from textual to social and contextual” (2006, 
p. 68).  The authors accordingly stress the need for foregrounding the place of social 
practice in media research to overcome the historic divides in the critical literature 
between the literary and economic-oriented traditions (read: cultural studies versus 
political economy), and to make room for innovative approaches to new media theory.12 
Their recommendation brings us to one of communication’s most contested terms. 
                                                
12 It is worth noting that, like my own work, Kerr et al.’s thinking about how best to 
interpret media culture and its pleasures as interconnected practices enacted by cultural 
producers and consumers that operate within established representational and semiotic 
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RECLAIMING INTERACTIVITY  
Our definitional wrangling does not end with media practices and pleasures.  
Indeed, there is arguably no single term in the new media lexicon more pervasive yet 
more vague than “interactive” (or “interactivity”).  Communication researchers have long 
attempted concept explications of interactivity, hoping to arrive at operationalizable 
definitions for empirical research concerning the many, disparate uses and effects of 
information communication technologies (see, Rafaeli, 1988; McMillan and Downes, 
2000; Kiousis, 2002). Game and media studies scholars have similarly wrestled with the 
slippery term, though these analyses have been more squarely aimed at understanding 
how the video game form shapes its interactions with its operators and what this interplay 
means for the industry and broader public debates about its merits and ills (e.g., violence / 
aggression, representations of gender and race, the educational potential of games, etc.).   
For example, new media scholar Janet Murray (1997) – whose seminal work I 
return to next chapter – observes that computational media really has participatory and 
procedural affordances, and that there are substantial differences between actions that are 
merely interactive (she offers the example of games of chance as simplified actions with 
effects), and mediated opportunities for exercising agency and intentionality in a digital 
domain.  Media theorists Lev Manovich (2001) and Alexander Galloway (2006) largely 
avoid the term because they see interactivity as mischaracterizing the computational and 
programmable nature of new media and video games, and that it carries unproductive 
discursive baggage.  Specifically, Manovich contends there is a problematic conflation 
                                                                                                                                            
regimes is in debt to Nick Couldry’s call for understanding media as “an open set of 
practices” (2004) and P. David Marshall’s “intertextual commodity” (2002) concept. 
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between the psychological processes of interacting with media generally (i.e., all media 
are interactive in a psychological sense), with the medium-specific demands of 
programmable media.  And Galloway, who hails from a media studies background, wants 
to avoid the murky active audience debates (or interactive, as the case may be) to address 
the medium’s dialectical relationship with gamers.  Still others, like Kerr et al. (2006) and 
Julian Kücklich (2005), posit that interactivity ought to be discarded or replaced with 
neologisms (Kücklich suggests “playability”) that more clearly make sense of human 
play in these textual encounters.  Kerr et al. (2006) contend that interactivity is more 
likely a marketing term than a structural characteristic of new media because of the way 
that it has been co-opted by the culture industries (pp. 72-73).13  
Despite these legitimate objections, this project employs interactivity cautiously, 
fully recognizing the term’s contested history in the literature and its clumsy and 
hyperbolic deployment by technological Utopianists in the press.14  This project believes 
in the necessity of reclaiming interactivity, especially for understanding the media 
industry’s strategic deployment of the term in all of its ambiguous promise (e.g., as a 
formal characteristic, a discursive guarantee, a means of interfacing with audiences, etc.).   
The “interactive” in this project’s title refers to both the actionable play 
mechanics inside the games that once acted upon structure and guide the gamer’s ludic 
experiences, as well as the industry’s techniques for designing and selling their digital 
                                                
13 The authors’ preferred term “play” is no less immune to commercial forces and 
interests. Indeed, “play has been increasingly colonized by the culture industries well 
beyond childhood in recognition of its heightened importance in the formation of the 
audience’s pleasures at the beginning of the new millennium”  (Marshall, 2002, p. 69). 
14 See Kline et al. (2003, p. 14) for a summary of interactivity’s rhetorical dimensions.  
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wares that determine the kinds of games that appear on store shelves, and establish the 
main parameters of gaming culture that coalesce in public venues and private living 
rooms.  To clarify, I use interactivity in two distinct ways: to describe a formal property 
of the video game form, and as a social activity that makes that formal property 
recognizable.15  In other words, interactivity describes the cybernetic or “ergodic” 
machinations of the video game as “textual machine” (Aarseth, 1997); and it is the 
intertextual, cultural modality that connects gaming to extant cultural forms, genres, and 
narratives.  This duality of form and cultural positioning permits us to make sense of new 
media (including games) by referencing older media16 – a point made clear by P. David 
Marshall’s (2002) “intertexual commodity” concept.  In tandem, Aarseth and Marshall’s 
concepts illustrate that games comprise a wealth of interactive and interacting practices.  
In his seminal Cybertext: Perspectives on Ergodic Literature (1997), Espen 
Aarseth conducts one of the first sustained examinations of the formal, mechanistic 
elements of dynamic texts such as interactive fiction and video games.17  He introduces 
the term “intrigue” as a way to illuminate how the textual machinery operates in an 
adventure game versus how it might function in a mystery novel.  He states: 
The difference between dramatic and ergodic intrigue is that the dramatic intrigue 
takes place on a diagetic, intrafictional level as a plot within the plot and, usually, 
with the audience’s full knowledge, while ergodic intrigue is directed against the 
                                                
15 Russell Richards (2006) positions interactivity similarly, stating that it is a 
“contextualizing facility that mediates between environments and content and users and 
enables the generation of further content” (emphasis in original, p. 532). 
16 I return to the issue of textual and contextual media modality in Chapter 1. 
17 Aarseth coins the term “ergodic,” a combination of the Greek words ergon for “work” 
and hodos for “path,” to describe the “nontrivial effort [that] is required to allow the 
reader to traverse the text” (1997, p. 1). 
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user, who must figure out for herself what is going on.  Also, ergodic intrigue 
must have more than one explicit outcome and cannot, therefore, be successful or 
unsuccessful; this attribute here depends on the player. (1997, pp. 112-113) 
 
The player’s position within ergodic intrigue is that of the “intriguee,” and is a 
transcendental position that “depends on the strategic identification or merger between 
the player and the puppet” (p. 113). This merger of player and character is a popular point 
of focus in game studies because of what it means for identification and learning (see 
also, the work of James Paul Gee, James Newman, Zach Waggoner), but also because 
what it means with respect to pleasure – specifically the pleasure of choice and/or 
control.  He notes: “The reader’s pleasure is the pleasure of the voyeur. Safe, but 
impotent. The cybertext reader on the other hand, is not safe, and therefore, it can be 
argued, she is not a reader. The cybertext puts its would-be reader at risk: the risk of 
rejection” (p. 4).  This state of uncertainty (one might also say, the state of play) allows 
the user to exercise narrative and experiential control over the ergodic work, and thus 
derive unique pleasures absent from non-ergodic media like non-interactive films and TV 
programs.  The user’s uncertain mastery of an ergodic work hinges on her ability to 
master the textual machine.  “The ergodic work of art is one that has certain requirements 
built in it that automatically distinguishes between successful and unsuccessful users” (p. 
179). It is not sufficient for the user to simply “play” with the dynamic text; to master the 
video game, players must master its operative logic.  And it is through a sustained 
attention to the mastering of this rule system, alongside processes of representation and 
narration, and extra-textual strategies of meaning-making that the critic can stake claims 
about gameplay pleasures. 
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Moving outside the formal textual machinery but not the contextual and 
commercial apparatuses, P. David Marshall draws our attention to the innumerable ways 
that advertisers and communities of practice figure into audiences’ interconnected 
understandings about media products. His “intertextual commodities” concept argues that 
audiences are encouraged to playfully interact with texts across platforms and 
technologies, and that these associations constitute a complex matrix of cultural forms.  
Interactivity and play are as critical to the cultivation of user pleasure as they are to the 
culture producers’ institutional practices of product creation and marketing.  Marshall 
rightly notes (as others have [e.g., Ruggill, 2009; Kackman et al., 2010] that this has long 
been standard operating procedure for the culture industries (i.e., think P.T. Barnum’s 
publicity stunts).  However, digital technologies and user-created content have amplified 
the complexity of these intertextual matrixes, while institutionalizing play as a 
commercial strategy. Marshall notes: “The new intertextual commodity identifies the 
attempt by an industry to provide the rules of the game, while recognizing that the 
pleasure of the game is that rules are made and remade, transformed and shifted by the 
players” (2002, p. 80).  This is the reason why, for all of its conceptual baggage, when 
interactivity is understood as a complex web of user actions and textual affordances 
shared between producers and consumers, texts and marketing materials, the concept 
productively complicates static or technologically-determinist conceptualizations of the 
author-text-audience relationship (see, Cover, 2006), even if it invites exhausted (and 
exhausting) debates about what constitutes (inter)active (or inactive) audiences.  
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Thus, a compelling reason for reclaiming interactivity is because – as Aarseth and 
Marshall’s concepts tacitly argue – it is understood as facilitating states of play within 
and around popular games, and between gamers and the interactive games industry.  
Game designer and scholar Ian Bogost (2007) argues as much, adopting fellow game 
designer-theorists Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman’s definition of play, as “the free 
space of movement within a more rigid structure” (p. 42).  Of course, the play experience 
neither requires a literal space, nor does it even necessitate interactive technologies.  The 
“movement within a more rigid structure” might very well be the movement of 
imagination within a word puzzle. Conversely, the presence of technologies alone will 
not necessarily produce interactive states of play.  All play requires a ludic “leap of 
faith.”  An example: an elevator button is not a plaything for a lawyer running late to a 
meeting.  But that same button (or rows of buttons) could be an enticing plaything for 
that lawyer’s precocious, twin daughters.  There is nothing inherently playful about 
elevator buttons; but it also does not foreclose the possibility of play so long as there are 
those willing to take an imaginative leap and craft a magic circle around it.  This simple 
example underscores that mediated interactions are never idealized, Platonic phenomena, 
but are historically located events bounded by their techno-cultural environs.  
These numerous complexities explain why scholars have employed novel titles 
when re-conceptualizing the new media user as something other than a viewer or reader: 
be it a “player” (Marshall, 2004; Roig et al., 2009), a “viewser” (Harries, 2002, p. 172), 
an “intriguee” (Aarseth, 1997), a “virtual citizen-solider” (Stahl, 2010), or some other 
neologism (like “button-pushers” in the case of the lawyer’s daughters).  Whatever title 
 40 
or terminology, the point remains that “…video games introduce a ‘playful’ subject 
position in our relation with media, for example, transforming the established 
‘spectatorship’ relation with audiovisual products to a more interactive engagement with 
media, which reflects the playfulness present in new media practices” (Roig et al., 2009, 
p. 95).  The study of interactivity and its pleasures, thus, requires an examination of play. 
INVADERS!, LUDIC DISPLEASURE, & POLITICIZING THE MAGIC CIRCLE  
The Dutch historian and sociologist Johan Huizinga (1950), who has been 
lionized as the veritable patron saint of game studies, is one of the first to consider the 
cultural elements of human play, coining the term “magic circle” to describe the social 
membrane that envelopes those engaged in play. The magic circle, which occurs in 
sanctioned spaces and for allotted times, has ritualistic qualities such as role playing and 
rules of order that separate organized play from the world (e.g., playing poker at a card 
table, “hide-and-go-seek” in the woods, or laser-tag at an amusement park). The major 
shortcoming of Huizinga’s original magic circle concept, however, is that it is too 
idealized, too Platonic.  The magic circle is not a metaphysical shield that insulates 
players from the world.  Rather, the magic circle is a permeable social barrier that filters 
out certain extraneous forces, while allowing others elements through.  That is, after all, 
why any virtual world or play space is culturally meaningful.  The magic circle is 
penetrable for the same reason why culture is dynamic – because it is people who 
constitute and animate the magic circle, and not some set of unbending, a-historic rules.  
Game scholars have since qualified the original, overly idealized magic circle concept, 
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and it remains a productive idea for media and game studies because it connects human 
play to broader cultural forces.  
The commercial gaming apparatus facilitates interactive states of play for in-game 
magic circles (i.e., mediated gameplay proper), while forging the key extra-gamic 
relationships among its primary agents: the game and player, the game and its industry, 
and the player and the game industry (i.e., the overlapping sections of the ludic war Venn 
diagram [see, Fig. 0.2]).  The play of the gaming apparatus, or the give and take between 
existing structures and emergent freedoms, characterize the internal gameplay logic of the 
video game and the gamer’s mediated experience, as well as the industrial and economic 
pressures that studios negotiate when producing games (e.g., fulfilling generic 
expectations while offering something innovative, or selling war games without violating 
social norms and mores).  That is, there are textual freedoms and constraints to any rule-
based video game, just as there are contextual freedoms and constraints for the industry 
that produces those games, and the negotiations between player-purchasers and media 
firms. Indeed, were it not so awkward, a more apt subtitle for this book might be “The 
Interacting Pleasures of Military Video Games” since the forces of production, 
marketing, and consumption enable gamers and the industry to play and replay with the 
popular imaginary of war and nationhood during moments of complex global crises. 
As Stanley’s Invaders! art piece usefully demonstrates, not all combat games are 
designed to engender user pleasure.  Interventions by artists and activists are a powerful 
reminder that popular culture remains a negotiated terrain, and that military games have 
their share of fans and critics.  Given the emotive power of the 9/11 attacks and its 
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images, it is not surprising that Invaders! was criticized for daring to embed a recent 
tragedy within a fictionalized gamespace.  After all, the art piece literally invited 
participants to play with protecting the WTC.  Mixing what is arguably the most 
traumatic and central image of the 9/11 attacks with coin-operated playthings from 
yesteryear was simply too much for some to bear. Yet for those attendees who actually 
played the game, there was an additional layer of frustration – an element that may have 
escaped those who only heard about the installation.   
In Stanley’s motion-sensitive art game homage, players return fire at the incoming 
horde by aiming and waving their hands at the projection screen (contrary to some initial 
inaccurate reports, the player is most certainly trying to protect the Towers).  Yet, as 
Michael McWhertor (2008) remarks on the game blog Kotaku, Invaders! makes for a 
distinctly unpleasant experience. Would-be WTC defenders must use their bodies to 
shoot frantically.  But because the descending aliens never cease their massive descent – 
emptying one screen of aliens is replaced by another – the game sets the player up for 
inevitable failure.  Invaders! is a “game” that cannot be won.  It has no ending other than 
leaving players exhausted and frustrated. And therein, according to the project’s artist and 
defenders, lies the game’s critique of U.S. war policy.  
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Figure 0.7: A gamer defends the Twin Towers in Invaders!18 
 
On his blog, Stanley (2008) responds to those who critiqued his installation 
without having experienced it, quipping: “For me at least, a video game is at some point 
always going to be about its gameplay” (n.p.). Later, he continues in that same posting: 
Sure, there is something definitely ambiguous about defending the towers in a 
game, and some complex emotions that, indeed, might be a little too raw, or odd, 
for some, even in an 8-bit representation that is highly stylized and presents itself 
immediately as such. But whatever one decides in the end, I have heard many a 
cry within the gaming world that we need to take into account the internal logic of 
games, and that means actually understanding the mechanics of its gameplay, and 
respecting its figurative tropes. (Stanley, 2008, n.p.) 
 
                                                
18 Image from: http://cache-
03.gawkerassets.com/assets/images/9/2008/08/invaders_hands_on_01_01.jpg 
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Stanley’s observation about his own work echoes a central concern in media and game 
studies over how to interpret the complex meanings that arise from this curiously 
interactive medium.  I agree with Stanley: competent game analyses – be they popular 
news reportage or scholarship – should not attend to a title’s representational strategies 
(the image of the Twin Towers) without also asking questions about the game’s 
underlying algorithms or rule structures (What does it mean to play a game that can’t be 
won?), and its social play context (such as an art exhibit at a game convention).  
Invasion! is a uniquely provocative countergame, though it is neither alone in 
sentiment nor in its preferred medium of expression.19  Modern warfare’s commercial 
representations are critiqued in a wide range of anti-war game projects: from original 
digital games, to game modifications, to machinima (short films made with repurposed 
video gameplay content), to in-game protests.  For example, Gonzalo Frasca’s September 
12th makes it is impossible to eradicate scrambling terrorists without causing collateral 
damage that then breeds more radicals.  Jon Griggs’ Deviation (2005), a short machinima 
movie made within the first-person shooter Counter-Strike (1999), examines the 
unquestioned tactical protocols and cyclical violence of the first-person shooter genre.  
The Velvet-Strike art team made use of Counter-Strike in the wake of the U.S.-led Global 
War on Terror to craft anti-war spray paint modifications that players could use to inject 
political commentary into their virtual combat zones.  And as part of his “dead-in-iraq” 
protest, digital artist and scholar Joseph DeLappe tirelessly types the names of the U.S. 
soldiers killed overseas in the public chat screens of the military’s best-known 
                                                
19 See Galloway (2006, chapter 5) for a discussion of the countergame movement. 
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recruitment game, America’s Army (2002).  These countergames and artistic 
interventions are clearly antithetical to the play logic typical to most commercial military-
themed video games.  Invasion! et al. destabilize the ostensibly safe parameters of the 
video game’s “magic circle” by injecting realities of war into these diegetic play spaces, 
and actively deny to gamers the pleasures typically found in combat shooters.20 
In the weeks, months, and years after 9/11, the Twin Towers found themselves 
falling again, and again, and again, in an endless loop of media replay.  The mediated 
trauma of the coordinated terrorist attacks quickly became a rallying point for collective 
national unity and international support, even as the images were simultaneously being 
mobilized as justification for a new aggressive brand of foreign policy that demanded 
preemptive American military action against perceived national threats.  The attacks of 
9/11 and the subsequent U.S.-led Global War on Terror in Afghanistan and Iraq gave rise 
to worldwide anxieties that fueled a panoply of artistic responses across media: from 
performance art, to street theater, to short films, to video games. Projects like Invaders!, 
September 12th, and “dead-in-iraq” that are made of or through the video game medium 
are particularly well-suited for highlighting how our understanding of contemporary 
warfare is intimately, if not inseparably, linked to popular representations of combat, be 
they cinematic, televisual, or in the case of video games, computational in origin.  These 
anti-war interventions, which operate at the margins of the games community, also throw 
into dramatic relief the methods and strategies by which the majority of the commercial 
                                                
20 For additional analyses of military countergames, see Part V of Huntemann and 
Payne’s (Eds.), Joystick Soldiers: The Politics of Play in Military Video Games (2009). 
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shooters at its center are crafted and packaged to sell pleasurable combat experiences – 
experiences that engender what John Fiske (1989) calls “hegemonic pleasures.”   
The famed media and cultural critic makes a distinction between two prevailing 
forms of pleasure.  According to Fiske, there exist “popular pleasures” which “arise from 
the social allegiances formed by subordinated people, they are bottom-up and thus must 
exist in some relationship of opposition to power (social, moral, textual, aesthetic, and so 
on) that attempts to discipline and control them” (p. 49).  By and large, these are not 
pleasures of commercial military shooters (though there might be cerebral pleasures of 
playing anti-war games).  Military shooters instead reward gameplay choices that follow 
mission guidelines, tactical protocols, and the swift elimination of perceived threats.  
Fiske would label the exercise of disciplinary power over oneself and others in military 
games as being hegemonic in nature; as expressing a “conformity by which power and its 
disciplinary thrust are internalized” and “are widely experienced” (1989, p. 49).  More to 
the point, the critique posed by countergames only makes sense if one first understands 
how most war games operate – computationally, ideologically, and culturally.  For this 
reason, this book examines popular military “shooter” games and ludic war culture, in 
effect, to answer the tacit questions posed by the aforementioned countergames’ 
collective critiques; namely: how exactly do commercial military shooters make virtual 
war fun?  And what might this type of war play mean, politically and culturally speaking? 
POLITICAL DESPAIR AND MEDIATED RENEWAL  
The marketplace successes of military shooters notwithstanding, commodifying 
and marketing contemporary conflict remains a challenging task for entertainment 
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producers across media because postmodern warfare – discussed in detail next chapter – 
is characterized by its conspicuous absence of a transcendent and principled political 
agenda (Hammond, 2007).  The U.S. public’s suspicion of military interventions began at 
the conclusion of World War II, became increasingly evident throughout the Vietnam 
War, and was patently obvious by the time the Cold War ended with the fall of the Berlin 
Wall.  In The End of Victory Culture (2007), public intellectual and cultural historian 
Tom Engelhardt observes how, “It is now practically a cliché that, with the end of the 
Cold War and the ‘loss of the enemy,’ American culture has entered a period of crisis that 
raises profound questions about national purpose and identity” (p. 10). But the political 
crisis that attends to postmodern war is not the lone consequence of either having or not 
having some compelling Other. The crisis predates the end of the Cold War and is 
connected to the era’s dominant mode of war production.   
The decline of America’s “victory culture” that Engelhardt masterfully chronicles 
(spanning from the end of World War II in 1945 until the extraction of U.S. personnel 
from Vietnam in 1975) is a cultural symptom of total war’s obsolescence as the primary 
mode for national defense during the twentieth century.  Total war, or a nation-state’s 
mobilization of all (or nearly all) its resources for conflict, ended as a viable defense 
strategy with the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  These nuclear strikes proved 
that the use of atomic weapons by multiple nations engaged in a total war scenario would 
make it all but impossible to distinguish war’s winners from its losers.  Therefore, 
symmetrical war, which had been the idealized form of conventional armed conflicts in 
World Wars I and II (imagine two sides squaring off with roughly equal resources), was a 
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strategic impossibility for nations armed with nuclear weapons, as it introduced a 
potential state of mutually assured destruction.   
Media representations of war and the Baby Boomers’ war play changed alongside 
the end of total war, since it foreclosed the possibility of a lasting, American total victory 
and foretold an atomic age of potential nuclear horrors.  According to Engelhardt: 
So those children of the 1950s grasped the pleasures of victory culture as an act of 
faith, and the horrors of nuclear culture as an act of faithless mockery, and held 
both the triumph and the mocking horror close without necessarily experiencing 
them as contraries.  In this way, they caught the essence of the adult culture of 
that time, which – despite America’s dominant economic and military position in 
the world – was one not of triumph, but triumphalist despair. (2007, p. 9) 
 
This state of “triumphalist despair” continued unabated as nuclear proliferation spread 
and the U.S. and Soviet Union ratcheted up their atomic arms production, effectively 
solidifying a Cold War stalemate that would last nearly half a century.  And because the 
U.S. and Soviet Union could not attack one another directly without risking a military 
escalation that might end in mutually assured destruction, their interests were expressed 
through proxy conflicts like the Cuban Missile Crisis, the CIA’s support of Pinochet’s 
regime in Chile, and the Soviet-Afghan War.  However, none of these altercations left as 
lasting or deep a scar on the American psyche as the Vietnam War.  
In the years following the U.S.’s defeat in Vietnam, American entertainment 
coped with this unexpected and unprecedented military loss by re-establishing the 
modern “warrior cult,” or what sociologist and historian James William Gibson calls, the 
“New War.”  In Warrior Dreams: Paramilitary Culture in Post-Vietnam America (1994), 
Gibson argues that this New War culture attempted to “fix” the national identity crisis 
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through numerous cultural goods including, pulp novels, live-action war games, and 
revisionist Hollywood films that would give American soldiers a second chance to solve 
the problems caused by feminists, peace activists, and meddling and spineless politicians.  
Foremost among these New War cultural playthings are combat films that fantasize about 
a return to Vietnam, and the consequences of failing to respond to national threats with 
deadly force.  Many of these films are not just nationalistic fantasies – they are veritable 
para-programmatic guides for how decisive warriors might fix the broken social order. 
“America has always celebrated war and the warrior. Our long, unbroken record of 
military victories has been crucially important both to the national identity and to the 
personal identity of many Americans – particularly men” (Gibson, 1994, p. 10). The 
military entertainments and playthings of Gibson’s “new war,” like those of Engelhardt’s 
“victory culture,” are similar insofar as they are collective responses to national traumas 
during an era of postmodern warfare.  The loss in Vietnam (despite the U.S.’s 
overwhelming technological and financial resources) and the vulnerability to nuclear 
attacks (despite being the first nation to engineer the atomic bomb) are situations that 
asked: “If Americans were no longer winners, then who were they?” (Gibson, 1994, p. 
10). Or, as Engelhardt inquires: “Is there an imaginable ‘America’ without enemies and 
without the story of their slaughter and our triumph?” (2007, p. 15).  These distressing 
questions of triumphalist despair that began after World War II and which matured 
during the Vietnam quagmire and the long Cold War, would all but seemingly dissolve 
into air on a sunny Tuesday morning in lower Manhattan.  
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Media pundits were quick to opine that: “9/11 changed everything.”  Yet the tone 
of American discourse was oddly familiar in the wake of the attacks.  And why should 
this not be so?  The terrorist attacks tapped into deep-seeded fears of reprisal, fractured 
the national myth of post-Cold War invulnerability (remember we were told by political 
theorists like Francis Fukuyama that Western liberal market-driven economies had 
delivered us to a final state of social evolution? – it was our “end of history”), and the 
attacks reintroduced the discourse of national and military triumphalism that had been 
nascent for over a quarter century. The seeds of guilt and future comeuppance had 
actually been sown with the final twin strikes of World War II.  In this instance, what is 
past is truly prologue.  Engelhardt (2007) reflects:   
If the 9/11 attacks were a traumatic shock to Americans, at a deeper level we had 
known they were coming. Not, as conspiracy theorists imagine, just a few of the 
top officials among us, but all of us – and not for weeks or months, but for over 
fifty years.  That’s why, for all the shock, what came to mind was, in a sense, so 
familiar.  … Americans were already imagining versions of September 11th soon 
after the dropping of the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima. That event set the 
American imagination boiling. Within months of the destruction of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, all the familiar signs of nuclear fear were already in place – 
newspapers were drawing concentric circles of atomic destruction outward from 
fantasy Ground Zeroes in American cities, and magazines were offering visions of 
our country as a vaporized wasteland, while imagining millions of Americans 
dead. (pp. 306-307) 
 
The knee-jerk American response to this national wound, as represented in 
popular discourse and culture, was not to investigate the roots of this psychological and 
political trauma but to reaffirm reactionary and conservative ideals. Susan Faludi 
documents in The Terror Dream: Fear and Fantasy in Post-9/11 America (2007) how we 
(i.e., Western popular culture and Americans) ran to insulate “ourselves in the celluloid 
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chrysalis of the baby boom’s childhood” (p. 4).  Like Engelhardt, Faludi sees the 
gendered and sexist responses to 9/11 as being symptomatic of a general (and, indeed, 
generational) unwillingness to interrogate the material causes underlying the attacks, or 
the vulnerability of our social infrastructure.  Rather than asking questions about why 
America’s technology might be turned against itself by well-funded, non-state terrorists, 
the response was to laud cultural artifacts from a “simpler time” (e.g., TV Westerns and 
war stories from Engelhardt’s victory culture) and to reproduce ideals from supposedly 
halcyon days-gone-by.  Faludi observes: 
From deep within that dream world, our commander in chief issued remarks like 
“We’ll smoke him out” and “Wanted: dead or alive,” our political candidates 
proved their double-barreled worthiness for post-9/11 office by brandishing guns 
on the campaign trail, our journalists cast city firefighters as tall-in-the-saddle 
cowboys patrolling a Wild West stage set, and our pundit proclaimed our nation’s 
ability to vanquish “barbarians” in a faraway land they dubbed “Indian Country.” 
(Faludi, 2007, pp. 4-5) 
 
Later, she continues: 
Taken individually, the various impulses that surfaced after 9/11 – the denigration 
of capable women, the magnification of manly men, the heightened call for 
domesticity, the search for and sanctification of helpless girls – might seem 
random expressions of some profound cultural derangement. But taken together, 
they form a coherent and inexorable whole, the cumulative elements of a national 
fantasy in which we are deeply invested, our elaborately constructed myth of 
invincibility. (Faludi, 2007, p. 14)  
 
Americans quickly embraced fantastic entertainment that promised Manichaean moral 
universes, and mythological, frontiersman heroes that could reaffirm and reconstruct our 
national mythology as the world’s lone military superpower.   
Military shooters are among this throng of politically reactionary media as they 
facilitate play opportunities for striking back at virtual terrorists with extreme martial 
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prejudice.  In fact, military shooters stand ready to manufacture, negotiate, and maintain 
the American warrior identity in the early twenty-first century, as Hollywood’s post-
Vietnam and Reaganite films did during the twentieth century – recall Stahl’s epochal 
transition from war spectacle to interactive war.  Moreover, because military shooters 
offer immersive and interactive experiences of American exceptionalism, providing users 
with ways of enacting and experiencing the “Bush Doctrine” of foreign policy (see, 
Chapter Three) – which maintains that the liberal democratic, market-driven political 
paradigm can and should be exported, and that preemptive military force is one viable 
way of realizing this goal (see, Fiala, 2008; McCrisken, 2003) – these games perpetuate 
the historical and ideological conflation between the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor 
with al-Qaeda’s assault on the World Trade Center to make the War on Terror and 2003 
Invasion of Iraq as morally defensible as the America’s involvement in World War II.  
Many of these games, echoing the popular political discourse issued in the wake of the 
9/11 attacks, short-circuit historic fact; they attempt to elide a half century of 
interventionist foreign policy and numerous proxy wars, to access the moral capital of a 
just war born out of necessity (I discuss this textual “slight of hand” in Chapter Two). 
Contemporary military shooters not only “play games” with the past, however.  A 
fair number of the most popular titles likewise imagine a near-future America that is 
either under threat or under attack from outside forces.  These proleptic games (Smicker, 
2009) premediate future catastrophes to foreclose the possibility of experiencing another 
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9/11-like national trauma (Grusin, 2010).21  Like human play (Sutton-Smith, 1997) and 
popular mythology (Mosco, 2004), premediation is not necessarily bound to any factual 
state of affairs, present or future.  According to Grusin (2010): “Premediation is not about 
getting the future right, but about proliferating multiple remediations of the future both to 
maintain a low level of fear in the present and to prevent a recurrence of the kind of 
tremendous media shock that the United States and much of the networked world 
experienced on 9/11” (p. 4).  This helps to explain why the lion’s share of military 
shooters produced after 9/11 possess fearful narratives that take place in the future before 
or after fictional attacks on the U.S.  These games resonate with players not only because 
they premediate the trauma of 9/11, but – as importantly – because they give players a 
means of striking back against the titles’ varied crises.  Such performative responses are 
unavailable while watching the original attacks on TV, or in fictional films that trade in 
similar imagery.  It is this critical technological affordance of a militarized gameplay that 
reanimates the bygone myth of victory culture in games when it fails to gain traction in 
other militainment.  It bears underscoring that the video game’s form and the shooter 
genre do not a priori demand such a handling of national trauma. However, its 
                                                
21 Richard Grusin (2010) coins the term “premediation” to conceptually complement his 
and Jay David Bolter’s earlier “remediation” (1999).  But whereas remediation is new 
media’s (or, as he prefers now, mediality’s) re-articulation and updating of previous 
communicative and artistic expressions in new media forms and formats, premediation is 
about modeling potential, future states for specific political ends.  Grusin notes about his 
two key terms’ point of connection: “Premediating the future involves remediating the 
past. Premediation is actively engaged in the process of reconstructing history, 
particularly the history of 9/11 in its incessant remediation of the future. Thus the 
historical event of 9/11 continues to live and make itself felt in the present as an event 
that both overshadows other recent historical events and that continues to justify and 
make possible certain governmental and medial practices of securitization” (2010, p. 8). 
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commercial imperatives and genre expectations make it difficult to avoid such ham-
handed choices.22  
 
Figure 0.8: A horrifying promotional poster for Modern Warfare 3 (2011) depicts a 
decimated New York City on the iconic Time magazine23 
   
                                                
22 The puzzle game Portal (2007), for instance, is an ostensibly non-shooter game 
presented in the first-person shooter format. 
23 This is the first instance of Time authorizing the use of its signature border and 
nameplate on a commercial product. Time’s publisher Kim Kelleher states: “This is 
where the boys are,” and that this collaboration with Activision is “a great way to connect 
with millions of people we might not have otherwise connected with” (Peters, 2011, n.p.) 
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STRUCTURE OF FEELING REDUX 
Irrespective of whether one enjoys or even plays military shooters, video games 
are a commonplace part of our digital lives. The NPD Group, a major marketing and 
consumer research firm, reports that more Americans played video games than attended 
movies in the first six month of 2009, and that game purchases accounted for a “one-third 
of the average monthly consumer spending in the U.S. for core entertainment content, 
including music, video, [and] games” (NPD Group, 2009, n.p.).  The game industry’s 
major lobbying group, the Electronic Software Association, celebrates the following 
facts: “sixty-eight percent of American households play computer or video games”; “the 
average game player is 35 years old and has been playing games for 12 years”; “forty 
percent of all game players are women”; and that “in 2009, 25 percent of Americans over 
the age of 50 play video games” (ESA, “Industry Facts,” 2009, n.p.).  These figures fly in 
the face of the long-standing (and largely incorrect) stereotype of games being 
diversionary toys consumed by misanthropic boys.  This also means that more Americans 
play games than those who do not, making gaming a distinctly mainstream phenomenon.  
The rapidly increasing ubiquity and accessibility of video games does not, 
however, mean that we should neglect to study the power they wield as popular culture.  
George Lipsitz reminds us of ordinary cultural objects’ ability to tell us about ourselves:  
For all of the triviality and frivolity, the messages of popular culture circulate in a 
network of production and reception that is quite serious. At their worst, they 
perform the dirty work of the economy and state. At their best, they retain the 
memories of the past and contain hopes for the future that rebuke the injustices 
and inequalities of the present. It might be thought a measure of the inescapable 
irony of our time that the most profound intellectual questions emerge out of what 
seem to be ordinary and commonplace objects of study. (1990, p. 20) 
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Commercial military-themed war games and their attendant ludic war experiences 
perform cultural functions on both ends of Lipsitz’s popular culture spectrum: they 
reinforce problematic ideologies like American exceptionalism and celebrate 
interventionist military policies (see, Chapter Three), while simultaneously giving gamers 
unique opportunities for forging and growing social bonds, enjoying immersive role-
playing experiences, and exploring and testing strategies for collaborative problem 
solving (see, Chapter Five).  
The project’s interest about how pleasure is produced by gaming’s interacting 
commercial processes and social circuitry begs a more difficult question about military 
gameplay’s relationship to the broader national identity: in particular, what do these ludic 
pleasures mean, or what does this war play say about post-9/11 American culture?  
Answering this question is this book’s endgame, and it will be taken up most fully and 
forcefully in the Conclusion.  For now, it is useful to preview briefly how ludic war’s 
affective, hegemonic pleasures reflect underlying economic and cultural forces. 
The ludic war experience represents a mediated “structure of feeling,” to borrow 
Raymond Williams’ term, that at once expresses concerns particular to the contemporary 
moment, while also making public the material processes that bring that cultural 
formation into being.  Over the course of his influential career, Williams (1977) never 
explicitly defines his structure of feeling, though some critics argue his reluctance to do 
so is strategic.24  In what is perhaps his most definitive articulation, Williams explains the 
                                                
24 David Simpson (1992) contends that the “degree to which the structure of feeling is not 
articulated to the point of ‘theoretical satisfaction,’ despite its deployment throughout 
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structure of feeling as a broad experiential process that contains specific “internal 
relations, at once interlocking and in tension” that generates social values and meanings 
that are “actively lived and felt” (p. 132). The structure of feeling is, in effect, a “cultural 
hypothesis, actually derived from attempts to understand such elements and their 
connections in a generation or period, and needing always to be returned, interactively, to 
such evidence” (Williams, 1977, pp. 132-133).   
Commercial military shooters concerning postmodern war simulate war scenarios 
between U.S. soldiers and terrorist groups for gamers’ entertainment.  These titles’ 
narratives and gameplay demands express a range of post-9/11 anxieties concerning 
terrorism, militarism, and state power; and their production histories and supporting 
materials (including their discourse and advertising efforts) evidence the game industry’s 
strategic machinations for interfacing with its varied constituencies during a time of war. 
This book’s goal over the following chapters is to disclose how military gameplay’s 
interacting circuitry works towards producing these affective pleasures – or in Williams’ 
phrasing, the interacting structures for the production of the ludic war feeling – that make 
these games commercial successes, and how, when taken together, the ludic warring 
attempts to resurrect, revitalize, and re-imagine a virile, militaristic national identity that 
rises Phoenix-like from the ashes of the Twin Towers. 
                                                                                                                                            
twenty years of major critical work, suggests a strong resistance to such theorization” (p. 
21). Sean Matthews (2001) agrees with this, posting that the “suggestive, provisional, 
even vague quality of the [structure of feeling] is in fact therefore its virtue” (p. 191). 
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ABOUT THIS BOOK 
This book examines those social actions and gameplay practices that make 
playing post-9/11 military shooters fun.  This book takes seriously Melanie Swalwell and 
Jason Wilson’s (2008) call to critically analyze gameplay as an important experiential 
phenomena, while trekking beyond the formal player-game interactions to understand 
how gaming pleasures are produced by extra-textual forces (pp. 6-7).  Accordingly, this 
project pursues a multiple-case study design because it is a comprehensive research 
strategy25 for understanding how producers, marketers, and players negotiate the major 
commercial and cultural concerns of military gaming in real life contexts – including 
representing and remembering conflict and politics (text), sanctioning and commoditizing 
appropriate kinds of mediated violence (paratext), and the social environment of gaming 
(context).  It is my belief that the continued popularity of the military shooter is due to the 
interconnected forces and practices that allow players to find manifold pleasures in 
virtual warring in the wake of the political crises produced by the 9/11 attacks and the 
Global War on Terror. 
Chapter One employs “gameplay modality” (King and Krzywinska, 2006) to 
explain how the military shooter format makes virtual conflict pleasurable by offering 
players intimate battlefield views and performative liberties not afforded by other war 
entertainment, in effect, overcoming the perspectival distances and political anxieties that 
hound other militainment.  These games seek to have it both ways: they wish to be read 
                                                
25 According to case study expert Robert Yin (2003): “The holistic design is 
advantageous…when the relevant theory underlying the case study is itself of a holistic 
nature” (p. 45). 
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as “realistic” by connecting symbolically and thematically to worldly strife, while making 
available to players medium-specific affordances that make for pleasurable play 
experiences.  By attending to the gameplay similarities and differences of seminal war 
shooters produced decades apart, media critics and historians can understand how 
generational changes in gaming technologies and play mechanics affect virtual war 
experiences in foundational ways.  In particular, the game industry’s movement towards 
producing ever-increasing immersive and narrative-based gameplay is an attempt to 
ameliorate war’s crisis of meaning so it may be neatly packaged, sold, and played. 
Chapter Two examines the first-person modality that dominates the best-selling 
Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare (2007) and, its sequel, Modern Warfare 2 (2009).  These 
titles are noteworthy for placing players in different war theaters as soldiers and civilians 
who fight and die.  These shifting points of view engender a paradoxical subjectivity that 
is at once situated in individual battles, and one that transcends space and time.  This 
interpersonal modality of play models the “sacrificial citizenship” (Kahn, 2010) that 
characterizes post-9/11 American political identity – one that hails all citizens as de facto 
conscripts for a war that may demand, at any moment, the greatest of personal sacrifices. 
Chapter Three analyzes the way two Tom Clancy brand video game franchises – 
Rainbow Six: Vegas and Ghost Recon: Advanced Warfighter – transform the author’s 
prosaic technothriller fiction into ludic form, giving players an interactive means of 
playing through the discourse of American exceptionalism.  By examining the games’ 
design choices in light of the critical commentary around Clancy’s commercial empire, I 
argue that these titles support the Bush administration’s policies and tactics of preemptive 
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military force after 9/11.  By remaining attentive to what these games ask us to do, and 
how they represent U.S. soldiers, we can critically appraise the pleasures of becoming a 
technowarrior and how game design choices reflect and support the tenets of American 
exceptionalism in the new century.  
Chapter Four shifts the project’s focus to the extra-textual forces that shape ludic 
war culture. This chapter studies how three gaming paratexts – production personnel 
interviews, press reviews, and online video game advertisements – prefigure how 
“military realism” is ideally interpreted for the best selling military shooter of 2007, Call 
of Duty 4: Modern Warfare.  This Call of Duty installment presents a valuable case study 
because it is an extremely popular title across gaming platforms and online gaming 
services (selling well over 11 million units as of February of 2009 for the PC, Xbox 360, 
Playstation 3, and Nintendo DS systems [VG Chartz.com]26, and it was the second most 
played multiplayer game on Xbox Live in 2008 [after Halo 3]27), and because it is the 
first of the storied franchise to be set in the twenty-first century (the previous Call of Duty 
games were World War II shooters). The marketing paratexts that circulate around Call 
of Duty 4 not only generate excitement for the game and work to drive sales, but they also 
suggest particular textual readings over others, hoping to inoculate the pleasures of their 
publicized ludic wars from threats of moral panic backlash. 
                                                
26 Activision has sold over 11 million game discs for the Xbox 360 and Playstation 3 
console versions of Call of Duty 4.  The sales numbers are higher if one includes the PC 
and Nintendo DS numbers. Also, in the gaming industry, any title that sells over a million 
copies is considered a blockbuster. 
27 http://multiplayerblog.mtv.com/2009/01/05/top-20-xbl-games/ 
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The final two chapters examine the manifold pleasures of playing ludic war in 
their social contexts.  Chapter Five presents a participant observation of a gaming center 
where hardcore gamers engage in all-night competitive gaming events.  This chapter’s 
ethnographic description explores the social codes and conventions present in a 
commercial play space that supports a variety of gaming experiences, and finds that the 
social environment is shaped as much by the military shooters as it is by the center’s 
devoted gamers.  Moreover, the competitive ludic war experience often escapes its 
mediated bounds, as the rules and relationships founded on virtual battlefields find 
gendered and charged expression in the physical gaming space.  
Chapter Six uses interview data drawn from a focus group with avid players to 
examine the foremost pleasures of maintaining one’s gaming capital and identity as a 
“hardcore” gamer in a shared play space and in online play sessions.  The previous 
chapter’s participant observation is my “outsider” etic account of a localized play culture; 
whereas Chapter Six presents an “insider” emic account of these players’ practices in 
their own words.  This chapter confirms many of Chapter Five’s gameplay “lessons,” and 
reveals that avid gamers regularly negotiate the conflicting modalities of ludic war play. 
The Conclusion is a brief coda arguing that the military shooter is not only the 
quintessential post-9/11 video game, but that it ought to be thought of as the apotheosis of 
contemporary militainment. These final remarks theorize how ludic war’s affective 
structure of feeling stands ready to save postmodern war’s legacy from its own moral and 
tactical shortcomings.  In short, these mediated battles hope to “reset” the victory culture 
mythology by making virtual war fun and pleasurable.  This book is about how that 
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symbolic and experiential campaign for gamers’ “hearts and minds” is waged in and 
around video games’ virtual battlefields, and what these virtual battles say about 
American identity and gaming culture after 9/11.   
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SECTION I:  






















Nintendo War 2.0: Towards a New Modality of Ludic War Play 
It is a great irony 
that a child  
tortured by fears  
of nuclear holocaust 
should take such delight  
in a game  
that gave its own  
programmer 
nightmares 
of the apocalypse; 
 the mushroom cloud 
  rising as a splash 
 of red pixels, 
  the dream maker 
tortured 
 by his own creations. 
 
Meanwhile, 
I lose the last base:  
blew my missiles too early, 
panicked; couldn’t 
pace myself “My God, we’re 
all going to die,” I thought, 
and we did. 
 
The Game Over screen comes up 
and, with sweaty palms 
I whisper one word, standing 
in awe of the end  





-- The “Missile Command” entry in Seth Barkan’s creative writing 




Audiences for contemporary war films have been diminishing steadily over the 
course of the protracted U.S.-led military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The 
conspicuously empty theater seats have been matched in living rooms by a similarly 
anemic viewership of war-oriented television programming.  Media and war scholar 
Susan Carruthers (2008) rightly observes that along with fictionalized combat films, 
documentaries about the recent conflicts – whether they focus on the military, media, or 
civilian populations – have not fared much better, and that war entertainment’s absent 
audiences present a clarion call for media and war scholars to contextualize and 
historicize “this attenuation of attention” (p. 71).  In his Time magazine column, “Where 
are the War Movies?,” Richard Corliss (2006) speculates that Hollywood’s disinterest in 
the Iraq and Afghanistan wars could be attributable to several factors: possibly a lack of 
political consensus and battles that can be dramatized easily; or that these wars have 
touched relatively few American households; even cinema’s waning influence as a 
cultural form.  And while ticket sales themselves do not explain the underlying reasons 
for the growing disinterest in Hollywood’s combat fare, data pulled from the film 
industry site Box Office Mojo (Fig. 1.1) demonstrates empirically and emphatically the 
growing commercial disinterest for combat movies set in the post-Cold War period 
produced during the early years of the twenty-first century.  Even the perennially popular 
WWII genre has not fared as well over this same period, as only a few major war films 
produced after 9/11 have enjoyed the box office success of similar period films produced 
several years earlier – films like The Thin Red Line (1998), Saving Private Ryan (1998), 
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and Pearl Harbor (2001), each of which grossed globally $98 million, $482 million, and 
$450 million, respectfully. 
Figure 1.1: Global Box Office Receipts for Hollywood’s Top-grossing 
Combat Films, 2001-2009 (in millions of US Dollars)28 (Source: Box Office 
Mojo, 2010) 
 
Curiously, the journalistic and scholarly observations heralding the decline, if not 
the commercial death, of moving image war entertainment produced during the first 
                                                
28 Ticket sales are from boxofficemojo.com.  The parentheses contain sales revenues (in 
millions of US dollars). The WWII films include: 2001: Enemy at the Gates (97), Pearl 
Harbor (450); 2002: Hart’s War (32), We Were Soldiers (115), Windtalkers (78); 2003: 
n/a; 2004: Saints and Soldiers (1); 2005: The Great Raid (11); 2006: Days of Glory (23), 
Flags of Our Fathers (66), Flyboys (18); 2007: Letters from Iwo Jima (69); 2008: 
Defiance (51), Miracle at St. Anna (9), Valkyrie (200); 2009: Inglourious Basterds (314).  
And the Post-Cold War combat films include: 2001: Behind Enemy Lines (92); 2002: 
Black Hawk Down (173), Collateral Damage (78), Sum of All Fears (194); 2003: Tears 
of the Sun (86); 2004: n/a; 2005: Jarhead (97); 2006: n/a; 2007: The Kingdom (87), 
Redacted (<1); 2008: Battle for Haditha (<1); 2009: The Hurt Locker (40). [Ticket sales 












decade of the new century have almost entirely forgotten or ignored video games.  The 
preeminent counterfactual case in point is the November 10, 2009 release of Activision’s 
military-themed Modern Warfare 2.  Not only was this sequel to the popular Call of Duty 
4: Modern Warfare (2007) the best selling video game of 2009, it was the single biggest 
entertainment launch in history – netting over $406 million dollars during its first day on 
store shelves and eclipsing the $1 billion dollar mark in under two months (Fletcher, 
2010, n.p.; Guinness, 2010, n.p.).  This means that Modern Warfare 2 earned more 
money during its first five days on store shelves than Hollywood blockbusters like Harry 
Potter and the Half-Blood Prince and The Dark Knight (“which holds the U.S. box-office 
record with $203.8 million in first five-day sales” [Reisinger, 2009, n.p.]).29   
Using sales data culled from the game industry site Video Game Chartz, the 
following graph evidences a different, rising trajectory for WWII and post-Cold War 
themed combat video games released during the first decade of the new century as 
compared to film trends.30 
                                                
29 These remarkable sales figures were surpassed by the game’s 2010 sequel, Call of 
Duty: Black Ops (Raman, 2010, n.p.). 
30 I do not mean to equate box office receipts to game sale, as they are not equivalent 
media purchases or experiences. I am interested in the trends’ differing trajectories. 
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Figure 1.2: The top-selling military-themed shooters, 2002-2010 (in millions 
of units sold for the Xbox/Xbox 360, and Playstation2/Playstaion3 
systems)31 
 
Modern Warfare 2 and its franchise sequel Call of Duty: Black Ops (2010) are far and 
away the best-selling military shooters in industry history. But these releases are only the 
                                                
31 The WWII-era games include: 2002: Medal of Honor: Frontline (7.73); 2003: Medal of 
Honor: Rising Sun (5.77); 2004: Call of Duty: Finest Hour (3.98); 2005: Call of Duty 2 
(2.47); Call of Duty 2: Big Red (4.57), Medal of Honor: European Assault (2.17); 2006: 
Call of Duty 3 (3.82); 2007: n/a; 2008: Call of Duty: World at War (10.04); 2009: n/a; 
2010: Call of Duty: Black Ops. And the Post-Cold War games include: 2002: SOCOM 
(3.44), Conflict: Desert Storm (2.32); 2003: SOCOM II (2.65); 2004: n/a; 2005: SOCOM 
3 (1.55); 2006: SOCOM: U.S. Navy SEALs Combined Assault (.6), Tom Clancy's Ghost 
Recon Advanced Warfighter (2.26), Tom Clancy's Rainbow Six: Vegas (1.96); 2007: 
Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare (13.19), Tom Clancy's Ghost Recon Advanced 
Warfighter 2 (1.85); 2008: SOCOM: U.S. Navy SEALs Confrontation (1), Tom Clancy's 
Rainbow Six: Vegas 2 (3.45), Battlefield: Bad Company (2.23); 2009: Modern Warfare 2 
(22); 2010: Battlefield: Bad Company 2 (5.5), Medal of Honor (5); 2010: Call of Duty: 















resent high points of a commercial trend that has been running counter to the reception of 
other combat media for years.  These mediums’ different trend lines beg the research 
questions that drive this chapter and book: why do contemporary war games sell in a 
media environment that is not favorable to other militainment; and what contextual forces 
and medium-specific traits might explain their success?  
It bears repeating at this early juncture that there is no single answer – no 
“smoking gun” (if you’ll excuse the pun), virtual or otherwise – for what makes combat 
games’ ludic war experiences fun and popular.  In one of the first mainstream press 
analyses of modern military shooters’ popularity, games journalist and New York Times 
Magazine editor Chris Suellentrop argues that Modern Warfare and similar titles have 
proven that “players have an appetite for games that purport to connect them to the wars 
their college roommates, or their sons, might be fighting in” (2010, para. 2).  The 
aesthetic and narrative emphasis on realism is undoubtedly true for some gamers; but this 
explanation only gets us so far.  As the book’s introduction argues, media-based 
pleasures are over-determined phenomena, as are the textual, paratextual, and contextual 
elements that contribute to any media artifact’s financial and affective successes (i.e., 
those forces and practices examined in this and in the following chapters’ case studies).  
Media pleasure’s inherent complexity is further complicated by the culture industries’ 
colorful array of intertextual production and marketing practices. Media and game 
scholars have appropriately examined the diverse, constitutive elements that make 
immersive games like first-person shooters (FPS) pleasurable: textual characteristics 
ranging from immersion / presence (Murray, 1997; McMahon, 2003) and agency / 
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control (Aarseth, 1997, Grodal, 2000), the visual and narrative intertextuality that 
connects games to film (both Hollywood cinema [Wolf, 2001; Bryce and Rutter, 2002; 
Galloway, 2006] and experimental filmmaking techniques [Brooker, 2009]), to a 
participatory community that that expands the gaming experience (Nieborg, 2005; Jones, 
2008), and which modifies titles and crafts new one during times of political crises 
(Lowood, 2008).   
This chapter and the ones to follow are also not the first to make sense of military 
shooters in light of their extant political contexts. The critical pieces that have been 
published to date concerning the representations of twenty-first century war in video 
games evidence overlapping and complementary observations about the positive framing 
of post-Cold War military policies and technologies.  For instance, scholars have 
examined the discursive fidelity between the cinematic and gamic versions of Black 
Hawk Down (Machin and Van Leeuwen, 2007); others have argued that this form of 
media play contributes to a militarization of everyday life and are attempts to popularize 
net-centric warfare and preemptive strikes to control the future (Mirrlees, 2009; Smicker, 
2009), and how game narratives have shifted away from the underdog story of one 
soldier against many (i.e., the Rambo story), to the “overmatch” narrative where an elite 
team is still outnumbered, but is armed with overwhelming technological support and 
combat skills (Thompson, 2009).  
Keeping these textual and contextual insights in mind, the current chapter 
examines how the first-person shooter game format creates an attractive textual means of 
interacting with the politically unpleasant aspects of postmodern conflict.  Specifically, it 
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argues that the military-themed shooter functions as a structuring play modality that 
narrates and personalizes postmodern military interventions.  Postmodern war – a 
contested term that will be explored shortly – possesses vexing traits that make its 
popular representation problematic, as is evinced in part by combat cinema’s waning 
commercial appeal during a time of war.  By contrast, military-themed shooters employ a 
uniquely suited modality of play that addresses the challenges of making war play 
pleasurable during a time of international martial conflict.32  
Geoff King and Tanya Krzywinska’s (2006) concept of “gameplay modality” is 
employed in first half of this chapter to make sense of how interacting with video games 
– like other forms of human play – carries its own set of expectations and attitudes (its 
own “context-defining frame”) regarding how these texts are understood in relation to 
and separate from other media interactions (p. 20).  Combat video games’ intertwined 
contextual and formal markers of modality signify repeatedly that these objects are to be 
played with, and invite players to engage in sanctioned ludic war performances in their 
mediated gamespaces; meaning, even if the manifest screen content of military shooters 
look, sound, and possess themes similar to other war entertainment and news reportage, 
first- and third-person shooters offer players performative liberties not afforded by other 
media seeking to commodify the War on Terror.  These games want to have it both ways: 
they want to be read as “realistic” by connecting symbolically and thematically to 
                                                
32 The third-person perspective (in third-person shooters) is also an immersive point of 
view, though not as intimately subjective as the first-person perspective. 
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worldly strife, while simultaneously making available to players medium-specific textual 
affordances that enable pleasurable play experiences. 
Of course, not all war games are created equal, and gameplay modalities – like 
media culture writ large – represent dynamic and fluctuating textual configurations that 
change over time, reflecting specific historical moments and modes of production. The 
final section of this chapter accordingly examines the major gameplay similarities and 
differences between two seminal war shooters produced decades apart. This comparison 
illustrates how generational changes in gaming technologies and play mechanics affect 
gamers’ ludic war experiences in foundational ways, and it argues that the movement 
towards producing increasingly immersive and narrative-based ludic war is an attempt to 
ameliorate postmodern war’s crisis of meaning.  
POSTMODERN WAR AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
 Postmodern war’s discursive terrain and its definitional wrangling by critics is the 
key historical and political backdrop against which military shooters and their ludic war 
pleasures are evaluated and experienced.  In fact, and as I argue shortly, commercial 
militainment struggle to succeed in the marketplace precisely because of postmodern 
war’s varied epistemological and ontological challenges; i.e., how can war entertainment 
be appear efficacious or truthful when contemporary war’s narratives, images, and 
reportage are held in such suspicion?  Video games are not immune to these commercial 
and representational challenges.  However, game producers have been able to use 
gameplay’s unique modality to navigate postmodern war’s commercial hurdles.  
Reviewing postmodern war’s conceptual and historical legacy will allow us to better 
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understand why military shooters engender specific textual pleasures (Chapters Two and 
Three), and why and how marketers pre-frame their digital wares (Chapter Four). 
 War and media scholar Chris Hables Gray (1997) argues for the postmodern label 
for contemporary warfare for two reasons.  First, according to Gray, modern war has its 
origins in the 1500s when “total war” (the mobilization of all a nation-state’s resources 
for the purposes of winning a conflict) became a physical and organizational possibility, 
and its end with the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, when the use of atomic 
weapons in a total war scenario would make it all but impossible to distinguish war’s 
winners from its losers. Second, the representations and practices of contemporary war 
share enough similarities with postmodernism’s paradoxical cultural phenomena, 
generally speaking, to warrant the admittedly tricky label.  The paradoxes of 
contemporary war (again, according to Gray) are fueled in equal parts by new 
technologies and modernist logics of rationality and social organization that evolved 
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Although Gray unquestionably focuses on 
the role of technological innovation in driving changes in warfare (not unlike technics 
scholar and historian Lewis Mumford or even cultural critic Paul Virilio), he credits 
information as being the preeminent tool in the warfighter’s toolbox. Gray notes: “As a 
weapon, as a myth, as a metaphor, as a force multiplier, as an edge, as a trope, as a factor, 
and as an asset, information (and its handmaidens – computers to process it, multimedia 
to spread it, systems to represent it) has become the central sign in postmodernity” (1997, 
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p. 22). Friedrich Kittler (1999) and Paul Virilio (1999)33 agree with this emphasis, having 
themselves labeled contemporary warfare as “infowar.” Kittler notes that ever since the 
late Cold War, the Pentagon has moved from Electronic Warfare, which is the attempt to 
gain control over the electromagnetic spectrum, to Information Warfare, or the “fight 
over digital technology with digital technology” (1999, p. 176).   
 For other media and war critics, information control and technological advances 
explain only so much. Philip Hammond, in Media, War and Postmodernity (2007), 
observes that descriptions of postmodern war tend to over-emphasize two major themes: 
(1) the proliferation of smart technology that distances soldiers from targets, and (2) an 
attendant media spectacle produced by news firms and the culture industries that actively 
conflate the actual with the virtual (p. 18). Hammond divides the “postmodern war” 
scholars into those who position the first Gulf War as the apotheosis of postmodern 
warfare and who highlight the deployment of high-tech weapons and near real-time 
media coverage (e.g., James Der Derian, Chris Hables Gray, Douglas Kellner, and Jean 
Baudrillard34), and another group who sees postmodern war as mainly small, low-tech 
intrastate conflicts in developing nations or in Eastern Europe over local politics and 
organized crime (e.g., what Mary Kaldor [1999] calls the “new wars” of low intensity 
conflict between small groups [ethnic groups, terrorist organizations] versus “old wars” 
                                                
33 Virilio employs a diverse range of terminology (e.g., pure war, infowar, and electronic 
war) when he speaks of contemporary warfare, although I’m unclear on whether he is 
consistent in his usage.  For example, he calls Vietnam history’s first electronic war due 
in large part to the electronic-acoustic “MacNamara Line” that was developed by 
researchers at Harvard and MIT (Virilio, 1989, p. 82). 
34 It bears noting that there is considerable theoretical variation and disagreement within 
this grouping. 
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between large nation-states).  The point of division between these camps, according to 
Hammond, is that the former group privileges the role of technologies and media 
spectacle versus the latter cadre that sees local, identity politics as being postmodern 
war’s most formative characteristic.  Hammond (2007) situates his own work between 
these poles, arguing that:  
… war and intervention since the Cold War have been driven by attempts on the 
part of Western leaders to recapture a sense of purpose and meaning, both for 
themselves and for the their societies.  This in turn has led to a heightened 
emphasis on image, spectacle and media presentation. Yet it is not really the 
media themselves that is the problem, even though some reporters and 
commentators have actively colluded in the process.  Rather, it is the changing 
character of war which is at issue, and behind that, a fundamental shift in the 
policies of Western societies, summed up as the “end of Left and Right.” (p. 11) 
 
Bringing these critical threads together, we can argue that postmodern warfare’s 
break with modernity is its political rupture as it is expressed through its info-centric 
technological transformations.  Ironically, the end of the Cold War did not solve but 
exacerbated postmodern warfare’s ontological crisis. Building on the work of Zaki Laidi 
(1998), Hammond argues that the post-Cold War period introduced a crisis of meaning 
for Western governments who lost their best, go-to enemy – the Communists. “That is to 
say, the fall of the Berlin Wall signaled the end, not only of communism, but all forward-
looking collective projects for the foreseeable future.  In postmodern terms, one might 
say that the end of the Cold War represented a collapse of grand narratives” (Hammond, 
2007, p. 14).  The West’s loss of its “Other” engendered a vacuum in the political 
imaginary; a void that was unsatisfactorily filled by humanitarian missions and (what 
some have called) “cosmopolitan interventionism” that recognizes others’ suffering. 
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However, “Sympathy for others’ pain and suffering is a lowest-common-denominator 
approach to humanity which emphasizes individual human frailty and vulnerability. It is 
about as far away from a future-oriented collective project as one can get” (Hammond, p. 
35). Such a vague political project begs questions like: what exactly counts as suffering; 
why choose one humanitarian mission over another; and when exactly have we “won”?   
It bears underscoring at this juncture that the term “postmodern,” as the aforementioned 
critics use it, reference the dominant mode of war production in the West and how it 
gains popular representation. The embattled term is intended as a diagnostic label that 
highlights the duplicitous newness and image-based simulacrum of war.  Postmodern for 
these scholars is neither a celebration of the new, nor should it suggest a material or 
epistemological rupture with the past.     
Hammond rightly argues that the post-Gulf War humanitarian and peace-keeping 
missions of the 1990s (e.g., Somalia, Kosovo) were politically unsatisfying because 
“therapeutic war” (his term) cannot help but to be disappointing when compared to 
previous conflicts that had more compelling and nationalistically beneficial political 
agendas.  The rise in military interventionism predicated on humanitaranism is a direct 
outgrowth of the “collapse of the political sphere” (Hammond, 2007, p. 57).  Hammond 
continues: “Indeed, to a great extent the attraction of this discourse lay in the fact that it 
was anti-political. Putting morality above realpolitik and vested interest, it appealed 
directly to no interest, and addressed itself to no particular constituency” (emphasis in 
original, p. 57).   
Therapeutic war’s underlying discourse is nothing new to American culture. 
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According to rhetoric scholar Dana Cloud (1998) it is the “discursive pattern of 
translating social and political problems into the language of individual responsibility and 
healing,” and it had become a dominant political rhetorical strategy and thematic motif 
across U.S. popular culture following the social turmoil of the late 1960s (p. 1). 
Therapeutic discourse’s spread during the Vietnam War and especially in its wake, maps 
over well with what Hammond (and others like Gray and Douglas Kellner) have said 
about postmodern war’s impacts on how war is waged, how it is perceived – including 
the domestic crises supposedly engendered by “the Vietnam Syndrome” – and later, the 
distinctly un-therapeutic, humanitarian missions of the 1990s.  Thus, the low intensity 
conflicts of the early post-Cold War period are less a direct outgrowth of technology than 
they are a lack of a compelling, unifying political mission; or as Hammond puts it, “The 
humanitarian spectacle…was a symptom of the crisis of meaning, not a solution to it” 
(2007, p. 58).35 The end of the Cold War allowed this war-as-therapy discourse to 
flourish and weave its way into the language of 1990’s humanitarian missions.  The post-
Cold War’s crisis of meaning and its politically impotent interventions ended in a flash 
on September 11, 2001 – or so it would initially seem. 
The War on Terror was not the solution to postmodern war’s identity crisis.  This 
amorphously labeled war lost its patina in a few short years thanks to a cavalcade of 
strategic missteps by the Bush administration.  In fact, not long into George W. Bush’s 
                                                
35 It bears noting, however, that these low intensity conflicts are viable interventions 
because newer technologies allow for minimal loss of life and just-in-time military 
assemblage, even if these same technologies themselves do not offer any moralistic or 
ethical foundation for their deployment. 
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second term, the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan were characterized by the 
mainstream press – the same press that had enthusiastically endorsed the initial invasions 
– as being politically suspect at best, and criminally mischievous at worst. This persistent 
public distrust of postmodern warfare is primarily a two-fold issue concerning the 
efficacy of documentary, news-gathering practices, and the political motivations driving 
the military interventions, reflecting the two dominant camps of postmodern war critics.  
That is, the public and the press question the very veracity of that which is being 
represented and reported, as well as the political ideals motivating the government’s 
shifting foreign policy aspirations – a political apprehension that has migrated to 
entertainment wares about post-9/11 military conflicts.  
One of the foremost reasons why the War on Terror has been difficult to re-
package into entertainment commodities is because the daily news coverage of the Iraq 
and Afghanistan wars has been handled like high-concept Hollywood products.  From its 
earliest stages, journalists and commentators saw the War on Terror as an overtly 
calculated and transparent attempt by the U.S.-led coalition powers at “creating an image 
of purposefulness” (Hammond, 2007, p. 59).  The news media’s self-conscious 
awareness of the manufactured quality of the war reportage – indeed, its awareness of 
modern war as media spectacle – undercut the coalition’s case that their campaign was 
righteous and just; “…the coalition’s obvious intention to generate good PR simply 
confirmed the perception that the war’s presentation was carefully crafted and 
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manipulative” (Hammond, 2007, p. 66).36  The cases of the U.S. government’s blatant 
image and information manipulation are numerous. Events and policies that have 
contributed to the public and news media’s justifiable skepticism about the war efforts 
include, in part: the famous April 9, 2003 toppling of the Saddam Hussein statue in 
Baghdad by Iraqi civilians (in fact, the media event was spearheaded by the Army’s 
psych-ops team [Zucchino, 2004, n.p.]); the longstanding ban on publishing photographs 
of soldiers’ remains returning to Dover Air Force Base (this restriction, which was 
instituted in 1991 by George H. W. Bush, was lifted in 2009 by the Obama administration 
[Taylor, 2009, n.p.]); the broadcasting of government-produced news reports supporting a 
range of policy efforts, including regime change in Iraq, in the nation’s largest TV 
markets (Barstow and Stein, 2005, n.p.); and the manufactured stories of battlefield 
heroics created for Private First Class Jessica Lynch and Corporal Pat Tillman (in 
actuality, Lynch’s rescue was a carefully coordinated media event [Kampfner, 2003, 
n.p.], and Tillman was not shot and killed by an Afghan militia but by “friendly fire” – 
but not before being preemptively memorialized as a war hero [Laurence, 2007, n.p.]).  
Of all the examples one could cite, the U.S. government’s PR piece de resistance 
during the early years of the War on Terror remains President Bush’s aircraft carrier 
landing and “Mission Accomplished” address.  This $1 million piece of televisual 
stagecraft invited sharp criticism from journalists and Democrats who saw the event as 
little more than a thinly veiled re-election stunt (Rampton and Stauber, 2003, p. 9).  Yet 
                                                
36 Visual studies scholar Nicholas Mirzoeff (2005), whose work I utilize in the next 
chapter, sees the government and news outlets’ media fabrications in a similar light, 
calling them “farce” that lacked the photographic punch of previous wars (Chapter 2). 
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for all the media cynicism that characterized the news coverage of the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the attitude about the truthfulness about the images and “spin” did little to 
dampen news outlets’ general support of the wars, or reporters’ complicity and collusion 
in spreading misinformation (recall Judith Miller’s reporting on WMDs for The New York 
Times).  Mortal combat remains a boon for ratings, cynicism notwithstanding.   
Given the skepticism surrounding the war planners’ political motives and their 
shifting strategic goals – mission objectives which changed from finding WMDs, to 
bringing Saddam Hussein to justice and freeing the Iraqi people, to advancing democracy 
in the Middle East – there is little wonder why entertainment producers sought to sell a 
less confusing war that was beyond the moral reproach of the day.  Hollywood’s return to 
WWII during the late 1990s and early 2000s was a commercially adept maneuver that 
permitted cultural producers to articulate popular anxieties about a nation at war while 
remaining optimistic about the U.S.’s chances of victory, a position that was increasingly 
untenable as the coalition’s litany of post-invasion missteps grew, including its failure to 
capture Osama Bin-Laden “dead or alive.”  In additional to its financial sense, returning 
to WWII also makes cultural sense given the numerous comparisons linking 9/11 to the 
1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (the term “New Pearl Harbor” has been used by the 
Bush administration’s defenders and its critics [see also, Mahajan, 2002, pp. 11-12]). The 
comparison of these homeland attacks (irrespective of the events’ legitimate similarities 
or differences) signals a desire for establishing a historical precedent for justifying the 
use of military force, and the centrality of the moving image in the documentation and 
collective memory of these traumatic events – be they black and white newsreels of 
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decimated battleships in Hawaii or handheld videos of smoking skyscrapers atop the New 
York City skyline.   
The comparisons between Pearl Harbor and 9/11 also explain why moving image 
representations of combat, even that of patently fictionalized conflicts, invite public 
debates about the moral appropriateness of war entertainment.  The issue is an especially 
thorny one for War on Terror media chiefly because it implicates the viewer in as-yet 
unsettled historical events. Even fictional post-9/11 combat entertainment cannot help but 
allude to the terrorist attacks – sometimes obliquely, sometimes explicitly – and 
America’s counterinsurgency responses.  This is the source of recent war media’s cultural 
salience, but it is also a potential stumbling block if war’s representations are mishandled 
(or perceived to be mishandled).  Visual studies scholar Nicholas Mirzoeff and author of 
Watching Babylon: the War in Iraq and Global Visual Culture (2005) whose work is 
invoked in the following chapter offers this observation about combat imagery: “…the 
war image in particular comes guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the sanctioning 
government that allows it to be seen. It is an event that creates a sense of identification or 
disidentification. In short, the representation of war as global culture reconfigures 
individuals in history by means of visual imagery” (p. 77).  War imagery is thus not 
simply about communicating some visual truth about what happens on the battlefield, or 
representing the daily reality that soldiers face. When viewed broadly, war imagery – 
including its fictional depictions across media – is also about the audience’s identification 
with the nation’s history and political mythologies, including its ideals of citizenship.  
Again: war games and war media are not created equal.  These militainments mediate 
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between individuals and their national imagined communities in medium specific ways 
and to different ends.  The discussion turns now to examining how video games’ 
representations of war are thought to connect (or not) with worldly strife.  
MEDIA MODALITY AND PLAYING WITH REALITY  
The chapter’s driving question about why military shooters succeed commercially 
in commodifying the War on Terror while other moving image media do not invites a 
series of more difficult questions about users’ expectations about the relationship 
between war and differing media forms, and the congruence (and incongruence) between 
fictional media’s depiction of combat compared to the consumer’s lived understanding of 
it.  Fortunately, the concept of “modality” has been used to explicate a “particular attitude 
toward an activity and how that activity is situated in relation to what is understood to be 
the real world” (King, 2008, p. 53). Complicating matters: this term may also refer to the 
means by which a semiotic system functions in creating an affective experience (i.e., 
modality as a mode of representational or narrative conveyance).  This chapter cautiously 
deploys modality in both of these senses because the ideas are interrelated, and because 
the modern military shooter’s gameplay is a synthesized experience of user expectations 
concerning war games’ relationship with reality generally (modality of gaming context), 
and the design technics by which military shooters produce their liminal but affective 
gaming experiences (modality as a semiotic system of representation, a mode, or as a way 
of doing things).  Thinking of media modality underscores this project’s methodological 
emphasis on understanding game culture as the result of fluctuating and interlocking 
social practices.  The study of the media modality of ludic war culture is, in effect, the 
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study of how video games, producers, players, marketers, et al. make virtual war fun.  
This chapter now examines the two registers of modality in turn, with the remainder of 
this section assessing how games relate to the reality of war (modality of gaming 
context), with the final section comparing two famous military shooter games to 
demonstrate how gameplay modality (modality of gaming textuality) is a historically 
contingent configuration, representing the media technologies that animate them. 
Media and game scholars Geoff King and Tanya Krzywinska (2006) contend that 
the video game possesses its own modality because the form possesses medium-specific 
semiotic and use markers differentiating it from other visual media (i.e., a combination of 
contextual framing routines and internal textual traits).  Moreover, the medium uniquely 
solicits and hails would-be players to experience its computational algorithms and (in 
some cases) its immersive narratives as a game, as something to be explored and played 
with. The authors borrow “modality” from Hodge and Tripp’s (1986) research on 
children’s perceptions of TV reality and fantasy, which the latter scholars have taken 
from linguistics (where that discipline has most closely scrutinized the modality of verbal 
language [Hodge and Tripp, 1986, p. 104]).  For linguists, “modality” denotes the 
perceived reality or certainty of a given message.  And like Hodge and Tripp’s research 
on televisual content, King and Krzywinska use modality to think through how video 
games represent fantasy and reality differently than other visual media, and how user 
expectations about that entertainment form shape public discourses and debates around 
gaming.  Media modality underscores the dynamic relationship between gaming’s 
contextual and textual elements.  Specifically, the way that games represent and possibly 
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impact one’s lived reality (context), as well as the design technics by which games 
simulate that reality, or a close facsimile of it (text).   
Any message’s modality is predicated on a range of modality markers that differ 
from one medium to another.  These modality markers are communicative elements that 
work together and/or at odds with one another to produce a perception of a message’s 
ontological realness.  Modality markers include elements as varied as: three-
dimensionality, color, detail, movement, music, sound effects, etc.  Individuals’ modality 
judgments, or their beliefs about a message’s connection to reality, are based on a range 
of these medium-specific modality markers; i.e., the modality markers for spoken 
language are different than those of body language, visual media, sound, etc. The 
modality (and the markers) for visual and photographic messages and media are thought 
to be generally quite high, since the sign and referent are often either indistinguishable or 
highly indexical; “The power of language systems is that there is a very great difference 
between the signifier and the signified; the power of film is that there is not” (Monoco, 
2000, p. 158). 
To clarify, the sense of realism or, on the other hand, the perceived unreality of a 
message – be it a political statement, billboard advertisement, animated cartoon – is not 
equivalent with the absolute veracity of that same representation or message.  We are 
talking here about the perceived truthfulness of a representation, and whether and to what 
extent that sense of truth is shared across social interactions.  Hodge and Tripp 
underscore this critically important distinction, stating: 
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The modality of a statement is not its actual relation to reality, its truth, falsity or 
whatever: it is a product of the judgment about that relationship which the speaker 
makes, wants, or enables the hearer to make, and the judgments that hearers do 
actually make by drawing on their selective reading of the variety of cues that are 
available as potential bases for moral judgments.  (1986, p. 106) 
 
Media modality is therefore neither an unchanging aesthetic or generic category like sci-
fi or fantasy with standard representational elements, nor is it a message’s singular truth-
value about a state of affairs.  Rather, a message’s modality is a complex site of social 
contestation, and its truthfulness is constantly being re-negotiated by interested parties37 –
“[modality] is nearly always a complex, even contradictory package of claims and 
counter-claims” (Hodge and Kress, 1988, p. 127).  One non-ludic example of message 
modality’s shifting discursive contours is the contentious debate over the so-called “death 
panels” that grabbed headlines during the 2009-2010 U.S. healthcare reform effort.  
Former Alaskan Governor Sarah Palin popularized the pejorative term, alleging that 
giving the federal government more control over regulating heath care costs would result 
in rationing care to sick Americans (i.e., government bureaucrats would be making 
choices based on finances, not doctors based on need; point of fact: the current U.S. 
system already rations care on the basis of income).  The ensuing public debates, which 
unfolded across media old and new – from cable news programs and newspapers to social 
media like twitter feeds and facebook pages – engaged the veracity of the claim, but as 
significantly, the term morphed into a talking point and rallying cry for political 
                                                
37 A slightly related concept might be the parodic “truthiness.”  “Truthiness” – which was 
popularized by comedian Steven Colbert, and which was named the 2006 “word of the 
year” by Merriam-Webster – includes “truth that comes from the gut” and those concepts 
and ideas that one wishes to be true, even though they may not be so factually.  
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opposition to regulatory reform; the point was often less about whether death panels were 
or could ever be a reality, but the point became instead that the idea of the death panel 
played into narratives about the shortcomings of government-controlled healthcare. 
The debate over a media message’s connection to reality is nothing less than the 
fight over the epistemological and ontological high ground, and ultimately, the exercise 
of social control.  Hodge and Kress make this point clear: 
Social control rests on control over the representation of reality which is accepted 
as the basis of judgment and action.  This control can be exercised directly on the 
mimetic content that circulates in a semiosic process, or it can be exercised 
indirectly, through control of modality judgments. Whoever controls modality can 
control which version of reality will be selected out as the valid version of that 
semiotic process. (1988, p. 147) 
 
There are two major fronts where debates over a representation’s connections to reality 
unfold: on a textual or representational level (i.e., that which is being depicted), and on a 
contextual or social level (i.e., public debates over a medium’s ability to communicate 
such truths).  The current chapter and the next two are concerned mainly with games’ 
textual representations, while Chapter Four tackles the latter point; specifically, how 
advertisers work to mitigate consumers’ concerns about the simulation of violence. 
King and Krzywinska (2006) wisely note that modality markers vary across the 
same semiotic mode, and that these same markers may enjoy variation within the same 
generic category for that singular semiotic mode.38  For example, although they are both 
                                                
38 This claim echoes a similar point made by Hodge and Kress (1988): “Different genres, 
whether classified by medium (e.g., comic, cartoon, film, TV, painting) or by content 
(e.g., Western, Science Fiction, Romance, news) establish sets of modality markers, and 
an overall modality value that acts as a base-line for the genre.  The baseline can be 
different for different kinds of viewer/reader, and for different texts or moments within 
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first-person shooters with similar control schemes, there is a considerable difference 
between the fantasy markers in the sci-fi shooter Doom (1993) and the historical markers 
in the WWII shooter Medal of Honor: Allied Assault (2002) (p. 21).  These textual 
variations alter user expectations concerning their respective modalities and shape 
subsequent debates around these games. King and Krzywinska state: 
Games whose localized modality markers lean towards the realism/authenticity 
end of the scale are, on balance, more likely to become subjects of controversy in 
debates about real-world issues. By making claims to authentic representation of 
Second World War contexts, in some respects, Medal of Honor opens itself up for 
potential criticism about the adequacy of the simulation it offers of aspects of an 
historical experience. (2006, p. 22)  
 
 
Figures 1.3 and 1.4: The player fires the BFG 9000 in Doom (1993)39 (L), and rests with 
a Thompson machine gun in Medal of Honor: Allied Assault (2002)40 
 
This is precisely why modern military-themed games like Kuma War and America’s 
Army tend to attract criticisms concerning their representations of military history and 
                                                                                                                                            
texts, but these differences themselves acquire significance from their relationship to the 
genre’s basic modality value” (p. 142).  
39 Doom image from: http://www.ripten.com/wp-content/uploads/2007/11/bfg_doom.jpg 
40 MoH image from: http://i.d.com.com/i/dl/media/dlimage/90/06/3/90063_large.jpeg 
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propagandistic recruitment, while more spectacularly violent and fantastic shooters attract 
media effects questions about aggression and violence (nevertheless, there remain those 
critics who reductively frame all first-person shooters as “murder simulators” irrespective 
of narrative or diegetic content41).   
For all the variation between the modality markers within a gaming genre – those 
components that read as realistic and those that do not – greater still are the differences 
between the modality markers found in games and those literal, worldly things that these 
screen elements represent.  That is, as “realistic” as shooter games purport to be (through 
their textual designs, advertising materials, etc.) the liminal state of gameplay – what the 
authors call a “distinct realm” – ultimately differentiates war games from unalterable 
combat films, TV shows, and news reports.  This essential difference rooted in the 
activity of play produces the experiential and expectational divides that determine how 
these entertainment texts are read as mediating (pleasurably or not) combat past, present, 
and future. War films ask you to watch the combat on-screen; war games ask you to play 
with the combat on-screen.  It is this foundational and consequential divergence in media 
interaction that partially explains why the public has received these intertexual artifacts 
differently than other war products.  The graphic below (Fig. 1.5) categorizes 
militainment on these two axes of modality.  The X-axis represents the relative number of 
modality markers that are thought to connect (or not) with reality (contextual modality). 
                                                
41 Col. Dave Grossman uses this colorful phrase to describe the process by which video 
games train gamers to kill without remorse. His reactionary book, Stop Teaching Our 
Kids to Kill: A Call to Action Against TV, Movie and Video Game Violence (1999) 
epitomizes the scientifically unsubstantiated moral panics around first-person shooters. 
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The left side of the spectrum favors abstracted representations; the right side favors 
specificity and worldly analogs.  The Y-axis represents the relative number of 
affordances to interact with the media artifact as an interactive apparatus (textual 
modality). 
 
 Figure 1.5: Mapping Militainment’s Modality Vectors 
 
The “distinctive realm” to which King and Krzywinska refer is, of course, the 
same elusive entity as Johan Huizinga’s famed “magic circle.”  While the concept has 
been productively critiqued and complicated (as this book’s Introduction explains) the 
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Dutch sociologist reminds us that the key experiential quality of gaming rests in its 
participatory nature.  The act of play is just that – an act – and that it is insufficient to 
understand play only as an epiphenomenal or shadow representation.  He sounds this 
important reminder for media studies scholars: 
The rite, or “ritual act” represents a cosmic happening, an event in the natural 
process.  The word “represents”, however, does not cover the exact meaning of 
the act, at least not in its looser, modern connotation; for here “representation” is 
really identification, the mystic repetition or re-presentation of the event. The rite 
produces the effect which is then not so much shown figuratively as actually 
reproduced in the action … As the Greeks would say, “it is methectic rather than 
mimetic.” (emphasis in original, 1950, pp. 14-15)  
 
Studying gameplay demands studying the dialectics of play, or the liminal relationship 
between what is happening on the screen and what that play purports to be about.  Play’s 
inherently paradoxical nature – it is and it is not what it purports to be – contains echoes 
of modality’s two main registers as this chapter has presented it.   
Whatever a game’s commentary on or connection to the real world – i.e., where it 
derives its social purchase or cultural salience – video gameplay must work to establish 
that connection along different fronts. Gameplay’s textual modality is never a given, even 
if most players expect that they will be entering a distinct realm when they pick up a 
joystick.  As an interactive set of claims about a near-real world at war, the modality of 
the military shooter only makes sense if we account for the varied design strategies that 
contribute to the creation of a given gameplay state (in addition, of course, to extra-
textual forces like marketing and social play practices). The discussion turns now to 
examining the mutual points of connection between real and virtual war, before 
unpacking the underlying structures that military shooters utilize to create their 
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engrossing experiences.  The chapter’s second definition of modality, gameplay as 
textual transport, explains how war’s horrors might be made pleasurable. 
MEDIA MODALITY AND TEXTUAL TRANSPORT 
Media representations of war are a profoundly complex and dynamic discursive 
field.  Combat’s breathtaking images and heartrending stories are remediated from one 
expressive form to another – traveling from military bloggers’ video postings on 
YouTube, to major Hollywood productions, to radio journalists’ podcasts.  Hollywood 
has been particularly successful at memorializing and narrating America’s military 
interventions because cinema is thought to accurately represent (or, at least, have the 
potential to accurately represent) such spectacular and visceral histories (i.e., with its 
modality and aesthetic design that includes photographic fidelity, narrative form, 
complex sound design that mixes musical scores with sound effects, etc.).  During their 
considerably shorter history, video war games have often parroted and co-opted cinema’s 
story conventions and visual spectacle, and have thus been engaged in an intertextual and 
inter-industrial exchange with Hollywood’s war films.   
Yet for as much as games owe their narrative and visual designs to filmmaking 
practice (see, Galloway, 2006), the first-person shooter format is nevertheless a medium-
specific modality that engenders medium-specific pleasures. The shooter’s narrative 
subjectivity (a point which receives additional attention next chapter) is culturally 
resonant because shooters draw on the common visual lexicon and representational tropes 
as other postmodern war media, while articulating these signs and markers in a ludic 
setting.  A brief historical review will make plain how the first-person shooter gameplay 
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modality operates as a textual vehicle that connects its gameplay to the broader visual 
geneology of postmodern war’s politically suspect imagery and missions. 
The first-person shooter (FPS) has been a perennially favorite genre since its 
formation and popularization in the early 1990s.  As the name suggests, the FPS has two 
essential conventions: its perspective and its activity. These twin components appear 
together in a handful of video games in the 1970s and 1980s – in fact, Battlezone (Fig. 
1.6) is often considered to be a proto-first-person shooter.  And the genre’s underlying 
visual logic has graphical antecedents dating back many decades in cinema.42  However, 
the FPS did not truly emerge as a commercially viable game format until 1992 when the 
game studio id Software successfully merged traversable, three-dimensional space with 
frenetic, run-and-gun gameplay in their PC game, Wolfenstein 3D.  This breakout hit was 
soon followed by the company’s other popular franchises Doom (1993) and Quake 
(1996).  The success of these FPS shooters and the public outcry over their violent 
content secured id Software’s infamous place in gaming history and established the FPS’s 
generic conventions for years to come.   
Anxieties about the increasingly fuzzy line between realistic and fantastic 
representations of mediated conflict did not begin with the War on Terror or with first-
person shooters, but were voiced over a decade earlier by journalists’ sobriquet for the 
first Persian Gulf War (1990-91) – known provocatively then as the “Nintendo War.” 
                                                
42 Galloway (2006) cites numerous Hollywood studio films that use extended first-person 
sequences: Buster Keaton’s Go West [1925], Alfred Hitchcock’s Topaz [1969], and, most 
notably, Robert Montgomery’s Lady in the Lake [1947], which is shot entirely from the 
subjective point of view. 
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This nickname was all-too apropos for the first globally televised post-Cold War conflict.  
News correspondents and TV pundits were drawn to this colorful descriptor because 
Western news outlets largely framed the conflict as a “clean” military engagement 
(meaning few U.S. casualties; a feeling not shared by the Iraqis who lost tens of 
thousands of citizens), and because of the Defense Department’s steady stream of TV-
friendly combat footage.  Among the most celebrated moving images of the “Nintendo 
War” were the video feeds pulled from attack vehicles and rocket-mounted cameras that 
recorded the final moments of their “smart” weapons’ flights.  The memorable images of 
this war resemble the pixilated visions of destruction being played in arcades and living 
rooms – in games like Missile Command (1980) and Battlezone (1980). 
 
 
Figures 1.6 and 1.7: A military video of a “smart” bomb striking its target (L);a player 




Figures 1.8 and 1.9: Bombs rain over Baghdad during the first Persian Gulf War (L); a 
player shoots incoming rockets in the arcade classic Missile Command (1980) (R) 
 
Striking as these graphic similarities are, there is a more consequential 
correspondence between the mainstream news and game industry’s similarly evolving 
story-telling techniques in between the Gulf Wars of the 1990s and the 2000s, and how 
these industries would visually narrate war after 9/11.  The high-tech weapons’ points of 
view made famous during the Persian Gulf War were previewed in the interfaces of the 
arcade shooters of the 1980s that transformed digital crosshairs into the focal points for 
their militarized gameplay.  But missing from these mediated subjectivities was any 
narrative that contextualized the on-screen destruction.  Defense officials and reporters 
had to make sense of the pixilated video images on the nightly news, just as arcade 
patrons had to fabricate stories for their ludic firefights.  But this narrative absence would 
disappear in immersive video games with the development of the first-person shooter.  
Having matured during the intervening years between the wars in the Gulf, 
today’s first-person shooter games bear only a passing resemblance to their pixilated and 
cartoonish forbearers (games like the aforementioned Doom and Quake) thanks to 
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considerable advances in gaming technologies (e.g., faster 3D engines, higher resolution 
graphics, high speed internet connectivity, advanced artificial intelligence), including 
faithfully rendered game assets that are modeled after actual weapons, locales, and 
physics.  
 
Figures 1.10 and 1.11: War media utilize the same visual lexicon. Soldiers and gamers 
breach doorways in the real world43 (L) and in Medal of Honor (2010)44 (R) 
 
Despite these technological upgrades, the FPS’s two foundational structures – its 
perspective (“first-person”) and its activity (“shooter”) – remain stalwart generic features 
over its evolution, and help explain the genre’s popularity and affective hold. Andrew 
Kurtz (2002) explains how these structures work together to personalize gameplay: 
Seeing the game’s world through the eyes of the protagonist, the player negotiates 
the gaming space as he would in any computer game, through an input control 
such as a keyboard, mouse, or joystick. To create an even more seamless first-
person environment, the player typically sees a representation of the protagonist’s 
hands, most often armed with a range of selectable weaponry, protruding into 
video space from the bottom of the player’s screen, roughly at hip-level relative to 
the protagonist’s/player’s “eyes.” From this perspective the player moves the 
protagonist through a series of environments, ranging from simple room-based 
                                                
43 Image from: http://www.defense.gov/dodcmsshare/homepagephoto/2009-
06/hires_090605-F-8757F-030c.jpg 
44 Image from: http://www.blogcdn.com/www.joystiq.com/media/2010/02/moh5-
2182010-580px.jpg 
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mazes as in Wolfenstein 3D and Pathways Into Darkness, to more complex 
outdoor environments as in the Marathon and Half Life series of games. Given 
varying degrees of narrative complexity, the ultimate goal in the first-person 
shooter is to traverse from point A to point B, ridding the environment of the 
enemies which inhabit it. (p. 113) 
 
As a textual apparatus, the first-person shooter foregrounds the player’s as an agent of 
change in that diegetic universe.  As a narrative vehicle, the format transforms those 
choices into key nodal points for the development of its personalized war story. 
Let us return to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.  By this point in gaming history, first-
person shooters had matured as a genre and were regularly supplementing their complex 
spatial designs with an array of customizable gameplay options and, as importantly, 
compelling narratives that contextualized the on-screen violence.  The Department of 
Defense made a similar realization concerning its management of war information.  No 
longer content to only release sanctioned images and videos of their technologies and 
warriors in press briefings as they had during the Persian Gulf War, the Defense 
Department selected choice reporters to accompany its fighting men and women into Iraq 
during its “liberation.” These reporters did not necessarily present viewers with any more 
spectacular images of war than had been seen previously.  However, embedded 
journalists did succeed in delivering live images of themselves in Iraq as a means for 
American audiences to identify with the war effort (Mirzoeff [2005]).  To be clear: it is 
unlikely that design innovations in the commercial games market influenced war 
planners’ policy decisions facilitating embedded combat journalism.  Nevertheless, it 
remains a remarkable fact of our twenty-first century media environment that the traits 
long-associated with war cinema, i.e., spectacular, kinesthetic visuals and gripping 
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narratives of personal heroism, had migrated to the daily reporting practices of cable 
news shows and the design of FPS war games. As is argued by the media and war 
scholars cited earlier, the underlying reason for this resemblance in the narrative design 
of combat media is due to the changing nature of war during the early post-Cold War 
period, including the prevailing political anxieties and the warfighting technologies that 
were supposed to quell those fears.  
FROM THE FIRST-PERSON TO THE FIRST-PERSONAL SHOOTER 
One of this book’s guiding tenets is that the modality and meanings of video 
games are socially constructed and negotiated along numerous sites – inside and outside 
of the gaming text – from cover art, to level design, to news coverage (King and 
Krzywiska 2006; Jones, 2008).  Another one of this work’s foundational premises is that 
as techno-cultural artifacts, games cannot help but to reflect their moment and mode of 
production.  Meaningful cultural criticism about gameplay must accordingly make sense 
of titles’ creative designs as well as their broader social and political contexts.  Modality, 
as it has been argued, is a generative term for assessing how games are broadly 
understood as representing reality; or how gameplay is “situated in relation to what is 
understood to be the real world” (King, 2008, p. 53).  Modality is also useful for thinking 
through how the form operates as a textual apparatus for transporting players to another 
experiential realm – to another time and place, to a “magic circle.” This is the second 
resonance of the chapter’s key term, and the one that will be examined presently and 
across the next two chapters. The game comparison that follows is a preamble to the 
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following chapters’ deeper textual analyses that seek to explain how these popular 
militainment transport gamers to other experiential realms. 
Looking at two popular shooters side-by-side that were produced decades apart 
should clarify the interrelated issues of modality-as-reality-claims and modality-as-
transport by revealing how gaming platforms’ differing capabilities to represent and 
commodify conflict create pleasures that are both historically specific (reflecting extant 
technologies and cultural concerns), and aesthetic structures that transcend their eras 
(reflecting enduring medium-specific traits).  The following diachronic evaluation of two 
shooters is necessarily limited in scope and is not intended to represent all of the video 
games of their respective eras (the arcade shooters of the 1980s, or the first-person 
shooter games of the 2000s).  Nevertheless, the Cold War’s Missile Command (1980) and 
the War on Terror’s Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare (2007) are emblematic titles of their 
respective gaming epochs, and offer a dramatic comparative snapshot for appreciating 
how gameplay modality changes alongside technologies’ computational abilities, which 
in turn shapes their ability to create pleasurable ludic war experiences.    
When placed side-by-side, the arcade classic Missile Command (1980) and Call of 
Duty 4 (2007) bear little similarity.  The former game, which Atari modeled closely after 
its 1978 hit Space Invaders (Blumenthal, 1980, p.180), presents the player with a 
pixilated and flat world populated exclusively by six cities and three missile defense 
stations.  The player, whose view of this world remains fixed from a single, unflinching 
point of view, is tasked with protecting these cities from incoming missiles that increase 
in number and aggression as the levels progress.  There is no way for the player to finally 
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complete the game, because, at some point, the gamer will lose her cities to the 
overwhelming barrage of in-coming rockets.  This arcade favorite contains no music 
soundtrack, no video clips conveying a narrative background story (explaining, for 
instance, why the player is under attack), and there is no means of changing one’s point 
of view within this stark, two-dimensional world.  A Newsweek magazine piece 
colorfully describes the arcade classic as follows:  
If there is one game that requires the “right stuff,” this is it. Your mission is to 
protect six cities by destroying enemy missiles with missiles of your own. Your 
arsenal includes three separate bases for launching your counterattack, each with 
its own control button; a fourth control aims your shots. As the war progresses, 
the enemy gets faster and more accurate—he (sic) even throws a few “smart 
Tombs” (sic) your way. One good strategy: saturate the air with a line of 
explosions to absorb the first wave of enemy fire, then block subsequent 
offensives with smaller bursts. As long as at least one of your cities survives, the 
game will continue. Missile Command graphics are lively and colorful. Video 
warriors especially enjoy the machine's victory celebration. The screen explodes 
into red and triumphantly flashes an epitaph for civilization as we know it: “The 
End.” Any teen-ager who regularly scores above 100,000 should be required to 
submit his name and address to the U.S. Air Force. (Gelman, 1982, p. 92) 
 
 
Figures 1.12 and 1.13: Missile Command (1980) (L), and Call of Duty 4 (2007) (R) 
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By contrast, Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare (examined in the following chapter 
and again in Chapter Four) is a photo-realistic game that places the player in the midst of 
frantic firefights using a variety of weapons, equipment, and vehicles. Throughout the 
game’s multiple story-driven levels, the gamer plays as different soldiers along numerous 
war fronts.  Call of Duty 4’s production value is on par with Hollywood films, and this 
shooter has been lauded for its engrossing story, riveting score, and its numerous 
gameplay modes (including a wildly popular multiplayer setting).  Given these 
considerable visual, aural, and gameplay differences, what could these titles possibly 
have in common? Do they both engender ludic war experiences?  And if so, how? 
In her influential and prescient Hamlet on the Holodeck: The Future of Narrative 
in Cyberspace (1997), Janet Murray describes cyberdrama’s (a category that includes 
video games) three foremost aesthetic structures – immersion, agency, and transformation 
– that engender user pleasures.  Murray’s concepts, when applied to Missile Command 
and Call of Duty 4, reveal how design strategies for representing and simulating war have 
changed alongside advances in computer graphics, artificial intelligence, and processing 
power, in addition to reflecting the artistic and creative possibilities that attend to those 
innovations.  At the same time, video games typically strive to realize Murray’s three 
structures as best they can, which gives games a historically transcendent design 
continuity despite the form’s considerable technological changes over these same years.  
The admittedly limited comparison that follows should be viewed in light of the previous 
section’s argument about the contextual, discursive aspects of media modality, and how 
techno-cultural structures necessarily condition notions of realism in war games.  
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Immersion 
Murray’s first category, immersion, or the experience of being transported to a 
simulated realm, is not strictly a technological feat, but is a co-creation of player and text.  
She contends that because we want to experience immersion, “we focus our attention on 
the enveloping world and we use our intelligence to reinforce rather than to question the 
reality of the experience,” and that digital environments present users with “new 
opportunities to practice this active creation of belief” (Murray, 1997, p. 110-111).  (As 
the Introduction notes, Murray is among those new media critics dissatisfied with how 
interactivity is typically discussed in strictly technological terms). Key instruments in 
fostering these processes of belief building are the creation of space and story.  Moreover, 
the avatar, or the gamer’s primary representation in the mediated world, is a linchpin 
element that unites diegetic game spaces and game stories (I return to these points in 
Chapter Three’s examination of the Tom Clancy-brand shooters).   
The construction of space and story are wholly different in Missile Command and 
Call of Duty 4, and thus directly affect how the games are experienced.  For example, in 
Call of Duty 4, the player moves her soldier (who may be any number of characters in the 
single-player game) through three-dimensional spaces overcoming a variety of physical 
and tactical obstacles, and must cooperate with non-player characters to defeat terrorists 
in a number of near-real scenarios.  In Missile Command, the player moves and aims a 
reticle at the cascading rockets over several vulnerable, two-dimensional megalopolis.  
There is no personalized avatar, or any human form in this game because of the era’s 
computational limitations.  Video game scholar Mark J.P. Wolf (2003) argues, like 
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Murray, that the player-character is among the most important screen elements in video 
games, and that player-characters are either “surrogate-based” (there is a third-person 
view of one’s avatar) or “implied” (you may share the character’s perspective as in a 
first-person shooter game, or there may only be a manageable interface for interacting 
with the world as in the Civilization or SimCity games) (p.50).   
While the two war games handle space and narrative differently, the player’s 
foremost screen proxy in both Call of Duty 4 and the abstracted Missile Command are 
crosshairs.  These “implied player-characters” are informational markers that tell gamers 
where their gunshots (in Call of Duty) or surface-to-air rockets (in Missile Command) 
will strike. According to Wolf:  
The player-character surrogate in the video game is, in a very concrete sense, the 
external object into which the player is absorbed, which receives the player’s will 
to activity. This may help to explain why the majority of player-character 
surrogates in video games are character-based. (2003, p. 60)   
 
It is a remarkable achievement, indeed, that first-person shooters (like the Call of Duty 
games) can cultivate such immersive environments, and develop such detailed but 
implied player-characters without having to literally represent that figure in third-person 
(as one would with a surrogate player-character – think Sonic the Hedgehog, or the 
combatants from the Street Fighter series). The implied player-character at the center of 
the first-person shooter experience is a testament to these games’ engrossing spatial 
designs and narrative artistry. By contrast, there are few elements hailing the implied 
player-character in Missile Command as an embodied defense operator in that 2D world: 
there are no drill sergeants yelling at the player to aim better, no cinematic scenes 
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relaying a dramatic backstory, and no fellow humans inhabiting the world.  And because 
Missile Command is without immersive elements like narrative and 3D space that 
interpellate the gamer as a diegetic being, the arcade shooter’s collective abstracted 
modality markers engender a comparatively less affecting ludic war experience.45  
Agency 
Murray’s second cyberdramatic structure is agency, or the “satisfying power to 
take meaningful action and see the results of our decisions and choices” (1997, p. 126).  
Agency is at the heart of the interactivity definition debates, and is the key characteristic 
that gives new media its participatory quality; agency puts the “play” in “gameplay.”  
With respect to most war games, agency is generally expressed and manifested in terms 
of moving and shooting.  But meaningful gameplay is more than just seeing one’s 
joystick movements or mouse clicks on screen.  As Murray notes: 
Agency, then, goes beyond both participation and activity. As an aesthetic 
pleasure, as an experience to be savored for its own sake, it is offered to a limited 
degree in traditional art forms but is more commonly available in the structured 
activities we call games. Therefore, when we move narrative to a computer, we 
move it to a realm already shaped by the structures of games. (1997, p. 129) 
 
                                                
45 Of course, immersion proper is not predicated solely on graphical representation. Nick 
Muntfort’s Twisty Little Passages (2005) documents how text adventures and role-
playing games like Dungeons and Dragons can be extremely immersive. Abstraction in 
video games, as Wolf (2003) observes, can be quite engrossing and mentally stimulating 
as well since the players mentally fill in the representational gaps.  In a horrifying 
realization of this, Missile Command’s own programmer, Dave Theurer, had nightmares 
for half a year following the game’s production (Barkan, 2004, p. 140). 
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The reason that games, and especially narrative-driven games, excel at promoting a sense 
of agency is because the structured activity gives players prompts for meaningful role-
playing and opportunities for exercising intentionality and choice in a fictional world.46   
The most common game type and – not incidentally – the earliest form of 
narrative are “agon, or [the] contest between opponents” (Murray, 1997, p. 145).  This is 
why, according to Murray, the “simple shoot-‘em-up videogame…belongs to the 
extremely broad dramatic tradition that gives us both the boxing match and the 
Elizabethan revenge play” (1997, p. 145).  Missile Command and Call of Duty 4 are 
likewise part of that same contest tradition; the gamer staves off an unseen opponent’s 
missile volleys in one, and eliminates terrorists in close-quarters combat in the other. 
Murray continues: “Because guns and weaponlike (sic) interfaces offer such easy 
immersion and such a direct sense of agency and because violent aggression is so strong 
a part of human nature, shoot-‘em-ups are here to stay. But that does not mean that 
simplistic violence is the limit of the form” (1997, p. 146). We should add that simplistic 
violence is also not the limit of the genre.  And though long-hamstrung with simplistic 
representations of violence, all war games are not de facto “shoot-‘em-ups” (although, 
some combat games certainly deserve the pejorative label). Martial violence figures 
prominently in both games, and agency is exercised primarily at the business ends of 
their virtual guns.  But that obvious observation misses a larger point.  The virtual gunfire 
means something different in each game because of the surrounding narrative structures, 
                                                
46 Gameplay actions and existential thought share numerous concerns: player freedom, 
intentionality, contextual affordances, and experiential flow, among others.  For an 
exploratory discussion regarding these similarities, see Payne, 2009a.   
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aesthetics, and play contexts.  For example, there is a detailed and complex journey story 
afoot in Call of Duty 4 that gives narrative and ethical motivation to the in-game actions 
(again, even if those actions largely center around shooting). “One of the consistent 
pleasures of the journey story in every time and every medium is the unfolding of 
solutions to seemingly impossible situations” (Murray, 1997, p. 138).  There is no such 
narrative framework in Missile Command, making it a less personalized virual war 
experience than games with narratives. 
The gunplay is predictably different in these military shooters as well.  In Missile 
Command, the player-turned-defense operator can neither traverse space (change their 
shooting perspective) nor change weapons.  As the levels progress, the player is charged 
with becoming more accurate and efficient with the limited ammunition shot from their 
single firing position. Even veteran gamers must eventually sacrifice their cities to the 
incoming rocket barrage.  The ending in Missile Command is always the same; no matter 
the player’s skill, there will be a nuclear apocalypse with every quarter dropped into the 
arcade cabinet.  Call of Duty players, meanwhile, deploy a variety of guns for a variety of 
strategic ends: from using shotguns in close-quarters combat, to firing rocket launchers to 
eliminate enemy vehicles, to using silenced sniper rifles on surveillance runs.  The player 
must abide by the level’s specific dictates – e.g., not shooting teammates and non-
combatants, or capturing a specific piece of intelligence – but they are relatively free to 
engage the opposing force using whatever weapons they have at their disposal.  The 
ability to choose where and when to fire the weapon of one’s choosing ties the player’s 
choices to the game’s objectives, producing a sense of personal investment in seeing that 
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the goals are achieved.  Let me be clear on this point, as I do not want to overstate my 
case: it is not that in-game actions are de facto signs of player agency or are empirical 
evidence of interactivity (which they certainly can or could be), it is rather that game 
actions can be deeply meaningful if the gaming apparatus (again, understood broadly) 
creates an environment that reinforces the fiction of the synthetic world, and connects to 
gamers’ lived experiences.  Thus, the Cold War political environment informed the ludic 
experiences of 1980s arcade-goers playing Missile Command, just as the War on Terror 
colors the gaming experiences of today’s Call of Duty players.  Although the latter 
game’s visual, narrative, and control schemes engender a comparatively complex and 
customizable (and thus personalized) text, it does not follow that simpler games are 
unaffecting.  Indeed, our liminal states of play can be so immersive and agentive and so 
personally and profoundly moving – across game mediums and eras – that these 
experiences can change the way we look at ourselves and the mediated and non-mediated 
worlds around us, bringing us to Murray’s third aesthetic structure.  
Transformation 
Transformation is Murray’s third characteristic pleasure of cyberdrama and digital 
realms, and it refers to interactive media’s ability to offer users multiple imaginary roles 
and opportunities to see a process (or set of processes) unfold in varying ways. “In 
computer games we do not settle for one life, or even for one civilization; when things go 
wrong or when we just want a different version of the same experience, we go back for a 
replay” (Murray, 1997, p. 135). The ability to immerse oneself into a synthetic world and 
act on objects, thereby transforming that space and/or its stories to varying degrees, and 
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to do so over the course of multiple journeys is an immensely pleasurable sensation that 
is rarely available (or as available) in other media arts.  Murray argues: “Because the 
computer is a procedural medium, it does not just describe or observe behavioral patterns, 
the way printed text or moving photography does; it embodies and executes them.  And 
as a participatory medium, it allows us to collaborate in the performance” (1997, p. 181).  
By participating in the game’s processes and algorithmic procedures, we become part of 
the game, part of the story.  Murray wisely cautions that this personal attachment and 
performed enactment is not some neutral state of being, but that embodied experiences 
can contribute to the social good or collective ill.  Regrettably, there are those video 
games that quite purposefully trade in gross representations, drawing the ire of 
politicians, activists, and players.47  However, there are also video games that are used to 
train and educate users on a variety of subjects (e.g., the “serious games movement”), and 
some modified military titles are even used to treat soldiers’ cases of post-traumatic stress 
disorder.  Educational games are but one example that transformation, like media 
interactivity generally, is not a strictly technological event.   
Games are a potentially transformative medium because they allow us to consider 
the ramifications for a variety of actions, many of which are regularly denied to us in real 
life.  One of the foremost war game events is killing others and experiencing our own 
deaths.  Given all that has been said about Missile Command and Call of Duty 4, it is not 
                                                
47 These games are an ugly but real part of video game history. Two of the more 
infamous titles are Atari’s Custer’s Revenge [1982] where the player gets points for 
raping a captive Native American while dodging arrows, and the Flash-based internet 
game, Border Patrol [no date], has the player shooting Mexican stereotypes like the 
“Mexican Nationalist,” “Drug Smuggler,” and the “Breeder” before they enter the States. 
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surprising that they too differ with how they represent the gamer’s demise.  In her 
popular Joystick Nation (1997), video game critic and historian J.C. Herz recalls her 
feelings around one’s inevitable defeat in Missile Command.  Herz’s reflection speaks to 
the paradoxical pleasures of knowing when and how one meets their virtual maker. 
The most intense thing about Missile Command, though, was this weird crazy 
moment near the end, when the ICBMs were raining down and you knew you 
were just about to lose it, that was totally euphoric. Because you knew that you 
were going to die, that you were within second of everything going black. You’re 
gonna die in three seconds. You’re gonna die at this instant. You’re dying. You’re 
dead. And then you get to watch all the pretty explosions.  And after the fireworks 
display, you get to press the restart button, and you’re alive again, until the next 
collision with your own mortality. You’re not just playing with colored lights. 
You’re playing with the concept of death. (Herz, 1997, p. 64)  
 
Missile Command, which “originally grew out of a military simulation to see how many 
nuclear warheads a human radar operator could track before overload set in” (Poole, 
2000, p. 36), is a remarkable achievement because it played with and effectively 
commodified the Cold War anxiety of a nuclear holocaust.     
Call of Duty 4 also plays with death, but it does so in a more personal manner 
than Missile Command thanks to its immersive narrative and 3D universe.  Upon being 
killed in a multi-player game, the player is treated to a “killcam” replay that shows how 
that player was killed, and who killed them.  Yet Call of Duty 4’s most intimate and 
moving depictions of death are conveyed in its single-player, narrative-driven campaign 
mode.  It is with these depictions of death where the ludic differences between the titles 
are most pronounced.  This final point of comparison also allows prime us to begin 
thinking about the focus of the following chapters – how contemporary military shooters 
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model the personal sacrifices (Chapter Two) and political commitments (Chapter Three) 
that are necessary to wage modern counterinsurgency campaigns. 
The Modern Warfare games (i.e., Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare [2007] and 
Modern Warfare 2 [2009]) are emblematic modern military shooters that model in 
striking narrative and ludic terms the political need for personal sacrifice.  The first death 
scene of note occurs during the Call of Duty 4’s opening credit sequence when the player 
is located in the body of Yasir Al-Fulani, the fictional President of an unnamed country in 
the Middle East, during a separatist-led military coup d'état.  The kidnappers force the 
player (Al-Fulani) into the backseat of a car and, as the car travels down the city streets, 
the player sees an urban space ravaged by militants who conduct public executions and 
home invasions.  The player, Al-Fulani, is then drugged before the opposition leader 
Khaled Al-Asad.  Al-Asad addresses a small video camera before turning around to 
execute the player-character with a pistol in a public square. 
 
 
Figures 1.14 and 1.15: The player-character’s views of death during their televised 
execution (L), and from nuclear fallout (R) in Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare 
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The second scene of note occurs immediately after the gamer’s helicopter, who is then 
playing as U.S. Marine Sergeant Paul Jackson, is knocked out of the sky by an exploding 
nuclear device.  When the player-character awakens, he stumbles from the wreckage to 
find a decimated and irradiated Middle Eastern city devoid of life.  The player only has a 
few moments to explore the wasteland before he too dies of his wounds.  
The player is powerless to do anything but to bear witness to their virtual deaths 
in these levels.  Even the seemingly ever-present guns of this first-person shooter game 
are absent, and with them, the player’s ability to intervene in these sequences.  These 
moments are also especially powerful because they are told through the first-person 
perspective. Alexander Galloway (2006) rightly notes how the protracted first-person 
view (not a quick glance-object cut) operates differently in film than it does in games: 
“Where film uses the subjective shot to represent a problem with identification, games 
use the subjective shot to create identification” (emphasis in original, p. 69).  In these two 
moments, players see – in as intimate a manner as is possible – the circumstances and 
causes of their deaths: they see their executioner’s gun, and the mushroom cloud from 
ground zero. These two scenes are viscerally affecting and are, ironically, potentially 
personally transformative moments precisely because they present fates that the gamer 
cannot escape; they are scripted events that are technically non-transformative.  This 
curious design choice, which is examined in closer detail next chapter, inverts and short-
circuits the agency and transformation typically enjoyed in military shooter games.  The 
absence of technological transformation – such as these death scenes – does not foreclose 
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absolutely the potential for personal transformation.  After all, like agency and 
immersion, transformation is not some impersonal aesthetic structures or technological 
activity.  Rather, these three aesthetic structures of cyberdrama wield their affective 
power by interfacing and interacting with players and their extant cultural concerns, 
including topical elements like non-state terrorists and WMDs.   
Missile Command and Call of Duty 4 play differently with anxieties about an 
outside nuclear attack, be it by an unseen aggressor or a non-state terrorist group.  The 
games’ differing depictions of their player-characters’ deaths are symptomatic of the 
platforms’ technological capabilities, and are a singular but telling example of how ludic 
war’s textual strategies change over time, even as war games’ thematic concerns and 
video games’ aesthetic structures endure. Twenty-first century shooters offer players 
affecting gameplay experiences that are produced by immersive environments, photo-
realistic visuals, engrossing narratives, complex avatar controls, and digital worlds that 
can be transformed again and again – points that will be examined in greater detail in the 
following chapters.  I do not wish to suggest that games like Call of Duty 4 engender a 
qualitatively better ludic war experience than more graphically abstract games like 
Missile Command.  These are, however, most certainly different wars. Literary scholar 
Marie-Laure Ryan (2001) strikes this useful distinction between games across eras: 
Through the increasing attention devoted to the sensorial representation of the 
game-world, the pleasure of modern games is as much a matter of ‘being there’ as 
a matter of ‘doing things.’ From a strategic point of view the newer games 
(Doom, Myst, or Quake) are not superior to the old ones (PacMan or Tetris), but 
they are infinitely more immersive. (p. 309)   
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That is, while one game is not more inherently artistic than the other, Call of Duty 4’s 
realized rendering and telling of an interactive war story speaks more forcefully to post-
9/11 cultural anxieties than Missile Command’s non-narrative (or spectacle-based) 
gameplay does to the Cold War crisis because the former is, ultimately, a more 
aesthetically and technologically sophisticated piece of media.  Modern shooters’ 
heightened degrees of immersion, agency, and transformation engender complex textual 
experiences, and thus offer richer objects of study for the current investigation.  The 
changes in how ludic war is produced – from classic arcade shooters like Missile 
Command to multi-million dollar, multi-platform titles like Call of Duty 4 – represent the 
ludic transition from the first-person to the first-personal shooter, and explains why the 
gameplay modality of military shooters resonates with the political anxieties spawned by 
postmodern war in ways that other war entertainment does not, or perhaps, cannot. 
TOWARDS A NEW MODALITY OF LUDIC WAR PLAY 
 
The towers are gone now, reduced to bloody rubble, along with all hopes for 
Peace in Our Time, in the United States or any other country. Make no mistake 
about it: We are At War now – with somebody – and we will stay At War with 
that mysterious Enemy for the rest of our lives. 
 
-- famed “gonzo journalist” Hunter S. Thompson (2001) 
writing the day after the 9/11 attacks 
 
Cultural producers have had difficulty selling entertainment products about the 
War on Terror due to disenchanted attitudes with the protracted wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and a persistent suspicion of postmodern war media generally. Military 
shooters’ prodigious sales are an exception to this trend, suggesting that games offer 
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experiences that are qualitatively different than those found in other mediums (despite 
possessing similar imagery and themes).  This chapter has outlined the political anxieties 
that haunt depictions of postmodern warfare and how the video game’s modality of play 
offers users ways of interacting pleasurably with the popular war imaginary.   
Modality, as this chapter has employed the term, is a message’s connection to 
what is understood to be the real world, and media modality is a communicative form’s 
medium-specific ability to convey a sense of ontological reality or unreality.  Fictional 
media convey their truths differently because their medium-specific modality markers 
work in concert to affect us in varying ways.  In turn, users’ reactions to how a message 
or story is depicted produces modality judgments about the representational abilities and 
limitations of the communicative form itself.  Media modality and notions of realism are 
part of an interconnected, historically contingent, and fluctuating discursive field that is 
always subject to debate and contestation. 
The pleasures of playing video games are inextricably linked to issues of media 
modality, including: the prevailing notions about the interactive form itself, a given title’s 
game technics, mechanics, and narrative, and the manner in which these contextual and 
textual modality issues interact with one another.  Contemporary military shooters 
succeed in the marketplace where other war entertainment fail because the games respond 
forcefully to the postmodern war’s political crisis of meaning by granting players 
opportunities to fight virtually in wars resembling the ones they see in moving-image 
entertainment and in news coverage.  These affecting, medium-specific textual pleasures 
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are a consequence of the modern war shooter’s immersive visuals and narrative design, 
and its controllable on-screen action.   
Gaming’s textual modality facilitates an experiential transport that clearly 
overlaps with Murray’s aesthetic structures.  Yet, as it is hopefully now clear, immersion, 
agency, and transformation (and any other underlying structures) should not be thought 
of as operating alone or understood outside of history. The modality of context reminds 
us that media users wield technology in specific settings and thus experience these 
aesthetic structures at a historical moment.  Any holistic consideration of gaming’s 
pleasures must be evaluated in light of the contextual modality of media because it is the 
situational canvas against which any virtual play is ultimately understood.  Modality-as-
discourse complements analytically Murray’s aesthetic structures by emphasizing that it 
is the operation of a text in a lived context that ultimately determines how pleasurable 
media are or can be, including military-themed games.  
Modality and Murray’s three aesthetic structures of inform but do not structure 
explicitly the following two chapters’ analyses.  Chapter Two analyzes how the first-
person perspective embeds gamers in multiple storylines in the famed Modern Warfare 
series, and in doing so, models a militarized vision of “sacrificial citizenship” that is a 
component of the post-9/11 American political identity (Murray’s immersion). And 
Chapter Three assesses the way Tom Clancy’s best-selling shooter franchises grant 
players control over near-future weapon systems and communication technologies 
(Murray’s agency), and give players opportunities to save the homeland through the 
strategic conquest of terrorized, domestic spaces (Murray’s transformation), both of 
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which perpetuate a politically conservative vision of American exceptionalism. (Chapter 
Four also investigates modality, but it moves away from the game text to analyze how 
contextual understandings of violent, militarized gameplay inform the marketing efforts 
behind the first Modern Warfare title). 
 
Figure 1.16: Differing design technics and degrees of personalized gameplay modalities 
in Call of Duty 4 and Missile Command 
 
The foregoing comparison of Missile Command to Call of Duty 4 is neither 
intended to gloss over the multitude of technology and game design innovations that have 
occurred over the three decades separating these titles, nor should it be inferred that less 
complex games are unable to engender lasting and affecting responses.  Instead, the side-
by-side textual evaluation illustrates how media modality – in both of its usages – 
presents researchers with a means of tracking the “moving target” that is ludic war and its 
















like Call of Duty’s intimately presented, near-future war story.  Yet the games possess 
structural components that put them in a historic, industrial, and aesthetic dialog (i.e., 
they are in the same militainament quadrant in Fig. 1.5).  Media modality reminds us that 
there are, after all, important affective and technological continuities of form between 
these dissimilar shooters. As Murray (1997) rightly observes: “These pleasures [those 
emerging from immersion, agency, and transformation] are in some ways continuous 
with the pleasures of traditional media and in some ways unique. Certainly the 
combination of pleasures, like the combination of properties of the digital medium itself, 
is completely novel” (p. 181). Appearances to the contrary, these two shooters’ 
foundational gameplay elements give them a greater formal affinity to one another than 
either of them have with cinematic or TV war entertainment.  
Missile Command’s story-less and pixilated depiction of a nuclear Cold War 
turned hot is abstracted; its narrative – such as it is – is clearly allegorical.  The game 
invites the player to spend quarter after quarter to see how long they can defer the 
inevitable apocalypse while imagining what such a future might look like. Despite its 
simple presentation, Missile Command’s abstracted war nevertheless produces lasting 
visions of Cold War destruction (as Seth Barkan’s poetry attests).  Call of Duty 4: 
Modern Warfare is not allegorical, however. It is hauntingly and graphically specific. 
We must remember that in addition to generating compelling affect for individual 
players in narrative campaigns (or gamers in multiplayer sessions), these shooters also 
wield popular, global influence.  This is how modality-as-transport (this chapter’s second 
definition of modality) reconnects with modality-as-reality (the first understanding of 
 117 
modality).  The shooters examined in this and in the following chapters enjoy a certain 
received wisdom regarding the righteousness of American military interventions, in large 
part, because these commercial ventures are not government produced. These games 
wield what Joseph Nye (1990, 2003, 2004) calls “soft power” because they are not 
considered to be government propaganda:  
Soft power is the ability to get what you want by attracting and persuading others 
to adopt your goals. It differs from hard power, the ability to use the carrots and 
sticks of economic and military might to make others follow your will. Both hard 
and soft power are important in the war on terrorism, but attraction is much 
cheaper than coercion, and an asset that needs to be nourished. (2003, Para. 2) 
 
Gameplay modality therefore – understood simultaneously as claims about reality and as 
a form of textual transport – unequivocally demonstrates that the soft power of fiction can 
operate in the service of the hard power of the state. The next two chapters further unpack 
this connection by examining, first, how the Modern Warfare franchise’s immersive 
perspective and complex narratives produce a mode of personalized subjectivity that 
justifies the sacrifice of soldiers and citizens on behalf of the post-9/11 state; and, then, 
how Tom Clancy’s tactical shooters argue to the world why America must take the 
military lead in the twenty-first century by showcasing the dire consequences of its 
failure to act swiftly, unilaterally, and if need be preemptively.  
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Chapter Two 
The First-Personal Shooter: Narrative Subjectivity & Sacrificial Citizenship in the 
Modern Warfare Series 
 
True war stories do not generalize. They do not indulge in abstraction or analysis.  
For example: War is hell.  As a moral declaration the old truism seems perfectly 
true, and yet because it abstracts, because it generalizes, I can’t believe it with my 
stomach. Nothing turns inside. It comes down to gut instinct. A true war story, if 
truly told, makes the stomach believe. 
 
-- from Tim O’Brien’s The Things They Carried (1990, p. 78) 
  
INTRODUCTION  
I argued last chapter that the video game’s modality of play enables it to respond 
in medium-specific ways to the numerous anxieties – political, cultural, existential, etc. – 
introduced by postmodern conflict, and especially for those military operations conducted 
during the post-Cold War years.  I also argued that the interactive entertainment 
industry’s generational changes in gaming technology and design innovations have 
shaped cultural producers’ techniques when commodifying warfare.  The game industry’s 
drive towards crafting ever-more affecting and personalized ludic war experiences vis-à-
vis increased degrees of agency, immersion, and transformation, have resulted in a 
changing intimacy and personalization of players’ ludic subjectivities over this same 
time; representing the transition from the first-person to the first-personal shooter.   
The current chapter turns its attention to better understanding the manner by 
which the military shooter cultivates the textual attractions of its mediated subjectivity. 
The first-person shooter, more so than any other war game format or genre, allows 
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gamers to interface with a counterinsurgency imaginary that they can only bear witness 
to in other militainment.  I choose the word interface purposefully for several reasons. 
For one, interface denotes the general way that games play with popular notions of 
warfare (e.g., strategies, rationales, policies, themes, narratives, visual tropes), as well 
those digitized control interfaces of modern weapons systems (e.g., video shots from 
aerial vehicles and “smart” weaponry).  A second reason for emphasizing the term is 
because of the specific manner by which the Modern Warfare games (Call of Duty 4: 
Modern Warfare and Modern Warfare 2) locate the gamer in the virtual boots of 
numerous soldier-avatars across their narratives.  In playing through the games’ single-
player campaign modes as these soldiers, the gamer becomes the narrative interface or a 
virtual interlocutor, connecting the fictional soldiers’ separate stories of heroism, deceit, 
and sacrifice in this best-selling multi-part series.  The games’ changing perspectives give 
the player a uniquely transcendental view of the martial action that responds to the major 
dilemmas of postmodern war discussed last chapter: its perspectival distances and 
political meaninglessness.  
The gameplay modality that dominates the Modern Warfare series is that of the 
skilled soldier.  However, the two Modern Warfare titles are particularly noteworthy for 
placing players in different war theaters as soldiers and civilians who fight and die.  
These shifting points of view engender a paradoxical virtual subjectivity that is at once 
situated in individual battles, and one that transcends space and time.  This interpersonal 
modality of war play models for the player the “sacrificial citizenship” that has come to 
characterize post-9/11 American political identity – one that hails all US citizens as de 
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facto conscripts for a war that may demand, at any moment, the greatest of personal 
sacrifices.   
This chapter begins by arguing that the game industry’s push towards crafting a 
personalized narrative subjectivity resonates with the U.S.’s counterinsurgency doctrine.  
I then analyze how the Modern Warfare titles, in narrating their fictional war stories, 
engender a virtualized sacrificial citizenship that connects recent post-9/11 war efforts to 
a Cold War past. By granting players intimate battlefield views and performative liberties 
not afforded by other “war fare” – including simulating the gamer’s own death – the 
series engenders empathetic bonds between the gamer and its sacrificial avatars.  
THE NARRATIVE SUBJECTIVITY OF COUNTERINSURGENCY 
Technology ruled the day during the first Persian Gulf War.  Saddam Hussein’s 
troops and armored divisions were routed easily by the overwhelming power of the 
U.S.’s networked forces and advanced weapons systems spawned by the post-Cold War’s 
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).  The RMA (or, as it is sometimes called “the 
Transformation” – which receives additional attention in the next chapter on Clancy-
brand games) maintains that the U.S. armed forces could become swifter and more 
powerful by leveraging advances in communication and computer technologies as a force 
multiplier in conventional warfare.  This was not the case for the occupations of Iraq and 
Afghanistan however as these conventional technologies were proven insufficient and 
ineffective when faced with non-state terrorists’ asymmetrical tactics.  The RMA 
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eventually gave way to Counterinsurgency as a defense strategy, which downplayed the 
role of technology and emphasized instead the role of culture in winning wars.48    
Counterinsurgency (or COIN as it is known in military and think tank circles) is a 
military doctrine that calls for the United States to leverage its considerable technological 
superiority in failed political states (i.e., those harboring terrorists) alongside cultural 
outreach and nation-building projects with the aim of achieving military and political 
victory for “the long war”.49  Counterinsurgency is also a distinct ideological lens.  It is a 
way of viewing global conflict and the United States’ central place in adjudicating and 
moderating that conflict.  Citing General David Patraeus’ famed Counterinsugency field 
manual (2006), which outlines the military and cultural strategies needed to face down 
threats posed by asymmetrical warfare, Nicholas Mirzoeff argues that COIN presents the 
long war as nothing less than a global cultural war. He states: “Cultural war, with 
visuality playing a central role, takes ‘culture’ as the means, location, and object of 
warfare … In the era of United States global policing, war is counterinsurgency, and the 
means of counterinsurgency are cultural. War is culture.”  (Mirzoeff, 2009, p. 1737).  
Visuality, like media modality, is as a key concept for understanding how first-person 
shooters produce their affective experiences and convey beliefs about U.S. warfighting.  
                                                
48 Despite their different emphases, the RMA remains the progenitor of 
Counterinsurgency; “Counterinsurgency is the permanent continuation of the RMA” 
(Mirzoeff, 2009, p. 1738). 
49 The term “the long war” – which initially referred to the protracted battle against non-
state terrorists in the wake of 9/11 – has since been used in a variety of popular and 
military publications, though some officials dislike its connotation with the previous and 
most recent long war – the Cold War.  See Unfolding the Future of the Long War (2008) 
by Christopher Perin et al. of the RAND Corporation for an extended discussion 
concerning the term’s definitional challenges. 
 122 
Visuality is a historically specific and contingent mode of vision; or, perhaps a 
more useful phrasing for our purposes, visuality is a kind of media modality.  Vision and 
visuality are related terms, though they are not synonyms.  The former is a physical 
activity; the latter is a cultural and social activity. Vision is the ability to see, whereas 
“Visuality…[orders and narrates] the chaotic events of modern life in intelligible, 
visualized fashion” (Mirzoeff, 2006).  Visuality is therefore a discourse – it is a way of 
organizing sights and sounds into a causal order whereby personal sensoria are made 
intelligible vis-à-vis some interpretive framework. The social construction of visuality 
makes it, like the modality of media, a site of struggle for meaning and social power.     
If war is culture, as Mirzoeff claims, then modern war is more precisely visual 
culture (see, Virilio, 1989), and postmodern war is simulational culture.  The visual 
modality of the military FPS is the idealized military visuality of simulational culture.  
This is because games like the Modern Warfare series and Tom Clancy-brand shooters 
model how military-grade technologies function in the post-Cold War era, and they 
narrate why counterinsurgency interventions are launched or might need to be launched. 
To call the first-person shooter the ideal visual modality of the early twenty-first century 
is not hyperbole.  In fact, Mirzoeff warns us about dismissing the congruencies between 
counterinsurgency efforts and commercial shooter games.  He states: 
In the section of the counterinsurgency manual intended to be read by officers in 
the field, visuality is defined as the necessity of knowing the map by heart and 
being able to place oneself in the map at any time. This mapping is fully 
cognitive, including “the people, topography, economy, history, and culture of 
their area of operations” (US, Dept of the Army 7-7). The counterinsurgent thus 
transforms his or her tactical disadvantage into strategic mastery by rendering 
unfamiliar territory into a simulacrum of the video game’s “fully actionable 
 123 
space” (Galloway 63). When soldiers refer to action as being like a video game, 
as they frequently do, it is not a metaphor.  By turning diverse aspects of foreign 
life into a single narrative, the counterinsurgent feels in control of the situation as 
if a player in a first-person shooter video game. The commander thereby feels 
himself to be in the map, just as the game player is emotively “in” the game. 
(emphasis added, 2009, p. 1741)   
 
The first-person visuals made famous during the Persian Gulf War were an aesthetic 
prerequisite to the shooter’s immersive visualization of counterinsurgency.  But, as was 
argued last chapter, the key design innovation of the FPS’s modality is not some dramatic 
graphical upgrade or play mechanic – it is the adept creation of narrative subjectivity.   
Narrative subjectivity and war visualization are inextricably linked concepts.  The 
visualization of war is the ability to see the battlefield in all of its complexity. It involves 
understanding how various war units interact as one might move knights, rooks, and 
bishops on a Chessboard. “Visualization is the key leadership tactic that holds together 
the disparate components of counterinsurgency” (Mirzoeff, 2009, p. 1741).  But 
visualization encompasses more than visuals alone; it is more than dispassionate and 
quantifiable battlefield tactics.  The visualization of war also includes understanding the 
rationales that motivate military interventions and the risks they pose for “blood and 
treasure.”  For shooters like Modern Warfare and the Clancy-brand games examined next 
chapter, the visualization of ludic war means empathizing with soldiers’ and civilians’ 
stories of sacrifice that enable America to wield its political power in the new century.   
And herein lies the ideologically seductive power of ludic war’s gameplay.  By 
linking the gamer’s actions with the unfolding counterinsurgency narrative, the war 
stories on screen – in effect – become the gamer’s stories (thanks in no small part to the 
 124 
aesthetic structures of immersion, agency, and transformation).  In the case of the Modern 
Warfare games, because the player experiences these campaigns as different international 
soldiers engaged in a range of combat activities around the globe, the changing 
subjectivity – although always experienced from the first-person, gun-toting perspective 
– further implicates the gamer into the overarching narrative action by engendering a 
paradoxical vantage point that is at once situated in individual campaigns, while also 
providing the player with a wider perspective that transcends space, time, and single 
soldiers’ points of view.  These changing virtual subjectivities make the gameplay action 
personal (i.e., the enemy is shooting at me, and I am shooting at them) and interpersonal 
(i.e., the ability to virtually walk in an avatar’s boots, and another, and then another).  
These interconnected situated and transcendental points of view enable the gamer to 
make sense of the violent actions that would be morally objectionable were they not able 
to piece the marital vignettes into some justifiable whole.   
Mirzoeff posits that: “Counterinsurgency has become a digitally mediated version 
of imperialist techniques to produce legitimacy” (2009, p. 1737).  Commercial military 
shooters are a paradigmatic part of this legitimacy-producing cultural effort due to their 
unique ability to simulate what counterinsurgency efforts might look and feel like.  We 
see this expressed clearly in the Modern Warfare games where the gamer plays as 
multiple characters in its complex narrative, and in the Clancy-brand shooters examined 
next chapter, where cutting-edge military weapon systems and battlefield tactics promise 
to protect the homeland from terrorists and perpetuate American exceptionalism as the 
reigning political belief that informs America’s post-9/11 foreign policy doctrines.  
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As we know from last chapter, the first Gulf War was analogized to graphically 
abstracted and story-less gamespaces.  It was the “Nintendo War.” It was an 8-bit war. 
But the second Gulf War is a mediated event through and through. (TIME magazine 
dubbed the Iraq War the “YouTube War” [Cox, 2006] for its vast array of video 
depictions created by media firms, soldiers, and civilians that have been posted to the 
video-sharing site of the same name). Unlike the pixilated and person-less (and often 2-
dimensional) battlefields typical of classic gaming titles from the 1980s, the first-person 
shooters of the 2000s offer immersive and customizable theaters of war. These virtual 
wars are no 8-bit battles.  They are complex, 3D synthetic worlds.  They possess soldiers 
who yell and scream, and bleed and die – only to be digitally resurrected when the levels 
are replayed.  The FPS games of the 2000s fuse complex storytelling with immersive 
level design, producing a textual modality that promotes a narrativized form of 
militarized vision – one uniquely equipped to meet the anxieties of conducting war after 
9/11.  By the time that the U.S. military had returned to Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein in 
2003, the first-person shooter was well on its way to presenting players with a new 
modality of ludic war.   
These games were and remain marketplace successes because their photo-realistic 
visuals and immersive stories sync with what players believe combat to look and feel 
like.  Moreover, these narrative and procedural elements engender a vicarious sense of 
patriotism.50  Patriotism is not a staid definition as an encyclopedia entry might 
summarize it, but it is a lived and felt energy.  Conservative political philosopher Roger 
                                                
50 Note: this is not equivalent to saying that this is what we know war to be like. 
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Scruton calls patriotism “a natural love of country, countrymen (sic) and the culture that 
unites them” (emphasis added, qtd. in Dooley, 2009, p. 158).  For Scruton and similarly 
minded thinkers, patriotism is an essential building block of the nation-state; it is a social 
bond that unites a nation’s imagined community of citizens across space and time.  
Modern Warfare simulates a sense of virtual patriotism through its immersive narratives 
of personal sacrifice that create a bond between the gamer and the sacrificial soldier or 
citizen.  Remember: counterinsurgency is a powerful policy concept because it theorizes 
how to face down asymmetrical terroristic threats through the deep appreciation of the 
tactics, strategies, and personal costs extending beyond any single battle.  The Modern 
Warfare games model for players the human sacrifices that modern counterinsurgencies 
demand, and reify the processes by which everyday soldiers and civilian become patriots. 
The remainder of this chapter examines how this best-selling series generates its affective 
hold; or to borrow Tim O’Brien’s phrase, this chapter will now examine how the Modern 
Warfare games make “the stomach believe.”  
SACRIFICIAL CITIZENSHIP IN THE MODERN WARFARE SERIES 
Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare (2007) was the first game of the storied franchise 
to deviate from its famed World War II setting.  The game was a popular and critical 
success, selling over 14 million units across multiple consoles, and receiving almost 
universal praise from game reviewers and critics.51  Two years later its sequel, titled 
simply Modern Warfare 2 (2009), was released to slightly more tepid reviews though 
                                                
51 The game reviewers’ discourse receives sustained attention in Chapter 3. 
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greater fanfare – moving over 20 million units.52  Both Modern Warfare games owe 
much of their success to the franchise’s established track record, including popular online 
multiplayer modes that pit gamers against one another or in teams in fast-paced, 
objective-oriented matches.  The Modern Warfare games’ single-player narratives – 
criticized by some game journalists for their relatively short campaigns (each takes about 
six hours to complete) – are structurally similar to the previous Call of Duty installments 
insofar as they place players in the boots of recurring characters along several war fronts. 
While this mechanic is hardly novel for the franchise, Modern Warfare possesses a 
textual potency absent from its previous WWII shooters.   
In the previous Call of Duty games, the gamer plays as international soldiers – 
American, British, Soviet, Canadian, Polish – fighting in a superbly documented and 
historic global war.  This is not the case for Modern Warfare’s fictional, near-future 
battles.  In these games the player’s Special Forces soldiers battle to contain a raff of 
modern-day horrors.  Fighting today’s non-state terrorists have considerably different 
resonances than fighting yesteryear’s Nazis, and the Modern Warfare games tap into 
prevailing anxieties in ways that the WWII shooters cannot.  This is reflected in the 
games’ contextual modality issues (some of which were covered last chapter).  For 
instance, WWII gameplay concerns largely revolve around issues of historical accuracy 
(as King and Krzywinska rightly note): did the battle unfold in this manner, and are these 
uniforms and weapons accurately rendered?  This is not the foremost contextual modality 
concern for titles daring to model near-future conflicts. WWII is generally thought to be 
                                                
52 These sales numbers were tabulated in June 2010. 
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beyond moral suspicion.  This is not the case for the War on Terror.  The concern for 
these contemporary titles is instead: is it morally permissible to play war games that 
invoke the contemporary war imaginary?  Modern Warfare and similar games 
commodifying the War on Terror must make a special effort to justify repeatedly the 
sacrifice of American lives.  And, by extension, the games must also justify that playing 
with these concerns is likewise permissible.  The Modern Warfare games make their 
textual justifications in dramatic fashion.   
The Modern Warfare single-player campaigns contain serpentine storylines and 
numerous characters that make an elegant summarization difficult. Call of Duty 4: 
Modern Warfare (2007) centers on the multi-front counterinsurgency efforts of the 
British Special Air Service (SAS), a Special Forces unit of the British Army, and the 
American United States Marine Corps (USMC) in tamping down an international 
conspiracy waged by Russian Ultranationalists and Islamic separatists operating in an 
unnamed Middle Eastern country. Led by Imran Zakhaev, the Russian Ultranationalists 
have financed a military coup d'état in that unnamed country, allowing Khaled Al-Asad 
and his Islamic insurgents to overthrow the local government.  The American forces 
invade the Middle Eastern country to capture or kill Al-Asad, while the British forces 
pursue his Russian financiers.  The gamer plays as different SAS and UMSC soldiers 
attempting to return the Middle Eastern country to its elected leadership and prevent 
Zakhaev’s group from launching nuclear-armed ICBMs at the United States. The game 
ends when a joint USMC and SAS task force kills Zakhaev and detonates the nuclear 
ICBMs over the Atlantic.  
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The events of Modern Warfare 2 (2009) begin a few years after the first, once 
Imran Zakhaev has been lionized as a political martyr and the Ultranationalists have 
gained control of the Russian government.  The player again assumes control of 
American and British soldiers in multiple theaters of war – this time, as part of “Task 
Force 141,” a multi-national counter-terrorist unit, and the U.S. Army Rangers.  Vladimir 
Makarov, one of Zakhaev’s former lieutenants, has been spearheading numerous terrorist 
attacks across Europe, and succeeds in framing an American special agent in a civilian 
massacre at a Russian airport.  This heinous act prompts Russia into declaring war on the 
United States.  Task Force 141 is charged with traversing the globe for evidence that will 
exonerate the United States in the airport massacre, while the Rangers defend Virginia 
and Washington D.C. against invading Russian forces.  After a series of plot twists which 
reveal American and Russian military leaders to be duplicitous, power-hungry 
warmongers, the Rangers preserve Washington D.C., and Task Force 141 eliminates the 
traitorous military leaders. 
In the game’s “post-mortem” (a review of a project’s development history), Call 
of Duty 4’s lead designer Zied Rieke and technical art director Michael Boon discuss the 
creative liberties that the Infinity Ward game studio took with the first Modern Warfare’s 
story. The designers state: 
Modern-day warfare is very emotional for people, which is both good and bad.  
We really wanted to avoid referencing any current, real wars, and one aspect of 
the gameplay that we didn’t want to change from previous titles was the idea of 
two large opposing forces with similar numbers and technology. To facilitate that, 
we invented a war with several fronts, primarily involving a group splintered from 
the Russian army, with a secondary front in the Middle East.  (2008, p. 25) 
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They continue later: 
Story is something we’ve always put a little effort into, but by and large we’ve 
prioritized it below other aspects of our games. Moving away from WWII and 
into a fictional war removed that option. We spent hours brainstorming with 
military advisors, trying to come up with a credible scenario that would involve a 
large-scale war, and then weeks interviewing writers to find someone who could 
help us craft a narrative that would draw the player in.  The result, while not 
Shakespearean, has drawn almost universal praise. We feel like we have a new 
skill, and we intend to build on it in our future projects. (2008, p. 26) 
 
It is certainly debatable whether or not the first game’s story represents a 
“credible scenario,” and Modern Warfare 2’s sensational narrative stretches the 
credibility of this claim even further.  However, the designers correctly assert that: 
“Modern warfare is very different from more traditional warfare in that direct 
confrontations between huge armies are relatively rare. Instead, you have a huge variety 
of different types of low-intensity conflicts and special forces missions” (Rieke and 
Boon, 2008, p. 25). The titles re-imagine a counterinsurgency wherein the fighting is 
between Western nations and their well-funded and well-organized enemies.  That is, the 
two sides in this fictional war function as military equals (which typically do not have 
direct, asymmetrical warfare, though they will engage in indirect or proxy warfare as was 
the case during the Cold War).  The choice to set military equals against one another in 
the current era is an adroit slight of hand that enables the player’s virtual war experience 
to be politically satisfying (i.e., the enemy is an equally matched adversary), and at the 
same time, resemble the smaller-scale engagements players have come to expect from 
post-Cold War interventions.  In actuality, the game and its sequel more closely represent 
modern day conventional warfare, not modern day asymmetrical warfare (even if the 
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game’s levels are largely built around Special Forces missions).  This conflation explains 
part of the games’ ideological appeal.  Infinity Ward’s fictional war scenario is politically 
satisfying because it recasts the Manichean political dynamics of WWII (i.e., Allies vs. 
Axis powers) and the Cold War (i.e., U.S. vs. USSR) in the post-9/11 era, where such 
divisions are rarely that clear and where military might is generally quite lopsided.  This 
design choice also makes sense given the franchise’s successful track record with its 
WWII titles. There is, however, a more consequential textual mystification that helps 
explain the games’ popularity.     
Modern Warfare’s campaigns focus on the gamer’s combat in a contemporary 
setting, and the visual modality that dominates the games is that of the skilled soldier.  
But there exist pronounced moments in the games’ single-player campaigns that stand 
apart from the rest – moments where the player is prevented from acting as the skilled 
and heroic soldier.  At first blush, these scenes seemingly throw the hectic combat into 
stark relief by challenging postmodern warfare’s existential and political anxieties; in 
particular, the dehumanizing distance of war machinery’s technological mediation and 
the epoch’s political crisis of meaning.  These scenes are experientially arresting, 
literally; players are unable to move or defend themselves as they normally might.  These 
narrative moments seemingly give the Modern Warfare titles a pronounced moral and 
political ambivalence. These scenes hint that “truth” on the battlefield is a complex and 
elusive entity, and that determining war’s “winners and losers” is never as clear as the 
games’ scoring mechanisms might suggest.   
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But like the design conceit that transforms asymmetrical counterinsurgency into a 
conventional and symmetrical war, these scenes too perform a textual slight of hand.  
Ironically, it is precisely these anomalous scenes’ radical deviation from the martial 
gunplay that legitimize and rationalize the games’ principal activities – namely, the 
martial gunplay.  The narrative moments examined presently, which I am labeling 
moments of sacrificial citizenship, underscore the need for exercising and maintaining 
military vigilance by personally visualizing and experiencing the self-sacrifice that is 
largely absent in other shooters and similarly-themed militainment.53  
 Modern Warfare’s shifting subjectivity engenders a pronounced sense of 
“sacrificial citizenship” that is a key affective element in the games’ pro-
counterinsurgency ideology. Sacrificial citizenship is not a term that has been thoroughly 
conceptualized to date.  It appears sporadically across a range of scholarship, and it 
typically refers to a core element of American political identity that demands that the 
rights of citizenship be reaffirmed, and the political health of the U.S. body politic be 
reinvigorated, through citizens’ periodic and voluntary self-sacrifices. This sacrifice can 
be figurative or literal in nature.  For instance, legal scholar Paul Kahn (2010) discusses 
how the courtroom judge models a form of sacrificial citizenship when they do not rule 
by individual expertise, but rather “give themselves up to the law” (n.p.). Communication 
scholar Carolyn Marvin (1991) invokes sacrificial citizenship when discussing the 
American flag’s symbolic power and public debates around flag burning.  Marvin argues 
                                                
53 Please note: I am not claiming that scenes or themes of sacrifice are absent in 
contemporary war media. Rather, I am arguing that personal sacrifice is embodied 
because the war gamer controls (or has been controlling) the doomed avatar.    
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that the American flag is an “unacknowledged but potent symbol of the body … a special 
kind of body sanctified by sacrifice” (p. 120).  In these quite different cases, sacrificial 
citizenship involves a form of discursive transfer or symbolic exchange with the physical 
self.  The judge is not the law, but she is a vessel for law.  The flag is not the soldier, but 
it is a potent representation of Americans who have sacrificed their bodies for the nation. 
Sacrificial citizenship in the Modern Warfare games likewise involves a virtual 
exchange. The exchange occurs along two fronts: it happens within the games’ stories as 
characters’ selfless actions are connected across their multiple storylines; and sacrificial 
citizenship happens experientially when the gamer plays through the characters’ 
sacrifices.  These textual elements work in tandem, producing an experiential modality 
that works to offset the mediated distance and the crisis of meaning posed by postmodern 
warfare.  The chapter turns now to examining these video gameplay paroxysms. 
CLOSING THE PERSPECTIVAL DISTANCE IN “NO RUSSIAN” AND “SECOND SUN” 
There are a few notable soldier and civilian deaths in the Modern Warfare games 
that are scripted events; meaning, no matter how well one plays, certain characters cannot 
be saved because these deaths are part of the games’ storylines.  As was discussed last 
chapter, the first Modern Warfare game provides intimate scenes of one’s own virtual 
death.  These startling moments include the broadcast execution of overthrown President 
Al-Fulani, and the protracted death of U.S. Marine Paul Jackson following a small 
nuclear blast.  The player is restricted from doing little more than looking around as they 
suffer through these characters’ final moments.  Modern Warfare 2 continues in this same 
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vein of closing the gap between the player and their virtual demise, and it has at least two 
levels that require special attention – “No Russian” and “Second Sun.” 
The “No Russian” level contains the most controversial material in the two 
Modern Warfare games, and arguably that of the entire Call of Duty franchise.54  This 
early level places the gamer at the center of the airport massacre that is the catalyst for 
the fictional conflict between Russia and the United States.  The gamer plays as 
undercover CIA agent Joseph Allen who is tasked with infiltrating a Russian terrorist cell 
led by Vladimir Makarov.  During the elevator ride to the terminal, the terrorist leader 
instructs his team (including the player, Allen) not to speak any Russian (hence the 
level’s title) once they begin shooting, lest they reveal their true nationality.  The elevator 
doors open and the five-man squad opens fire on the travelers making their way through 
the security checkpoint and in the terminal beyond.   
 
                                                
54 There are at least three reasons to suspect that Infinity Ward was purposefully courting 
controversy with the inclusion of the “No Russian” level.  First, the game contains the 
option to skip the objectionable level and continue through the campaign mode.  Second, 
the player may advance through the level without shooting civilians (the level is 
terminated, however, if the undercover player fires on the terrorists). And the third reason 
to think that the studio was generating hype is because details about this level were 
“leaked” in the final weeks right before the game’s release. 
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Figure 2.1: The player participates in an airport massacre in Modern Warfare 2 
 
 
The game narrative goes to considerable lengths to justify and punish Allen’s – 
and by extension, the player’s – participation in the slaughter. The sacrificial citizenship 
that is modeled in this level is two-fold: Allen compromises his morality for a shot at 
bringing Makarov to justice, and he ultimately loses his life for the botched mission.  
Even before the player is transported into the Allen character, the interstitial cut-scene55 
that plays while the level loads establishes the need for the agent’s sacrifice.  
The “No Russian” loading scene begins as a wide shot of the Earth – as it might 
be seen through a surveillance satellite in the Defense Department’s imagined Global 
Information Grid – that observes military hot spots in Europe and Africa. In this 
segment’s voice over, General Shepherd explains to the player the dire need for Allen’s 
patriotic service.  The satellite images give way to digitized newspaper clippings and 
                                                
55 Cut-scenes are common narrative devices in games that forward the narrative while 
game information (e.g., levels, assets, etc.) load in the background. 
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other data summarizing visually Makarov’s long history of cruelty. The general states to 
Allen, the player:      
Yesterday you were a soldier on the front lines.  But today front lines are history. 
Uniforms are relics. The war rages everywhere. And there will be casualties.  This 
man Makarov is fighting his own war and he has no rules.  No boundaries. He 
doesn’t flinch at torture, human trafficking, or genocide.  He’s not loyal to a flag 
or a country or any set of ideals.  He trades blood for money.   
 
He’s your new best friend. You don’t want to know what it’s cost already to put 
you next to him. It will cost you a piece of yourself.  It will cost nothing 
compared to everything you’ll save. (Modern Warfare 2) 
 
General Shepherd rationalizes how the long war against terrorism demands special 
soldiers who can face down monstrous non-state enemies.  Soldiers who sacrifice a piece 
of themselves for the greater good is common thematic motif in war entertainment.  Yet 
this instance of “sacrifice” assumes ghastly import when the gamer suddenly finds herself 
staring down her gun sights at a room full of unarmed civilians.   
Another moment of personal sacrifice emerges at this level’s finale, once 
Makarov and his men elude the airport’s security forces. As the player steps into the 
escape van, Makarov turns and shoots the player.  Before he dies, Allen hears the leader 
remark to one of his men: “The American thought he could deceive us. When they [the 
Russian authorities] find that body [Allen] … all of Russia will cry for war.” Allen (and 
by extension the player) is punished for his participation in the massacre and for falling 
victim to Makarov’s nefarious plans.  (This would be an unceremonious conclusion 
indeed were the player not able to rectify the military’s mistakes and exonerate the U.S. 
from criminal wrongdoing).  The level’s controversial content nevertheless underscores 
the need for soldiers to engage in morally suspect actions if those counterinsurgency 
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operations (e.g. undercover missions, low-intensity proxy wars, etc.) are to serve the 
nation’s post-Cold War political interests. “No Russian” gives players the opportunity to 
see those questionable military actions up close, and it gives them the license to commit 
war crimes under the auspices of national security. 
 
 
Figure 2.2: The terrorist leader Makarov kills the player at the conclusion of Modern 
Warfare 2’s “No Russian” level 
 
In addition to committing “collateral damage,” Modern Warfare 2 also includes a 
memorable scene of becoming collateral damage.  During the “Second Sun” level in the 
game’s third and final act, the gamer plays as U.S. Ranger Private James Ramirez who is 
defending Washington D.C. against invading Russian forces. Ramirez’s team is stationed 
near a downed helicopter while his outnumbered team runs low on ammunition.  As an 
enemy attack chopper descends on the Rangers, its spotlight blinds Ramirez and the game 
suddenly transitions to an orbiting space station.  The player is now in limited control of 
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an astronaut conducting a spacewalk.  Houston’s Control Center requests that the 
astronaut (the player) turn his helmet camera toward a bright object streaking over the 
horizon.  Within a few short moments, the player sees that the object in question is the 
missile that was launched from a Russian submarine during a previous level.  Suddenly, 
the rocket explodes in its low orbit, obliterating the International Space Station, and 
knocking the player-astronaut into the darkness of space.  The screen fades again to 
white, as the player is transported back to Ramirez who is still hunkered beneath the 
helicopter.  The rocket’s explosion unleashes an electromagnetic pulse that disables the 
city’s electronics, including American and Russian weapons and vehicles.  With planes 
and helicopters falling from the sky around them (a not-so thinly-veiled visual allusion to 
the 9/11 attacks) Ramirez and the Rangers use this moment to their tactical advantage, 
and make their way to the besieged White House.   
 
 
Figure 2.3: An exploding rocket demolishes a space station and knocks the player’s 
character helplessly into space in Modern Warfare 2’s “Second Sun” level 
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Standing alone, the “No Russian” and “Second Sun” levels offer little more than 
nihilistic and bleak assessments of modern conflict.  Slaughtering unarmed citizens or 
dying unceremonious deaths – be it as an undercover solider or non-combatant – is a 
stark but strangely welcome corrective to the sanitized and citizen-less representations of 
contemporary combat, much of which dominate the history of video war games. The “No 
Russian” and “Second Sun” scenes are not autonomous sequences, however, and they 
cannot help but be interpreted within the games’ connected narratives. These first-person 
death sequences are contextualized within the larger storyline, thus diffusing their 
potential to prod the gamer into reexamining the precepts of postmodern war.  Instead, 
these civilian losses become regrettable but necessary sacrifices – narratively and 
ideologically, speaking – of modern counterinsurgency. They are the human resources 
needed for maintaining the “long war” that is the U.S.’s War on Terror campaigns.    
CLOSING HISTORICAL DISTANCES IN “ALL GHILLIED UP” & “ONE SHOT, ONE KILL” 
 
“Oceania was at war with Eastasia: Oceania had always been at war with 
Eastasia.” 
   -- George Orwell’s 1984 (1949, p. 182) 
 
Captain Price: The Loyalists are expecting us half a click to the north. Move out.  
Gaz: Loyalists, eh? Are those the good Russians or the bad Russians?  
Captain Price: Well, they won't shoot at us on sight, if that's what you're asking.  
Gaz: Yeah, well that's good enough for me, sir. 
-- British SAS soldiers in Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare (2007) 
 
 
Modern Warfare and similar shooters combat textually the anxieties of 
postmodern war by narrativizing virtual combat through the their immersive first- and 
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third-person perspectives.  These ludic wars are not fought primarily from the mediated 
perspective of aerial vehicles or unmanned drones first made famous during the Persian 
Gulf War, but are conducted by warfighters on the ground – soldiers who sacrifice their 
physical selves for the sake of the nation.  But contemporary war’s political crisis of 
meaning is not only an effect of advanced communication technologies’ experiential 
remove.  As was noted last chapter, this crisis is also due to postmodern warfare’s a-
historical nature, and the post-Cold War era’s absence of a reliable, ideological other.  
The Modern Warfare games’ near-future conflicts work towards diffusing these related 
anxieties by establishing historical continuities between Cold War menaces and twenty-
first century non-state terrorists, and by positioning the gamer as an agentive participant 
in these unfolding martial histories.  The Modern Warfare games each possess telling 
back-to-back levels that work through, or perhaps more accurately, work around the 
political challenges of conducting modern day combat operations. 
Call of Duty 4’s “All Ghillied Up” and the “One Shot, One Kill” levels stand out 
by virtue that they are the series’ only flashback sequences.56  All of the other levels 
unfold sequentially and possess a clear narrative causality. The gamer, who has been 
taking orders from Captain John Price in previous levels, plays here as Lieutenant Price 
fifteen years before the game’s main storyline – placing the action sometime in the mid-
1990s.  Paired with Scottish SAS officer Captain McMillan, he and the player are tasked 
with assassinating Imran Zakhaev during an open-air meeting in the abandoned city of 
                                                
56 The first level is named for the “ghillie suit” – a camouflage outfit worn by snipers and 
hunters. 
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Prypiat, Ukraine.57  After the two soldiers stealthily make their way past patches of 
deadly radiation and enemy patrols, they assume a sniping position in a derelict high-rise. 
As Zakhaev’s meet-up unfolds, McMillan coaches Price (the player) on the mechanics 
and challenges of firing his high-power sniper rifle from such a distance. After adjusting 
for wind and other variables, Price shoots Zakhaev and the force of the .50 caliber shot 
rips the Russian’s left arm from his body.  McMillan states (incorrectly) that the wound is 
fatal and he instructs Price to pack up and make haste to the extraction point. McMillan 
and Price encounter heavy resistance around the landing zone, but they manage to board 
a helicopter and are carried to safety.  In deviating temporally from the present-day action 
in Europe and the Middle East, these two levels showcase the dual ideological functions 
served by the Zakhaev antagonist and the Prypiat space in the cultivation of the game’s 
ludic pleasures as they relate to the visualization of history and sacrificial citizenship.   
The Imran Zakhaev character fills the void of the absent, ideological other, and is 
the game’s “missing link” between the Cold War’s Communists and the War on Terror’s 
“Islamofacists.” This ideologue seeks to return Russia to its pre-capitalist glory, and he is 
the principal financier behind the Middle Eastern terrorists who have deposed and 
executed President Al-Fulani.  But fifteen years before these events and prior to 
becoming the leader of the Russian Ultranationalist Party, Zakhaev operated as a rogue 
arms dealer who exploited the collapse of the Soviet Union for his personal gain.  This is 
the point at which Price and McMillan interrupt his black market sale of stolen uranium 
fuel rods taken from the Chernobyl nuclear power plant (the site of the infamous April 
                                                
57 Prypiat may also be spelled: Pryp’yat’ or Pripyat’. 
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26, 1984 “meltdown”). By creating a narrative through-line that connects the attempted 
black market sale of stolen uranium during the 1990s to the explosion of a nuclear device 
in the 2010s, the game evocatively connects Russian arms dealing and nuclear 
proliferation with Middle Eastern terrorism.  (The fact that Zakhaev survives the 
assassination attempt by the SAS only further underscores the game’s tacit assertion that 
Special Forces operatives need to exercise extreme martial prejudice to ensure that their 
human targets do not live to cause problems years later).    
Price and McMillan’s assassination mission also stands apart because it is one of 
the few moments in the first Modern Warfare game when the player interacts in a named 
and identifiable real-world space.58  By setting these levels in Prypiat, Ukraine, Modern 
Warfare suddenly inserts a worldly reality into the game’s near-real fiction.  The 
historical memory of the worst nuclear power plant accident in human history becomes a 
convenient sliding signifier in these levels.  Meaning, the game frames the city’s tragic 
history not as an object lesson in the dangerous power of nuclear energy production, but 
as a convenient narrative backdrop for international lawlessness.  The ghostly space is 
framed as a failing or failed political state that has become a magnet for terrorism, and 
which demands Western military interventions.  Point of clarification: I do not wish to 
dispute the dangerous reality of WMDs, or the ability of terrorists and black market 
interests to exploit unguarded or under-guarded nuclear stockpiles. Rather, the point is 
                                                
58 For whatever reason or reasons – perhaps due to the unqualified success of the first 
game, the studio’s sense of changing public sentiment, or perhaps due to the second 
game’s outlandish plot – Infinity Ward did not eschew naming and re-creating real 
locales in Modern Warfare 2 and Modern Warfare 3 [2011] (e.g., Washington D.C., Rio 
de Janeiro, Afghanistan) as they had in the first game. 
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that by introducing a real space into the game’s fictionalized history – in a narrative that 
has remained conspicuously vague about its combat settings – is startling.  Indeed, the 
choice to include Prypiat is nearly as affecting as the depiction of the abandoned city 
itself; a point echoed by McMillan during their exploration: “Look at this place.  50,000 
people use to live in this city. Now it’s a ghost town.  I’ve never seen anything like it.”  
 
Figures 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7: Call of Duty 4’s rendering of Prypiat (L) and photos of the 
abandoned city (R)59 
 
The dramatic intrusion of the historical real into the game’s fictional diegesis 
conflates historical enemies of the West (not unlike the clumsy “Islamofascist” 
neologism) from different eras for the purpose of placing the current struggle into a 
comprehensible and, ultimately, defensible narrative. Functionally, the Prypiat levels 
communicate Price and Zakhaev’s long-standing mutual antipathy, establishing their 
                                                
59 Image from: http://callofduty.filefront.com/potd/96531 
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personal motivations for their violent tête-à-tête in levels to come.  Ideologically, 
however, this sequence portends that our collective fates hinge on the ability of Western 
powers’ Special Forces to operate as needed, lest our cities come to resemble Prypiat 
(despite, of course, its fate not having been sealed by terrorists).  The sacrificial 
citizenship modeled in these levels is a quid pro quo arrangement: the soldiers make 
sacrifices for us the citizenry; in return, we sacrifice or desire to know precisely how 
these operations are executed (or who is executed for that matter, and how).60  
PLAYING WITH THE MODALITY OF HISTORY IN “END CREDITS” & “MUSEUM”  
Modern Warfare 2’s “End Credits” and its non-campaign “Museum” bonus level 
present players with two sides of the same proverbial coin as it relates to this war game’s 
handling of sacrificial history.  The former moment, which directly follows the 
conclusion of the game, is a virtual tour of a museum exhibit commemorating the game’s 
fictional global war.  As the production credits roll vertically, the virtual tour reminds 
players how civil society glorifies wars and its warriors, and how combat’s victors 
consecrate their story as accepted history.  The “Museum” bonus level is an interactive 
version of that same museum space.  It is also an irreverent handling of the social process 
represented in the End Credits, and it offers a textual subversion available only in the 
video game form.  While Call of Duty 4’s flashback levels in Prypiat illustrate how real 
history can be injected into a diegesis to lend narrative credibility and amplify the 
                                                
60 There is a perverse, all-too-real parallel in the manner in which the prisoner abuse 
scandal at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq unsettled and interrupted the prevailing national 
belief about the U.S. not torturing prisoners.  Despite overwhelming proof to the 
contrary, politicians and defense apologists repeated the line, “the U.S. does not torture,” 
as more conservative elements were saying simply, “my country, right or wrong.” 
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affective dimensions of a fictional war, the End Credits of Modern Warfare 2 reify the 
game’s fictional happenings to model the quite real process by which worldly war victors 
calcify their version of events as the accepted public record.  Said differently, and to 
reapply a concept from last chapter, Modern Warfare’s modality of play (i.e., modality as 
a textual apparatus) is the player’s entry point for thinking about how a nation’s history is 
always an unsettled matter (i.e., modality as the struggle over reality).  
Once the player defeats the duplicitous and power-hungry General Shepherd in 
the single-player campaign, the screen fades to black and the game credits roll 
(accompanied by an orchestral track scored by the famed composer Hans Zimmer).  
Seconds later the screen fades back from black and the camera pulls out to reveal 
Captain Price sitting in a small boat on an exhibition stage with other game characters 
frozen in various poses nearby.  The scene is a recreation of the game’s final “Endgame” 
level, where Price and the gamer (playing then as Capt. “Soap” MacTavish) pursue 
Shepherd down an Afghan river.  
The stillness is broken suddenly by a passer-by, and the previously frozen figures 
come to life.  Also visible at this point are descriptive plaques positioned around the 
figures.  It is now evident that we are in a history museum exhibition hall.  The museum 
attendees are the “real” people in this scene: they chat with one another, inspect the 
exhibits, talk on their cell phones.  The previously playable avatars and story characters 




Figures 2.8 and 2.9: Heroes and villains are memorialized on stage in Modern Warfare 
2’s “End Credits” 
 
After these figures complete their automated movements, the camera swings to the left, 
revealing a stage that depicts the U.S. Rangers’ defense of Washington, D.C. against the 
Russians.  This set shows James Ramirez’s squad (the gamer’s character in this level) 
standing against the backdrop of the charred White House.  The camera then swings 
again, revealing the larger exhibition hall with other stages, vehicles, and glass displays 
housing Modern Warfare 2’s varied weapons.  The credits continue to roll as the camera 
takes the viewer on a tour of the museum’s stages representing the game’s key set pieces 
– from fighting in the densely populated “favelas” (slums) of Rio De Janeiro, climbing 
the icy mountains of Kazakhstan, to swimming to a heavily-guarded off-shore oil rig.  
The museum tour ends once the floating camera has finished exploring the museum’s 
three halls.  The screen fades back to black and the credits continue rolling.  
The End Credits’ museum tour is more than a reflective “curtain call” for the 
Infinity Ward design studio and its virtual combatants.  It is a pointed conclusion to the 
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game’s theme of military history and the contestation over its historiography that is 
articulated throughout the series.  This theme is especially pronounced in the voice-overs 
during the second game’s loading screens.  For example, before his treacherous plans are 
revealed, General Shepherd offers this reflection on the U.S. military: 
We are the most powerful military force in the history of man. Every fight is our 
fight. Because what happens over here matters over there. We don't get to sit one 
out.  Learning to use the tools of modern warfare is the difference between the 
prospering of your people, and utter destruction.  We can't give you freedom.  But 
we can give you the know-how to acquire it.  And that, my friends, is worth more 
than a whole army base of steel.  Sure it matters who's got the biggest stick, but it 
matters a hell’uva lot more who's swinging it. This is a time for heroes. A time for 
legends.  History is written by the victors.  Let's get to work. (Modern Warfare 2) 
 
Shepherd’s thoughts about the need to wield military power agree with strategic 
aspirations as outlined by General David Patraeus’ famed counterinsurgency manual 
(e.g., the U.S. cannot abstain from participating in the “long war,” the need to train other 
nations to acquire “freedom”), and they are in line with the doctrine’s cultural goals as 
assessed by visual studies scholar Nicholas Mirzoeff (e.g., the centrality of Western 
culture in replacing weapons stockpiles, i.e., “whole army base of steel”).  But it is 
Shepherd’s common refrain throughout the game – “History is written by the victors”61 – 
that best explains the curious location of the End Credits, and why the virtual museum 
tour is a revealing coda for the franchise. 
In Imagined Communities (1983), Benedict Anderson discusses the museum’s 
power as a state apparatus that fulfill numerous cultural and political functions.  Foremost 
among these are the legitimization of the ruling elite’s hold on popular understandings of 
                                                
61 This phrase’s origins is unknown, but is commonly attributed to Winston Churchill. 
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the nation’s history and, by extension, its definition of citizenship.  These institutions 
sterilize the ugly history of colonial conquest for consumption by tourists, and with other 
social technologies like the map and census, provide the social glue that unify a nation’s 
imagined community of citizens (Anderson, 1983, Chapter 10).  
If the museum tour reads as particularly somber and serene it is because it lacks 
the frenetic fighting that has structured both games up until this point.  As museums 
cannot help but to do, the stage exhibits sanitize the intense violence and elide the 
soldiers’ personal stories of sacrifice – some of which the player witnessed and 
experienced personally.  During the second to last mission, “Just Like Old Times,” 
Captain Price justifies the suicide mission that he and Capt. MacTavish (the player) are 
about to embark on.  He reflects:  
The healthy human mind doesn't wake up in the morning thinking this is its last 
day on Earth.  But I think that's a luxury, not a curse.  To know you're close to the 
end is a kind of freedom.  Good time to take … inventory.  Outgunned.  
Outnumbered.  Out of our minds on a suicide mission, but the sands and rocks 
here stained with thousands of years of warfare … they will remember us for this.  
Because out of all our vast array of nightmares, this is the one we choose for 
ourselves.  We go forward like a breath exhaled from the Earth.  With vigor in our 
hearts and one goal in sight: We will kill [Gen. Shepherd]. (Modern Warfare 2) 
 
The player’s first-hand experience of the fictional war’s history extends well beyond that 
which is on display in the museum.  The player has traveled to the varied war theaters 
represented in the exhibition halls, she has shot the guns that are resting safely in the 
display cases, and has fought and bled with the soldiers modeled on stage. The player has 
also witnessed this action from a variety of soldier and civilian perspectives, all of which 
contribute to an embodied sense of sacrificial citizenship that is summarily memorialized 
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in the final tour of the museum space.  But this is not the game’s only presentation of the 
museum space. And its second depiction is anything but hallowed.  
The “Museum” bonus level is the game’s antithesis to the earnest sacrificial 
sacrifice engendered throughout the series’ story-driven campaign modes. Modern 
Warfare 1 and 2 are committed to immersing the player into an affecting war story that 
provides moral context and narrative motivation for the gamer’s martial actions.  The 
non-diegetic and non-narrative museum level is categorically disinterested in these goals.  
Moreover, it represents the unstable and frolicsome undercurrent of gameplay that 
opponents of war game find so objectionable. The museum level bears a closer 
resemblance to the multiplayer modes common in military shooters because of its 
privileging of “quick twitch” gameplay above any story.  As is often the case in the 
virtual arenas of multiplayer matches, there is no narrative setup.  The player must use 
their assets and skills as best they can to survive waves of overwhelming enemies.      
The playable rendition of the museum space that is revealed during the previously 
discussed End Credits sequence is a tourist-less bonus level that is unlocked after the 
single-player campaign is completed. This enigmatic level opens with this title card – 
“An evening with Infinity Ward. Modern Warfare 2 Gallery Exhibit. Encino, California, 
U.S.A.” – and it lets players explore the museum’s three halls and its display cases, 
including removing and firing weapons from said display cases.  There are no mission 
objectives or game goals directing the player’s action in this museum-turned-shooting 
gallery.  During their exploration, gamers may discover one of two red buttons on 
information desks in the museum’s halls.  They are labeled ominously, “Do Not Press.”  
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After pushing either button – as the curious player is surely wont to do – the space is 
transformed into a nightmarish Epcot-esque exhibit hall as the soldiers on stage spring to 
life and assault the player en masse.   
 
 
Figure 2.10:  The gamer battles soldiers of history in Modern Warfare 2’s bonus 
“Museum” level 
 
In eschewing any narrative pretext by pitting the player against characters drawn 
from the levels (e.g., protagonists, antagonists, various soldier classes) the museum level 
revels in the kinesthetic pleasures of non-narrative gunplay.  This is pure spectacle to be 
enjoyed for its own aesthetic sake.  The firefight’s unbridled celebration of gun spectacle 
is an important reminder that there are non-narrative pleasures of ludic war (i.e., recall 
the aesthetic pleasures that war games like Missile Command and Call of Duty share).  
The museum’s gunplay is not completely free form play; the action still respects the 
game’s physics and damage system. There is, however, no additional narrative or rule set 
governing the player’s actions.  The level’s martial gameplay bears a closer resemblance 
to Roger Caillois’ notion of paidia (play as an unstructured activity) than it does to Johan 
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Huizinga’s ludus (rule-based play), as the gameplay has throughout the campaign 
missions.  Moreover, this subversive and irreverent collapsing of the game’s fictional 
history into an unprovoked, non-narrative battle royal does little to address postmodern 
war’s crisis of meaning.  This absurd fight has no reasonable explanation; it is, with the 
push of a button, a museum besieged by gun-wielding maniacs.  The museum’s 
celebratory shooting spectacle is a convenient prompt for considering textual elements 
beyond the immersive perspective and counterinsurgency narrative that engender 
pleasures in post-9/11 ludic wars; elements like agency and transformation which are 
discussed next chapter. 
CONCLUSION: NARRATING COUNTERINSURGENCY, BECOMING COUNTERINSURGENCY  
 
War is hell, but that’s not the half of it, because war is also mystery and terror and 
adventure and courage and discovery and holiness and pity and despair and 
longing and love. War is nasty; war is fun. War is thrilling; war is drudgery. War 
makes you a man; war makes you dead. 
 
The truths are contradictory.  It can be argued, for instance, that war is grotesque.  
But in truth war is also beauty. For all its horror, you can’t help but gape at the 
awful majesty of combat. You stare out at tracer rounds unwinding through the 
dark like brilliant red ribbons. You crouch in ambush as a cool, impassive moon 
rises over the nighttime paddies. You admire the fluid symmetries of troops on the 
move, the great sheets of metal-fire streaming down from a gunship, the 
illumination rounds, the white phosphorus, the purply orange glow of napalm, the 
rocket’s red glare.  It’s not pretty, exactly. It’s astonishing. It fills the eye. It 
commands you. You hate it, yes, but your eyes do not. Like a killer forest fire, 
like cancer under a microscope, any battle or bombing raid or artillery barrage has 
the aesthetic purity of absolute moral indifference – a powerful implacable beauty 
– and a true war story will tell the truth about this, though the truth is ugly. 
 




Bookending this chapter is Tim O’Brien’s arresting reminder of creative fiction’s 
ability to convey experiential elements of modern combat (here, the Vietnam War), 
including its subjective and its contradictory “truths,” even when those ostensible truths 
are drawn from an author’s imagination.  These fictional truths concern questions of 
content and form, of subject matter and media modality.  What makes a war story feel 
“true?”  Why do some tales leave us unmoved, while others “turn the stomach?”  Why 
might the same war story resonate in one media but not another?  Or, why might it 
resonate differently?  In the above quote, O’Brien recognizes the visceral pleasures of 
warfare’s visual spectacle (the “aesthetic purity of moral indifference – a powerful 
implacable beauty”).  This is a violent phantasmagoria that the military shooter has been 
able to simulate successfully thanks to its photo-realistic visuals, surround sound, haptic 
feedback, etc.  But these games do more than replicate “the rockets’ red glare” and “the 
bombs bursting in air” – they narrate soldiers’ personal combat experiences, and the 
player bears witness to and participates in dramatic acts of virtual patriotism in Modern 
Warfare’s intertwined narratives.   
These games also add a sheen of legitimacy to the U.S.’s policy gambit in the 
Middle East by closing the perspectival distances of television’s war optics and by 
reframing the War on Terror as the latest and greatest symmetrical Cold War. The games’ 
war stories and the player’s changing points of view posit that counterinsurgency 
interventions are necessary, as are occasional civilian sacrifices.  Indeed, by narrating a 
righteous and successful counterinsurgency story (even if we ignore for the moment the 
purposeful conflation between the types of warfare described earlier) the games posit that 
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such interventions are an effective means of protecting U.S. and Western interests.  The 
following chapter continues this line of textual analysis by examining how Tom Clancy-
brand shooters support a conservative version of American exceptionalism. 
I want to conclude this chapter with a final thought regarding the “sacrifices” in 
Modern Warfare because I anticipate some exception to how this chapter has discussed 
the term.  As was noted earlier, the moments of sacrifice are technologically scripted 
events through and through.  The player has no power to decide whether or not their 
avatar volunteers his or her virtual life.  This inability to volunteer oneself freely – 
virtually or otherwise – cannot rightly be called “sacrifice” as there is no elective 
surrendering of the self.  One might rightly ask: how meaningful (or, how truly 
sacrificial) can these virtual deaths be?   
Two responses come to mind: the first is a practical matter concerning narrative 
cohesion; and the second is a modality issue involving processes of identification.  In 
story-driven video games there is a persistent design tension between crafting a 
compelling narrative and designing gameplay rules and freedoms.  In these rare moments 
of forced sacrifice, the games clearly subordinate the player’s agency to the story’s 
concerns. If these games were judged only by the gamer’s delimited range of agency (if 
not total paralysis) during these anomalous moments, these virtual deaths would be 
interpreted by players as politically hollow and disaffecting. The characters are clearly 
sacrificed because it amplifies the stories’ conflicts.  If players could chose not to die, it 
would complicate the task of designing causal narratives that justify the player-soldiers’ 
violent gunplay.       
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My second response to the anticipated objection concerns user identification with 
video game characters.  The sacrificial events in war films and TV programs are rarely 
questioned as “un-sacrificial” because the determinacy of these moving-image media is 
never in question.  This is clearly not the case for video games. Ludic sacrifice is at least 
technically conceivable, even if it is not a standard component of military shooters’ 
design (which it assuredly is not).62  These titles overwhelmingly possess linear 
narratives and spatial designs that do not, as a rule, permit much choice beyond avatar 
customization (how the soldier looks), tactics (how to attack the enemy), and weapon 
and/or vehicle selection.  This is partially a question of media affordances and genre 
expectations, but it is also one of user identification.  The viewer’s identification with the 
cinematic or televisual soldier is not the same as the player’s identification with the 
computational soldier. Despite the rupture in identification with a character over whom 
the player has limited or lost control, it is critical to remember that these moments are 
affecting precisely because the player is suddenly stripped of the will-to-power they 
normally enjoy. The Modern Warfare games ask the player to sacrifice their agency and 
disbelief momentarily for the sake of narrative satisfaction.  
American political identity was laid bare in the minutes, days, and weeks after the 
9/11 attacks.  The un-controllable scenes of sacrifice in the Modern Warfare games 
provocatively connect with these feelings of helplessness and paralysis.  As the book’s 
Introduction documents, the rapid return to the discourse and doctrine of American 
                                                
62 There are, for instance, role-playing video games where players may make moral 
choices that then shape subsequent narrative and non-player characters’ responses. 
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exceptionalism was one popular, reactionary strategy of regaining a sense of control that 
the nation had lost.  The next chapter addresses the ludic means of virtually re-seizing 
that sense of political power by examining the character and spatial designs in Tom 
Clancy’s technothriller shooters. 
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Chapter Three 
Fighting the Good, Preemptive Fight: American Exceptionalism in Tom Clancy’s 
Military Shooters 
 
 “…Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of 
the Federal Government. Today, that task has changed dramatically. Enemies in the past 
needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger America. Now, shadowy 
networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it 
costs to purchase a single tank. Terrorists are organized to penetrate open societies and to 
turn the power of modern technologies against us. 
To defeat this threat we must make use of every tool in our arsenal—military power, 
better homeland defenses, law enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off 
terrorist financing. The war against terrorists of global reach is a global enterprise of 
uncertain duration. America will help nations that need our assistance in combating 
terror. And America will hold to account nations that are compromised by terror, 
including those who harbor terrorists— because the allies of terror are the enemies of 
civilization. The United States and countries cooperating with us must not allow the 
terrorists to develop new home bases. Together, we will seek to deny them sanctuary at 
every turn. 
The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. 
Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, 
and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination. The United States will 
not allow these efforts to succeed. We will build defenses against ballistic missiles and 
other means of delivery. We will cooperate with other nations to deny, contain, and 
curtail our enemies’ efforts to acquire dangerous technologies. And, as a matter of 
common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before 
they are fully formed. We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. 
So we must be prepared to defeat our enemies’ plans, using the best intelligence and 
proceeding with deliberation. History will judge harshly those who saw this coming 
danger but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and 
security is the path of action…”  
-- Pres. George W. Bush’s remarks on the 2002 National Security Strategy 
 
“Always historicize!” 
-- Fredric Jameson’s opening directive in The Political Unconscious (2006, p. ix) 
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INTRODUCTION  
On September 20, 2002 the Bush administration unveiled a revamped national 
security strategy that described the government’s newfound defense policy of unilateral, 
preemptive military action to face down would-be terrorist threats.  This aggressive brand 
of foreign policy represented a dramatic change from the multilateral deterrence 
strategies that had dominated the Cold War and early post-Cold War years. Critics 
questioned the dramatic change of tone and posturing, arguing instead for caution and 
diplomacy.  Meanwhile, supporters believed that the 9/11 attacks (then, only a year old) 
provided all the necessary justification for a more interventionist defense strategy. And 
yet, as philosopher Samuel Weber observes in Targets of Opportunity (2005), as radical a 
shift as preemptive war policy represents, it is also a continuation of one of the nation’s 
most enduring political and cultural beliefs: American exceptionalism.63  According to 
this belief, the U.S.’s unique political origins and economic and productivity successes 
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries provide policymakers with all the necessary 
justifications for pursing a state of perpetual military supremacy (see, McCrisken, 2003; 
Hodgson, 2009).  Weber argues: “Global political supremacy, understood in large 
measure to derive from economic and technological superiority, is at the same time 
                                                
63 American exceptionalism has a long history with some diverging definitions. Most 
generally it describes the idea that the “United States is an extraordinary nation with a 
special role to play in human history; not only unique but also superior among 
nations…The belief in American exceptionalism forms a core element of American 
national identity and American nationalism” (McCrisken, 2003, p. 1).  Furthermore, the 
American exceptionalism discourse is said to have two dominant themes or threads: the 
first is an idealistic, supportive “city on the hill”; while the second is a more militant, 
expansive country guided by the forces of “manifest destiny” and the creation of a new 
world order (see, McCrisken, 2003, p. 2). 
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declared to be supremely vulnerable, given the relative availability of destructive 
technologies to ‘rogue states’ and, perhaps even worse, to nonstate ‘terrorist’ groups” 
(emphasis in original, p. 94, 2005). President Bush and his neoconservative allies argued 
for increased defense spending and executive privilege to preemptively prosecute 
terrorists, rogue states, and “evil-doers” with extreme martial prejudice.  
The 9/11 attacks offered neoconservatives the pretense for pushing though an 
aggressive post-Cold War defense policy that had actually been crafted nearly a decade 
before in the wake of the 1991 Persian Gulf War.  Then, Secretary of Defense Dick 
Cheney with fellow neocons Paul Wolfowitz and I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, drafted a 
classified document in 1992 called the “Defense Planning Guidance” that advocated three 
primary objectives for American foreign policy: (1) preventing the ascendance of any 
competing superpower; (2) gaining and maintaining access to Middle Eastern oil 
reserves; and (3) the efficacy of unilateral military action in meeting these objectives 
(Weber, 2005, p. 96).  This controversial document was later withdrawn after it was 
leaked to the Washington Post and New York Times. However, its central tenets remained 
popular in conservative policy circles and think tanks, and it finally found its official 
public articulation in September of 2002; an articulation that represents a generational 
shift in the public’s understanding of exceptionalism “from the liberal consensus to the 
conservative ascendency” that had been taking place during the last half of the twentieth 
century (Hodgson, 2009, p. 100).  Unofficially, this revitalized and aggressive post-Cold 
War interventionist policy was articulated in a variety of military-themed entertainments.  
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And there is arguably no commercial brand more synonymous with militainment and 
American exceptionalism – before and after 9/11 – than the name Tom Clancy.   
In the previous two chapters, I argued for the utility of “gameplay modality” as an 
analytical concept, and applied it to understanding how Modern Warfare’s narrative 
subjectivity attempts to ameliorate postmodern war’s representational problems by 
reinterpreting what modern-day counterinsurgency looks and feels like.  This chapter 
continues in a similar investigative vein, with the purpose of examining how the character 
and level designs of the best-selling series Tom Clancy’s Rainbow Six: Vegas and Tom 
Clancy’s Ghost Recon: Advanced Warfighter represent American’s high-tech military 
capabilities and policy beliefs about the use of preemptive martial force.  The Clancy 
shooters enable the player to become a virtual, military insider who knows how and why 
to fight during these imagined, near-future crises.  The justifications for preemptive war 
emerge out of the games’ mutually reinforcing avatar and spatial design constructs, 
producing a paranoid imaginary that reinforces the righteousness of neoconservative 
foreign policy ideas popularized during the early 2000s.  
The four Clancy titles examined herein have been selected for close analysis for 
several reasons.  First, as of 2010, all four shooters (Advanced Warfighter I [2006] & II 
[2007], and Vegas I [2006] & II [2008]) have sold over a million copies each, making 
them best-selling titles by conventional game industry standards.  Second, because 
Clancy’s work is arguably the apotheosis of pro-U.S. military fiction – he is the so-called 
“novelist laureate of the military industrial complex” (Thomas, 1989, p. 1) – these games 
offer unique points of entry for understanding how a multimedia brand renowned for its 
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attention to technological detail and suspenseful narratives is adapted for interactive play. 
Finally, the Rainbow Six and Ghost Recon series are prototypical squad-based tactical 
shooters that immerse the player in the role of a counter-terrorist squad team leader who 
must execute tactically sound actions to complete the mission; in effect, transforming the 
player into the military solution in these fictionalized Wars on Terror. These games 
clearly profit from their status as Clancy properties – a point which will be explored 
shortly – but as interactive, immersive counter-terrorist exercises, these games also model 
the political utility of martial power when it is executed “correctly.” By remaining 
attentive to what these games ask and allow us to do, and how they represent American 
soldiers and domestic spaces in the early twenty-first century, we can appreciate the 
foremost gameplay pleasures of becoming a technowarrior in these ludic wars, and how 
the design choices reflect a particular view of American exceptionalism after 9/11.  
TOM CLANCY’S BRANDED WARFARE 
Contrary to his prominent billing, Tom Clancy has had relatively little input on 
the production of the games that bear his name; the exception to this rule being his 
collaboration with Red Storm Entertainment’s production of the first Rainbow Six game 
in 1998 (Upton, 2003, p. 252). It is instead more accurate to think of the author’s input on 
the game design and content as functioning on the level of Clancy-the-brand or Clancy-
the-genre.  Case in point: In 2008, the French video game publishing powerhouse Ubisoft 
bought the rights to Tom Clancy’s name.  Previously, Ubisoft had published Clancy 
games only after paying royalties to the author.  Ubisoft elected to acquire all of the 
“intellectual property rights to the Tom Clancy name, on a perpetual basis and free of all 
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related future royalty payments, for use in video games and ancillary products including 
related books, movies and merchandising products” because the firm projected that it 
would save on royalties, which would “have an average positive impact on Ubisoft's 
operating income of a minimum of 5 million Euros per year" (Terdiman, 2008, n.p.).  
Ubisoft and its design studios are now tasked with ensuring the brand’s maintenance. 
(Nothing quite says “American exceptionalim” like selling one’s name to a French video 
game company). 
If an auteurist reading of the Clancy games produces too limited a view of the 
titles’ concerns, then a brand or genre analysis that includes all of the Clancy games 
produces too broad an analysis due to their gameplay diversity.  As it was noted in the 
Introduction, the Ghost Recon and Rainbow Six series are squad based tactical shooters; 
the Splinter Cell games concern solitary stealth and espionage; Endwar (2009) is a real-
time strategy game; and H.A.W.X. (2009) an aerial assault game. That is, while many of 
Clancy’s franchises unfold in ostensibly similar diegetic worlds with similarly contrived 
“save the world” plots (i.e., U.S. or Western powers) and characters, playing as a member 
of a counter-terrorist team engaged in close quarters combat is a wholly different 
experience from conducting the impersonal war planning integral to a strategy game, or 
unleashing powerful munitions from an aircraft onto ground and aerial targets.  These 
differing game mechanics and stories structure users’ interactions, and directly shape 
those notably different gameplay modalities.  For these practical reasons, the present 
analysis concerns only the broad contours of Clancy’s technothriller fiction as it informs 
his brand’s best-selling military shooters. 
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The Ghost Recon and Rainbow Six franchises borrow heavily from Clancy’s 
decidedly pro-U.S. technothriller genre64 – where suspenseful narrative elements are 
structured largely around military-grade technologies and their surreptitious uses – and its 
related discourse of technowar, or treating modern warfare as a capitalistic endeavor that 
privileges technology and economics in its production (see Gibson, 1986).  Technothriller 
fiction generally, and Clancy’s games in particular, endorse a highly militarized version 
of American exceptionalism by representing the Defense Department’s programs and 
postmodern warfighting techniques – most notably the Revolution in Military Affairs, or 
those military programs and policies about how to best wage technology-centered future 
warfare – in a favorable light.  Accordingly, the majority of the critical ink spilled on 
Clancy’s novels has centered on the author’s Manichaean moral universe and his 
preoccupation with military technologies and warfighting strategies.65  
                                                
64 Helen Garson (1996) offers this useful explanation of the genre: “Technothrillers are 
often a form of military fiction, with players who are soldiers, sailors, pilots. The novel 
serves as a subordinate backdrop to display advancements and projections of weaponry 
and war. Actual war, possible war, or averted war is fought on the pages of the 
technothriller … The crises and solutions in most technothrillers are mechanical. People 
may make mistakes, but the focus of the plot is on the machinery not on human 
limitations. The “good” characters in technothrillers are clearly delineated, are on the 
“right” side and, in the military fiction, are superpatriots” (p. 36).  
65 For instance, Walter Hixson (1993) sees Clancy’s novels as celebrating the “cult of 
national security” that posits that the U.S. is best served by an executive branch that 
controls foreign policy using whatever means necessary, including subversive, covert, 
and constitutionally questionable, if not patently illegal, operations (pp. 605-606). 
Emphasizing a similar point, Celeste Fraser Delgado (1996) contends that the 
government’s surreptitious and celebrated exercises of power in Clancy’s work, 
specifically agencies like the CIA and their ability to “disappear” people, is their primary 
power (i.e., their show of physical force is through the power of disappearance) (pp. 127-
128). And Andrew Hill (2009) sees Clancy’s work and similar technothriller fiction, like 
the television series 24, as justifying government-backed torture and domestic 
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The Clancy games’ eventual commercial successes were first sown during the 
waning years of the Cold War after President Ronald Reagan enthusiastically endorsed 
the author’s breakout political pulp fiction novel, The Hunt for Red October (1984), in 
1985. According to Life Magazine journalist Loundon Wainwright, Reagan called the 
novel “the perfect yarn,” and most likely enjoyed it because the story offered “relief from 
the drab reality of life – although it might be disconcertingly close to some of the reality 
in Reagan's daily intelligence briefings” (1985, p. 7).  In his report of the President’s 
escapist reading, Wainwright is also one of the first to critically assess the attractions of 
Clancy’s fiction. The reporter astutely notes:  
But surely one of the book's biggest selling points has to be that it all comes out 
right in the end. More than that, it reaffirms the comfortable convictions we have 
about ourselves and our superiority over the usually villainous Russians. In its 
broad strokes the book is as much an act of propaganda and caricature as those 
scores of Happy Yank films Hollywood turned out during World War II. There's 
nothing wrong with the novel; it's simply a not very skillful wrapping of action in 
the flag. It must be reassuring to many, including the President, to read novels that 
feature the good intentions, the ingenuity and the bravery of Americans, to 
fantasize for a few hours that the best Soviet commanders will wnat (sic) to 
defect, that in an orderly and well-plotted world we must win out over a people 
weakened by their slavish adherence to a cruel and rotten ideology. (1985, p. 7) 
 
Clancy’s dozen-plus novels published after The Hunt for Red October assume a similar 
literary construction and ideological disposition.  In The New American Militarism 
(2005), Andrew Bacevich describes the author’s oeuvre in these broad strokes: 
                                                                                                                                            
authoritarianism under the auspices of combating and preventing stateside terrorism.  Hill 
argues: “In Tom Clancy, readers are initiated into the ‘insider world’ of the military and 
intelligence communities through technical language; in 24, the language of technowar is 
translated visually, literally and formally presenting the War on Terror as a high-tech 
information war” (p. 136). 
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In any Clancy novel, the international order is a dangerous and threatening place, 
awash with heavily armed and implacably determined enemies who threaten the 
United States.  That Americans have managed to avoid Armageddon is 
attributable to a single fact: the men and women of America’s uniformed military 
and of its intelligence services have thus far managed to avert those threats.  The 
typical Clancy novel is an unabashed tribute to the skill, honor, extraordinary 
technological aptitude, and sheer decency of the nation’s defenders … For Clancy 
and other contributors to the [technothriller] genre, refuting the canards casually 
tossed at soldiers in the aftermath of Vietnam forms part of their self-assigned 
charter. (p. 117)    
 
Not shockingly, American military personnel and conservative opinion leaders are among 
Clancy’s biggest supporters.  The respect is largely mutual, as the author counts Reagan, 
former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, retired General Colin Powell, and Colonel 
Oliver North among his favorite and inspiring public servants (Garson, 1996, p. 8).  
Clancy’s most venomous contempt is reserved for terrorists and Congress, a fact 
that is reflected in many of his works.  The author is famously quoted as saying: “There 
are a lot of people in Congress who…would rather trash the military than hug their own 
kids” (Cooper, 1988, p. 60).  The author’s general disregard of America’s preeminent 
representative and deliberative political body – an elected quorum whose governing 
actions are by design balanced by other governmental actors and measured by debate – is 
anathema to the decisive action enjoyed by the author’s patriotic technocrats and soldiers. 
Clancy, like his fictional heroes, prefers action to deliberation.   
Clancy’s early publishing successes established the technothriller’s generic 
parameters, while the brand’s subsequent wide-ranging entertainment wares solidified in 
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consumers’ minds what to expect from the Clancy name.66  After all, the author’s prosaic 
fiction contains all the necessary ingredients for remediating his pro-military fiction into 
the video game form: his canon contains readily identifiable protagonists (i.e., soldiers 
and government agents) who are primed for technologically aided action (i.e., tactical 
warfare) against some international threat (i.e., terrorist groups, rogue states) that will 
underscore the political righteousness of American exceptionalism.   
The commercial success of his pulp fiction migrated swiftly to Clancy’s movies 
and video games because, like the novels, these texts narrate the political stakes of 
postmodern war and represent visually state-sponsored violence (not unlike TV shows 
like 24)67.  Yet the Clancy games locate players in an experiential space different from 
TV/film viewers or from pulp fiction readers.  The Clancy games remediate the genre one 
step further – beyond narration and visualization alone or in tandem – by modeling the 
field tactics needed to best non-state terrorists.  The Clancy-brand video games are thus 
the fullest textual realization of the author’s technothriller universe because the user has 
the richest opportunity to experience these American war mythologies by enacting and 
                                                
66 “Commodification turns genre into a brand-name…and the social contract into a 
product guarantee” (Buchanan, 2006, p. 74). 
67 Andrew Hill (2009) sees a substantial thematic overlap between Clancy’s signature 
heroes and 24’s Jack Bauer.  Hill notes: “We see in the novels of Tom Clancy and in 24 
the convergence of two powerful mythologies of warfare: that of the American frontier 
hero, independent, innovative, hard, stoic, isolate, and a killer, and that of technowar, the 
conceptualization of war as a high-tech, scientific production process … These 
complementary mythologies create in these texts a cult of the technowarrior, in which 
those with the “right” knowledge, the “right” technology, and the “right” willingness to 
use them are elevated to the status of infallible guardians of the sacred order of American 
culture” (2009, p. 140). 
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becoming the righteous technowarrior.  That is, the games support the discourse of 
technowar and American exceptionalism found in technothriller fiction generally, but 
these shooters also enable gamers to play with the martial force by which global political 
hegemony is secured. This textual affordance helps explain the games’ popularity, and 
the brand’s overall value to its game publisher Ubisoft.  Taken together, the Clancy 
games are the tenth best selling franchise of all time, having sold over 55 million units 
worldwide as of May 2008, surpassing other memorable franchises in sales such as The 
Legend of Zelda, Sonic the Hedgehog, and the Resident Evil series (Martin, 2008, n.p.).   
THE GAMEPLAY MODALITY OF THE “GOOD FIGHT”  
The Ghost Recon: Advanced Warfighter and Rainbow Six: Vegas series depict the 
political necessity and strategic efficacy of postmodern military interventions using 
similar stories and gameplay designs. The Advanced Warfighter and Vegas narratives 
unfold in the near-future Americas (Warfighter in 2013 and Vegas in 2010), with their 
conflicts originating in the streets of Mexican cities and ending on U.S. soil.  Both 
franchises locate the gamer in the midst of these firefights using first- (Vegas) and third-
person (Warfighter) perspectives in mainly outdoor expanses (Warfighter) and tight, 
indoor spaces (Vegas).   
 167 
 
Figure 3.1: A third-person view of a firefight in Advanced Warfighter 2 68 
 
 
Figure 3.2: A first-person view of the hectic action in Vegas 2 69 
                                                





In both franchises, the player’s counter-terrorism specialists are armed with a cache of 
weapons and communication devices to facilitate precise and well-timed strikes to foil 
the terrorist plots, most of which center on eliminating enemies and neutralizing weapons 
of mass destruction. Warfighter’s instruction manual summarizes its action thusly: “The 
Ghost Recon squad, led by Scott Mitchell [the gamer], is expert at using its sharp military 
tactics to survive seemingly impossible military situations. In this realistic conflict, ‘run 
and shoot’ behaviors are not a viable option and will only result in quick death. To 
prevail Scott Mitchell must use his tactical assets to their fullest” (Ubisoft, 2006, p. 3).   
Although these games have similar stories and mechanics, they nevertheless 
possess unique design elements that make them worth exploring individually.  For the 
Advanced Warfighter games, the future warfighter’s proper and judicious use of high-
tech weaponry and information and communication technologies are of paramount 
importance and represent the Defense Department’s current approach to “net-centric” 
warfare as being the best means of fighting twenty-first century terrorists. The Vegas 
games, meanwhile, unfold amid civilian population centers in the Americas and in the 
U.S., and these games stress the need for maintaining a preemptive policy of “fighting 
them there, so we don’t have to fight them here.”  Taken together, the Clancy shooters’ 
gameplay modality – again, understood as textual vehicles for narratives and as beliefs 
about the way the world works – illustrate the efficacy and moral righteousness of 
                                                                                                                                            




preemptive, technologically aided martial strikes to prevent horrific attacks on civilians, 
helping to ensure a state of post-9/11 Pax Americana.  
HOW WE FIGHT: VISUALIZING TECHNOLOGICAL EXCEPTIONALISM IN GHOST RECON: 
ADVANCED WARFIGHTER 
The Clancy name is a key asset to the lasting financial vitality of Ubisoft’s 
product line.  However, the Clancy games themselves do not represent a singular 
authorial voice as much as they imagine a set of overlapping technology and policy 
concerns common to postmodern warfare. The Ghost Recon and Rainbow Six series 
celebrate a technology-rich form of militarized American exceptionalism that represent: a 
technowar discourse where defense officials manage war like a corporate business or a 
science (Gibson, 1986); the increased reliance on (if not fetishization of) techno-centric 
solutions as represented by the Revolution in Military Affairs (Gray, 1997; Martin, 
2007); and the growing centrality of net-centric modes of conflict and the efficacy of 
prototype (and as yet unproven) weapon technologies like the Future Combat System that 
transform soldiers into cyber nodes in real-time information grids (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 
2001; Mirrlees, 2009; Smicker, 2009; Hay, 2010). These cutting-edge and near-future 
information and weapons technologies promise to make the military’s Special Forces 
units more agile, lethal, and invisible. Or, in the language of our “just in time” production 
culture, they are destruction-on-demand.70 Clancy’s titles transform the player – 
                                                
70 Martin (2007) explains how the Revolution in Military Affairs and military 
procurement began reflecting the “new economy” of the 1990s: “But the RMA, which 
boasts to remove labor from the scene of battle, provided cover for substantial reductions 
in active duty military personnel not unlike the outsourcing and downsizing of labor that 
drove the new economy.  Between 1987 and 1999 the army reduced its ranks by over 
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according to the Ghost Recon: Advanced Warfighter instruction manual – into “the 
soldier of the future.” It continues: “In full command of the cutting edge of military 
technology, you are the most lethal, high-tech soldier on the battlefield” (emphasis added, 
Ubisoft, 2006, p. 3).  
The player must use their technological advantages and training to overcome the 
superior enemy numbers and foil the terrorists’ attacks on civilian populations and 
domestic infrastructure in Advanced Warfighter I and II. In the first game, the player’s 
elite band of “ghosts” are deployed to Mexico City in 2013 after Nicaraguan rebel forces 
steal U.S. military hardware and try to unload their ill-gotten wares to Mexican 
paramilitary forces.  Before the ghosts recover the equipment, however, they are 
redirected to the Mexican capital to save the Mexican and U.S. Presidents and the 
Canadian Prime Minister from a coup d'état.  The North American leaders were meeting 
to announce the North American Joint Security Agreement (NAJSA) treaty (there are 
terrorist threats in both games to governmental defense infrastructure and negotiations).  
The Canadian Prime Minister is killed in the attack, the U.S. president disappears, and 
thus begins the player’s 48-hour mission to save U.S. President James Ballantine, prevent 
the military technology from falling into the wrong hands, and tamp down the Mexican 
insurgency.  In a similar hyperbolic vein, Advanced Warfighter II unfolds a year later as 
Mitchell’s ghost team is sent to Ciudad Juarez to neutralize a nuclear device that has 
                                                                                                                                            
300,000, the navy by over 200,000, and the air force by nearly a quarter-million.  The 
1990s saw demobilization of six divisions (from eighteen to twelve) and the loss of a 
known enemy. Subsequently, planning would need to be oriented toward using a more 
concentrated force for any number of kinds of intervention” (p. 77). 
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fallen into the hands of the same rebel force that is now threatening to take out an 
American nuclear defense shield. 
True to Clancy’s narrative poetics, and not unlike the Modern Warfare games, the 
Advanced Warfighter titles contain numerous complex plot twists that make recounting 
their serpentine storylines tedious work.  More importantly, such a detailed summary fails 
to illuminate what it is these games do best: represent techno-warriors, their technologies, 
and tactics.  This is not to suggest that the stories are irrelevant; indeed, the narratives 
provide the moral justification for taking martial action (as was argued last chapter). Still, 
it is more illuminating in this case to examine how the player is primed to act in 
Advanced Warfighter, since the player’s successful actions propel the games’ narratives.  
The player engages the enemy in Advanced Warfighter’s proleptic, post-Cold War 
battlefields as a high-tech, decision-making node in an interconnected, cybernetic 
weapons system.  The game’s centerpiece visual interface is the “Integrated Warfighter 
System.”   This is a fictionalized version of the Defense Department’s actual “Future 
Force Warrior” – itself, a major weapons subsystem of the (now defunct) Future Combat 
Systems project (2003-2009).71  Key features of the game’s Integrated Warfighter System 
include advanced communications and networked optics that keep the ghosts connected 
with one another and with their commanders, and a sophisticated heads-up display 
                                                
71 In 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates ordered the $160 billion Future Combat 
Systems program dismantled, and its technologies repurposed for existing Army-wide 
modernization efforts (Osborn, 2009, n.p.).  This decision is part of Gates’ pragmatic 
effort to change the Pentagon’s focus on fighting future wars via programs epitomized by 
the Revolution in Military Affairs programs, with the need to fight today’s wars 
(Shachtman, 2009, pp. 116-140).   
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(HUD) that maps virtual information over worldly objects and terrain in real-time (i.e., 
augmented reality). The player also remotely controls a bevy of piloted and pilotless 
support vehicles (e.g., spy drones, armored personnel carriers) that offer additional 
firepower and reconnaissance capabilities.  
 
Figure 3.3: A 2005 rendering of the U.S. Army’s modernized and networked force72 
 
                                                
72 Image from: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/28/politics/28weapons.html 
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Figure 3.4: The U.S. Army’s Future Combat System (as of 2006)73 
 
 
Figures 3.5: Loading screen from Advanced Warfighter I 
                                                
73 Image from: www.combatreform.org/fcsnetworkfantasy.jpg 
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Information and communication technologies are of particular importance in 
realizing Clancy’s brand of military fantasy because they mediate the player’s 
identification as the games’ counter-terrorism agents (as Scott Mitchell in the Advanced 
Warfighter games, and as Logan Keller in Vegas and Bishop in Vegas 2). Central to this 
process of identification is the avatar’s heads-up display (HUD).  This visual display is 
awash with digital markers and screens, enabling the gamer to see the hostile terrain as a 
cybernetic weapons system might see it.  During any one mission, the player may need to 
synthesize or triangulate the data gathered by a UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) or spy 
drone, her camera-equipped teammates, and weapons that can see through surfaces.  
Once the player has successfully gathered the necessary battlefield intelligence, and 
positioned their ghosts, the player engages the enemy force. (Advanced Warfighter also 
advances its narrative via the heads-up display – instead of relying on cutscenes, or pre-
rendered interstitial cinematic sequences – which keeps the player firmly immersed in 
that world from that soldier’s position). 
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Figure 3.6: Information is mapped over worldly elements in Advanced Warfighter II 
 
The Advanced Warfighter games’ technothriller narratives and its underlying 
technowar discourse, in concert with their computational rules and operations, wield 
rhetorical conviction concerning the efficacy of future warfighters and their weapons.  
The player will have either achieved success or will have failed after engaging the enemy 
(commercial war games typically do not allow for ambivalent or ambiguous outcomes). 
Whether the narrative moves forward or not, these bifurcated pathways tacitly posit that 
victory is achievable.  The question is instead: can the gamer play like a well-trained 
technowarrior?  Or, more to the point: can the player perform like a classically trained 
Tom Clancy hero?  Having to adopt a game’s play logic to win is a basic component of 
interactive fiction.  However, it assumes unique political dimensions for Clancy’s video 
games because the games present the player with all the necessary tools for enacting a 
state of military “overmatch,” where a technologically aided team can overcome 
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considerable odds (Thomson, 2009).74 It is therefore up to the player to determine how to 
allocate and utilize those technological and human resource advantages.  And while these 
tactical shooters are not role-playing titles with deep levels of character customization, 
players nevertheless experience how their gameplay choices – including which weapons 
to use and which paths to take – have distinct effects, contributing to the games’ 
processes of player-avatar identification.75     
The Clancy properties are ideologically comforting because they posit that 
overmatch victories, challenging as they may be, are possible with the proper application 
of advanced weapons systems and the will to use said technologies.  The firefights in the 
novels, films, and games gain credibility because they resonate with what gamers already 
know of the application of advanced technology in current military engagements; i.e., 
gameplay modality as a set of claims about the world. “As [George Bush’s Secretary of 
State Donald] Rumsfeld argued in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee in 
2003, ‘In the twenty-first Century, ‘over-matching power’ – the ability to field a small 
                                                
74 Thomson (2009) rightly notes that: “In computer games, the development of the hero 
narrative from underdog to overmatch, and the representation of war which they present, 
has therefore mirrored developments in real U.S. military policy and the way in which the 
U.S. fights its wars” (p. 96).  
75 In his study of player identity in role-playing video games, Zach Waggoner (2009) 
argues that making choices is a critical affective component for understanding how 
players connect with video games and their virtual characters.  He strikes a key 
distinction between agents and avatars – players’ two main types of in-game digital 
proxies.  Players can modify avatars in terms of their appearance or their function, 
whereas agents cannot be altered (e.g., Pac Man, Frogger).  The Clancy warriors – 
Mitchell, Keller, and Bishop – are avatars since they can be outfitted with a range of 
weapons and can be accompanied by teammates with different proficiencies. In turn, 
these personalized choices inform and shape how the gamer approaches the mission and 
explores the game space. 
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but technologically superior force – is more important than ‘overwhelming force’” 
(Kagan, 2006, p. 346 qtd. in Thomson, 2009, p. 97).  Clancy’s immersive war games 
wield their rhetorical conviction because their textual modality seems to represent 
accurately advanced weapons systems and simulate Special Forces field tactics. These 
games are pleasurably affecting, however, because the player makes the key choices 
enabling the overmatch military fantasy to come to fruition.   
Identifying as a cyborg weapons system is central to the ludic war pleasures of the 
Advanced Warfighter titles.  However, there is nothing particularly new about the fantasy 
of playing with defense weapons.  Cultural historian H. Bruce Franklin (2008) documents 
how the American imagination has long been shaped by its obsession with superweapons 
from at least the late nineteenth century, and the formative role that science fiction has 
played in the development of foreign policy and defense projects.  The cultural historian 
states of the occasional fine line between the George W. Bush administration’s neo-
conservative consultants and sci-fi authors:  
The New American Century authors become truly ecstatic as they project their 
images of war in space, from space, and in cyberspace (which their report calls 
cyber-war). Here it becomes truly difficult to distinguish between this strategic 
document and the Robert Heinlein – Ben Bova – Jerry Pournelle – Newt Gingrich 
branch of ultra-militaristic and technophiliac science fiction. But that science 
fiction had already become a part of the Pentagon’s strategic vision of the twenty 
first century. (Franklin, 2008, p. 219) 
 
And herein lies the cultural currency of the Clancy name.  The author’s brand is not just a 
recognizable marketing construct that taps into a proven generic formulae or consumer 
demographic (though it is that too); the name signals the rules for how its games are to be 
designed, and the virtual worlds that might be imagined.  (Even in projects where Clancy 
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is not invoked, his brand of technothriller fiction often features prominently in the visual 
design or political imaginary – from televised recruitment ads for the armed forces to 
policy literature penned by the Project for the New American Century).76   
If the fantasy of playing with weapons of mass destruction is nothing new for 
American culture, then what is perhaps innovative about these games is that they 
transform the player into a fantastically “smart” weapon.  The gamer is not some weapon 
of mass destruction; instead, she is a weapon of exact destruction.  The games celebrate 
U.S. technological exceptionalism by modeling for the player the precise martial power 
of the near-future, communications-rich cyborg warrior that is able to overcome 
considerable obstacles.  In a similar vein, Randy Martin (2007) sees the ICT-rich strike 
forces – represented in the Clancy shooter games by the Ghosts and Rainbow Six teams – 
as the inevitable outgrowth of postmodern warfighting techniques and a defense 
production logic where the massive military presence has been replaced “with a 
customized force configuration, managed informatically” (p. 77).  Advanced Warfighter 
perpetuates a simulational mythology of a long-standing military fantasy that sees next-
gen technologies as liberating Americans from excessive losses of “blood and treasure.”  
By playing as Capt. Scott Mitchell, the Advanced Warfighter games imbricate the 
player’s actions with the fantasy of technological exceptionalism (that the fail-proof and 
                                                
76 For example, the Air Forces’ “It’s not science fiction” campaign, which melds high 
fidelity computer generated worlds with footage of real world operators and soldiers, 
purposefully conflates physical and virtual worlds.  The ads suggest that the Air Forces’ 
current generation of warfighting technologies are more advanced than they are in 




sci-fi futuristic technologies allow one to overcome incredible odds) by equipping her 
with the tools and training to enjoy super-human vision and knowledge.  Martin describes 
how the military’s ICTs produce a more precise and lethal defense actor: 
…now computer modeling has been decentralized from the decision makers 
pushing the button for nuclear attack to the soldiers in the field. The network is 
meant to integrate people and things, machines and marines, labor and capital by 
converting the activities of all into the measurable output of information flows. 
Transformation, according to a statement by George W. Bush at the start of the 
Iraqi occupation, figures a military future “defined less by size and more by 
mobility and swiftness, one that is easier to deploy and sustain, one that relies 
more heavily on stealth, precision weaponry and information technologies” (2007, 
p. 76).   
 
This massive military transformation is defended on the grounds that surgical 
interventions that leverage ICTs and computing technologies can be used to preemptively 
protect a range of global interests, while sidestepping political blowback like the 
“Vietnam Syndrome.”  Technological exceptionalism is generally justified as working in 
the service of the U.S.’s political exceptionalism; or “how we fight” in the twenty-first 
century makes sense in light of “why we fight.” 
WHY WE FIGHT: NAVIGATING POLITICAL EXCEPTIONALISM IN RAINBOW SIX: VEGAS 
 
“If there’s a one percent chance that Pakistani scientists are helping al Qaeda 
build or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of 
our response,” Cheney said. He paused to assess his declaration. “It’s not about 
our analysis … It’s about our response.”  
-- Vice-President Dick Cheney (Suskind, 2006, p. 62) 
 
If the Advanced Warfighter games imagine what future, counter-terrorism 
warriors look like and how it is they visualize their technologically-enhanced operations, 
then the gameplay modality of the Tom Clancy’s Rainbow Six: Vegas games articulate in 
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forceful narrative and spatial terms why these types of soldiers and their preemptive 
actions are a post-9/11 necessity. Like the Advanced Warfighter titles, the Vegas games 
are squad-based tactical military shooters that let the gamer play with cutting-edge 
(though less futuristic) weapons and equipment.  The Vegas titles differ mainly from the 
Warfighter games insofar as they present their 3-D levels through the first-person 
perspective (the game switches to a third-person point of view when the player finds 
protective cover), and the firefights occur largely in interior spaces rather than in open-air 
locales.  Moreover, and as the titles suggest, these games focus on engaging terrorists on 
U.S. soil, rather than fighting them elsewhere (as is the case in Advanced Warfighter). 
The box art on the first Vegas game promotes its action thusly:  
Las Vegas. The entertainment capital of the world. Thousands of unsuspecting 
tourists visit each day. Thousands more call it home. But on this day, something 
has gone terribly wrong. The Strip has become a battleground. Fremont Street is 
no longer safe. And casinos are being blown up one by one. On this day, Rainbow 
Six is the city’s last hope. (Ubisoft, 2006) 
 
This franchise holds out the chance of saving the homeland from terrorists who have 
targeted civilians and domestic infrastructure.  And like the positive framing of the future 
weapon systems in Advanced Warfighter, proceeding through the domestic spaces in the 
Vegas games produce a terrorized “story map.”   
Building on the idea of the cognitive map, game scholar Michael Nitsche (2008) 
proposes the concept of the “story map” to explain how players experience virtual game 
spaces (pp 227-232).  Whereas a cognitive map is a mental interpretation of a fictional or 
real space’s characteristics or dimensions, Nitsche’s story map explains how players 
make sense of virtual realms when they are experienced in concert with immersive and 
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narrative elements.  According to Nitsche, “In contrast to the cognitive map generated 
primarily for orientation, a story map aims not at an accurate understanding of Euclidian 
space but of spatialized drama and its setting; it combines navigation of drama, film, and 
interactive space” (p. 230).  The story map is therefore neither an “objective” rendering 
of a game space, nor is it even principally about space; instead, the story map is the 
experiential whole of navigating a game’s architectural and spatial design while making 
sense of the story and other dramatic elements that narrate that exploration.   
The Vegas franchise engenders a decidedly fearful story map by having the player 
navigate the horrors that could be visited upon a major U.S. city ravaged by a well-
organized and well-funded terrorist group that was not stemmed by sufficient political 
caution.  In the games’ near-future narratives, transnational terrorists are planning to 
destroy domestic infrastructure (the attack on the Nevada Dam [read: Hoover Dam] in 
Vegas), and have smuggled chemical weapons into the country (in Vegas 2). The games’ 
terrorized spaces present a series of object lessons (or perhaps more accurately, object 
simulations), of the failure to guard absolutely against such potentialities; potentialities 
articulated most clearly by Vice-President’s Cheney’s famous “one percent doctrine.”  
Journalist Ron Suskind describes the former VP’s conservative and distinctly Clancy-
esque view of international terrorism as follows:     
A rogue state might slip a nightmare weapon, or a few pounds of enriched 
uranium, to a nonstate actor – a transnat – if it could be assured that the weapon’s 
country of origin was undiscoverable. And why not? Let the terrorist do the dirty 
work that some secret sponsor would never do in its own, but maybe had dreamed 
of: Bring America to its knees. Cheney’s response: If there was even a one percent 
chance of such an act occurring, we must act as if it’s a certainty. (emphasis in 
original, Suskind, 2006, p. 65) 
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The civilian spaces that are explored over the course of Vegas’ missions include 
downtown city streets, flashy casinos, high-end hotels, and recreation and convention 
centers. The tactical exploration of these residential and business spaces, which contain 
scant hints of their former humanity – ringing telephones, abandoned coffee cups, 
splattered blood on cubicle walls, and fleeing civilians and frightened hostages – 
engenders a terrorized story map that at once reflects the procedural dictates of the 
military shooter genre and conservative technothriller fiction, while indicting any policy 
that second-guesses the necessity of swift responses to any and all perceived threats.  
Thinking about the modality of game spaces and story maps can be difficult for at 
least two reasons.  First, as Nitsche notes, the descriptive metaphors that we use to 
explain spaces are not without their inherent linguistic baggage (2008, Chapter 11).  
Games described as a “sandbox,” “playground,” or “garden” are not meaningless labels, 
but they more accurately describe the experiential quality of a space, not its delimiting 
structure for in-game movement.  The critical and commercial hit Grand Theft Auto 4 
(2007), for example, is a “sandbox” action adventure game where the player is free 
engage in different actions: from completing narrative-based quests, driving around the 
city causing havoc, or peacefully sightseeing as a tourist might.  The game’s synthetic 
city is called a virtual sandbox because it accommodates a variety of play choices.   
A second reason why describing the architectural layout of a game space is 
challenging is because the virtual world is often experienced alongside a host of narrative 
and representational elements.  Like continuity editing in film and television, the detailed 
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and layered narrative-driven spaces in the Clancy games are erected to hide the games’ 
computational artifice.  (Of course, it is precisely because of this complex layering that 
the games can be experienced as impressionistic story maps).    
The governing spatial structures in Clancy’s Ghost Recon and Rainbow Six 
shooters closely resemble arena spaces.  Both franchises place the counter-terrorism 
squad at some insertion point – in Ghost Recon it is usually in an open-air location, for 
Rainbow Six a multi-leveled building complex – where the player is tasked with 
completing the objectives en route to the extraction point. According to Nitsche, “the 
arena’s spatial arrangement often supports events such as battles, dances, or speeches that 
demand skillful operation of the avatar, often in collaboration or competition with others” 
(2008, p. 183).  The tactical exploration of Las Vegas’ residential and business buildings 
transforms the municipality into a series of mini-arenas where the gamer test and re-tests 
her equipment and skills against enemy forces. 
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Figure 3.7: An overhead schematic for Vegas 2’s arena-like Convention Center77 
 
The repetitive firefights performed in Advanced Warfighter and Vegas’ arenas 
differentiate these games from other military shooters that possess linear or track-like 
structures.  For example, the Call of Duty titles examined earlier offer considerably more 
restricted environments where gamers are led down relatively narrow paths.  These 
guiding structures, which Nitsche calls “tracks” or “rails,” emphasize the need for 
accurate firing and frenetic movement (not carefully timed movements and coordinated 
attacks), and thus color differently the player’s experience of these virtual wars. A closer 
examination of dramatic moments from Vegas 2 will make clear how a Clancy-brand 
story map comes to fruition by uniting narrative action with virtual spaces. 
In Vegas 2, the gamer plays as Bishop78, a Rainbow Six veteran who has been 
reinstated to combat the terrorist menace seizing Las Vegas.  The player leads her three-
person squad through a series of engagements in and around the city; the overwhelming 
number of which include killing terrorists, disarming bombs, and rescuing hostages.  At 
the game’s midpoint, Bishop’s team traces a chemical bomb to the Hawkins Recreational 
Facility, a large exercise complex.  The player then fights her way through the facility’s 
offices, gymnasium, and courtyards.  As Bishop’s squad nears the recreation center’s 
stadium, the terrorists trigger their chemical weapon, killing the unseen civilians sealed 
inside.  The player is too late.  She must watch as the deadly gas leaks out of the 
                                                
77 Image from: Prima Games, 2008, p. 137. 
78 Bishop has no stated first name because the player chooses the avatar’s gender at the 
beginning of the game.  
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building’s locked doors and listen to the off-camera screams.  This nightmare scenario is 
one of the game’s most affecting scripted events precisely because it is off limits to 
exploration.79  True to the politics of the technothriller, the player bears witness to the 
horrors of ineffective or late intervention.  
 
Figure 3.8: The player’s team fails to rescue the stadium of civilians in Vegas 2 
 
Another remarkable sequence immediately follows the stadium massacre, as 
Bishop’s team pursues Miguel Cabrero, one of the terrorist leaders through a residential 
section of the city.  The player’s team moves swiftly from one backyard to the next, 
killing the terrorists aiding Cabrero’s escape. These middleclass backyards have been 
transformed into de facto arenas for tactical combat.  Bishop warns the team: “Check 
your fire.  Do not hit the houses.”  (Yet there is no penalty for shooting houses as there is 
for killing civilians; in fact, there is a distinct advantage to shooting the outdoor grills’ 
propane tanks to wound nearby enemies).  The level design here is peppered with an 
array of household items – grills, bicycles, flower planters – while the audio track 
                                                
79 Meaning, no matter how well the gamer plays, the hostages cannot be saved. 
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contains the off-screen noises of barking dogs and crying babies.  This level emphasizes 
that the wars on terrorism know no bounds. The Vegas story maps maintain that if we are 
to be victorious, we must possess the willingness to allow Special Forces to finish the 
fight wherever it takes them – including our backyard patios and gazebos. 
There is also at least one level in Vegas 2 that presents the War on Terror as a 
professional game, and recognizes its players as would-be recruits.  As Bishop’s team 
tracks down the terrorists through the Las Vegas International Convention Center, they 
move through what is unquestionably the game’s most self-referential level – an 
exhibition hall hosting a Major League Gaming (MLG) event.  The MLG is a 
professional video gaming league where players compete for cash prizes and professional 
sponsorship.  To the untrained eye, the exhibition hall may appear to be just a room full 
of tables and computers.  However, dedicated gamers and fans of competitive electronic 
sports recognize that these networked computers are for high-speed gaming competitions, 
and that the exhibition room, adorned with MLG ads, looks remarkably like an official 
competition venue.  Vegas 2’s publisher, Ubisoft, crafted the game’s LAN-inspired 
multiplayer map after consulting with the MLG, and the league has since adopted Vegas 
2 for its online competitions (De Matos, 2008, n.p.).  To clarify about this self-referential 
and “hall-of-mirrors”-like play space: competitive gamers in the physical world are 
playing as soldiers in Clancy’s technothriller universe, and these avatars are virtually 
fighting in a room that represents competitive gaming competitions.    
The convention center’s MLG room in the single-player campaign and its 
multiplayer map illustrate the persistently blurry lines that have come to characterize the 
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military-entertainment complex.  Yet there is something else afoot here as well.  The 
MLG stage is more than just product placement for the league because it interpellates its 
community of hardcore gamers as potential warfighters.  By locating a firefight in a room 
that supports these competitions, the title recognizes gamers as a group who would likely 
sympathize with technothriller’s basic ideology since they have demonstrated the know-
how for actualizing its martial tactics in an array of spaces (including a game room!).    
 
Figure 3.9: Avatars fight in an exhibition hall hosting a MLG event80 
 






Figure 3.10: The stage at a 2007 MLG competition in Charlotte, North Carolina81 
 
Vegas’ story maps posit that preemptive military interventions are a post-9/11 
necessity, and legitimize interventionist policy ideals like Cheney’s “one-percent 
doctrine.”  The former VP’s doctrine promises freedom from “slow-footed, hedged, 
evidence-based analysis,” and because, as Suskind explains, “There was certainly a one 
percent chance that [Iraq, Afghanistan, and] such regimes might have weapons of mass 
destruction and might give them to terrorists. We, then, must act as if it’s a certainty” 
(2006, p. 81).  The Vegas games teach us that no domestic space – public meeting spaces, 
game rooms, and even our own backyards – are safe from these terrorists and their 
WMDs.  “Fortunately,” all of these spaces are equally transformable into tactical battle 
sites.  The games’ procedural rhetoric maintains that with the right application of strategy 
and technological support, there is no space that cannot be secured by American forces.  
                                                
81 Image: http://www.gotfrag.com/files/upload/mlg_stage.jpg 
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The lessons of Vegas’ gameplay modality communicates that avid gamers are uniquely 
qualified to participate in future wars on terror, and that they can attest to the virtues of 
American exceptionalism since they have experienced the efficacies of preemptive war. 
SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED – PREEMPTIVELY: CLANCY GAMES AS GAMES OF 
EXCEPTION 
 
“Knowing these realities, America must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing 
clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof – the smoking gun – that could 
come in the form of a mushroom cloud.”  
– Pres. George W. Bush in Cincinnati, Ohio 
on Oct. 7, 2002 
 
"If we have actionable intelligence about high-valued terrorist targets and if President 
Musharraf (of Pakistan) will not act, we will." 
– Pres. Barak Obama during Presidential 
Debates, August 2007 
 
The games examined in this chapter and the last do more than visually narrate 
why America fights preemptive wars. These games likewise demonstrate how 
postmodern conflicts are to be conducted and how such actions reflect reigning foreign 
policy beliefs after 9/11. The Advanced Warfighter and Vegas games, more so than other 
military shooters, model the value of technologies to transform disciplined soldiers into 
elite technowarriors who can win on tomorrow’s battlefields and secure the political 
promises of American exceptionalism.  
The procedural rhetoric of these games is not limited to their high-tech interfaces 
or story maps, however (though the characters, settings, and mechanics are constitutive 
elements in the franchises’ commercial appeal). What sets these Clancy games apart from 
other shooters is that they remediate the author’s technothriller genre, enabling the player 
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to perpetuate the American exceptionalism popularized in his books and films by 
becoming the elite technowarrior who enforces martially that legal “state of exception.”82 
The Clancy games’ hegemonic pleasures are intimately bound up in operating as 
“exceptional” citizen-soldiers. Clancy’s warfighters are exceptional with respect to their 
weapons systems, communication technologies, and skill sets, and they are exceptional 
with respect to their legal status.  The textual modality of Clancy shooters is pleasurable 
because players can brandish the surreptitious force that cannot be officially recognized 
by the government (yet which grants such instrumental actions and agents its legitimacy).  
And the contextual modality of the Clancy games is pleasurable because it resonates with 
stories of the U.S. military’s actual black op missions. For instance, the assassination of 
Osama bin Laden in 2011 by the Navy’s SEAL Team Six (which receives attention again 
in the Conclusion), required the team to invade Pakistan and the former al-Qaeda leader’s 
compound under the cover of night, and under the cover of legal exception.   
                                                
82 In political theory, the “state of exception” is the sovereign’s ability to violate, ignore, 
or transcend the rule of law under the auspices of ensuring the public good.  Contrary to 
its name, the state of exception is anything but, having now become “the dominant 
paradigm of government in contemporary politics” (Agamben, 2005, p. 2).  The state of 
exception does not only concern what is or is not legal for a given regime, but begs 
foundational questions about the definitional and operational limits of law itself – 
confusing, for instance, the distinctions between the executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches of government – and how ostensibly illegal or extra-legal government actions 
are situated in relation to the law (e.g., extraordinary rendition and detention, so-called 
“enhanced interrogation techniques,” and powers granted under the October 6, 2001 USA 
Patriot Act). Italian political philosopher Giorgio Agamben (2005) notes: “The state of 
exception is not a dictatorship … but a space devoid of law, a zone of anomie in which 
all legal determinations – and above all the very distinction between public and private – 
are deactivated” (p. 50).  
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Figure 3.11: Iconic photograph of Pres. Obama and his staff in the Situation Room 
monitoring SEAL Team Six’s raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound83 
 
But rather than acting as a ludic aporia that draws attention to the state of exception’s 
legal, political, and ethical contradictions, the Clancy games and similarly designed 
militainment revel in the pleasures of protecting the state’s democratic rules of law by 
acting autocratically beyond those laws.  Political and moral contradictions of modality 
cannot always be ignored in militainment, however.  The next chapter examines the 
challenges that marketers face when selling the public on playing ludic war during a time 
of international conflict, and the strategies these firms pursue to minimize negative 
associations that might paint them and their wares in a negative light. 
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Marketing Military Realism: Framing Modality in Call of Duty 4 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter investigates the fine line that video game marketers tread when 
selling the pleasures of playing ludic war.  Marketing materials are vital sites for critical 
media inquiry because these paratexts prime would-be player-consumers for how they 
should understand these games, and (more importantly for producers’ purposes) why it is 
they should buy them.  Contemporary video war games are typically advertised as 
offering players ever-increasing levels of visual and aural realism and computational 
verisimilitude.  However, because simulation fever – a type of moral panic concerning 
media modality discussed shortly – is latent in all games and is of particular concern to 
titles that trade in simulated violence, military-themed games must be packaged in such a 
way that celebrates acceptable technological or aesthetic attributes, elements like 
algorithmic sophistication or an attention to historical specificity, while sidestepping 
issues that might spur critical reflection about war games’ inability to model the social 
reality that attends to worldly conflict. Commercial video games about military 
interventions are rarely if ever sold on their ability to prompt gamers into reflecting 
critically about how the combat scenarios are represented for their enjoyment. Instead, 
one is only supposed to think about select aspects of combat while playing a war game. A 
close examination of Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare’s key marketing paratexts – 
production personnel interviews, press reviews, and online video advertisements – 
prefigure how “military realism” is ideally understood for this, the best selling military-
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themed video game of 2007 (Klepek, 2008, n.p.).  These marketing paratexts not only 
generate hype and work to drive sales, but as importantly, they also suggest particular 
textual readings over others with the goal of insulating Call of Duty’s war play from 
interpretations and criticisms that might link the violent play on screen to the worldly 
violence unfolding in Iraq and Afghanistan. The story of a television ad campaign will 
bring these points about pleasure, panic and play into finer focus. 
“STANDOFF” AND SIMULATION FEVER 
With the release of the Xbox 360 game console on May 12, 2005, Microsoft 
launched its “Jump In” series of television and Internet commercials, inviting viewers to 
join their newest online gaming experience.  The “Jump In” campaign was notable for at 
least two reasons: the ads did not showcase gameplay footage, and they represented 
diverse groups of people playing together in the real world.  The players depicted in these 
ads included women, the middle aged, and people of color; demographics not typically 
associated with video gaming. There was, to be sure, a conspicuous absence of white 
teenage boys in these spots. The commercials showed public play across urban spaces: in 
one ad, kids and adults engaged in a citywide water balloon fight; in another, unlikely 
bystanders literally “jumped” into the action of a Double Dutch jump rope game; a third 
fast-paced ad showed two groups of young adults bringing their “cops and robbers” game 
from an apartment to the busy city streets below; and in another ad, hot air balloons 
delivered a sofa, TV, Xbox 360, and games to the middle of a parking lot, turning the 
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onlookers into a gathering of gamers.84  These live action commercials welcomed gamers 
of all ages to pick up a controller and join the diverse online play.  In fact, the “Jump 
Rope” spot won the “Best of Show-National” and “Mosaic Award” (for multicultural 
advertising) at the 2006 ADDY Award Gala hosted by the American Advertising 
Federation.  Mark Tutssel, the chief creative officer of the advertising agency Leo 
Burnett Worldwide, praised the spot, saying: “This extreme Double Dutch jump rope jam 
metaphorically captures the excitement and social aspect of the new generation Xbox 
360” (Xbox Press Release, 2006, n.p.). 
Yet the “Jump In” campaign was not wholly successful.  The McCann-Erickson 
advertising agency responsible for the lauded “Jump Rope” commercial also produced a 
spot called “Standoff” that Microsoft elected not to air in the United States.  Anticipating 
possible domestic backlash, Microsoft ran “Standoff” briefly in Europe instead.  A quick 
description of the spot will explain Microsoft’s understandable hesitation.    
“Standoff” unfolds in a crowded train terminal.  As two young men pass one 
another, their eyes meet and their glances hold.  They continue to stare as they turn to 
face one another. Suddenly, one man thrusts his arm at the other’s face, with his hand 
shaped like a gun.  The other man quickly responds in kind. Another man standing 
nearby does the same.  This action multiplies quickly, spreading like a virus through the 
station as the traveling population is transformed into a mob of stationary faux-gun-
wielding pedestrians.  The terminal is at a standstill.  The camera cuts aggressively 
                                                




between the multitude of tense faces and stiff arms.  Suddenly, the man in the original 
standoff shouts, “Bang!” and the station erupts into a chorus of mouth-made gunfire.  
People dive for cover, hide behind tables for protection, and collapse after being “shot.” 
The spot ends, as the others do, with the call for us to “Jump In.”  
 
Figure 4.1: Travelers size one another up in Microsoft’s “Standoff” ad85 
 
While we can only speculate as to how this ad might have been received by U.S. 
television audiences, we can more easily appraise why it was not aired in the States.  The 
commercial’s depiction of a massive game of Assassin (a.k.a., Gotcha, Killer) 
provocatively connects the pleasures of mediated gameplay with violence in the real 
world.  That is, play killing and play dying unwittingly but evocatively connects the 
mediated Xbox video game experience to a moral panic discourse that has hounded the 
gaming industry since its emergence in the 1970s.  This resilient but scientifically 
                                                
85 Image from: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CoA5mC5FgIw 
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unsubstantiated concern maintains that violent video games are the primary driver for a 
range of violent acts where teens or young adults are unable or unwilling to distinguish 
between right and wrong.  The April 20, 1999 massacre at Columbine High School is 
only the most high profile case of heinous crimes that have been supposedly caused, in 
large part, by violent games.86 Clearly not wanting to cast its products or services in a 
negative light by associating it with such controversies, Microsoft shelved the “Standoff” 
commercial in the U.S.  But there is perhaps a deeper reason for Microsoft’s “gun shy” 
attitude toward the “Standoff” ad – namely, simulation fever.    
Video game designer and scholar Ian Bogost (2006) coins and defines simulation 
fever as “the nervous discomfort caused by the interaction of the game’s unit-operational 
representations of a segment of the real world and the player’s subjective understanding 
of that representation” (p. 136). Because any simulation or video game necessarily 
models some processes and not others, and because there is a potential friction between 
the way a process is represented with how a user subjectively interprets said process, it 
potentially produces a state of anxiety in the player.  Simulation fever is a subset or 
variation on the moral panic.  Or, to connect this idea directly to this book’s concerns: 
simulation fever is the slippage of gameplay modality, or the incongruity between the 
game’s functioning as a textual operation and its imagined connection (or not) to the 
                                                
86 Video game violence and addition to games have been blamed for crimes ranging from 
theft to murder to suicide.  For additional examples of how games have been implicated 
in these crimes, see: Calvert, 2003; Benedetti, 2007; Buncombe, 2008; Turner, 2008.  
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player’s ideas of reality.87  Of course, games do not always have to be comfortable 
mediated experiences; that is, they can purposefully produce negative affect.  However, 
they almost always strive to be consistent and coherent with respect to their organizing 
design logic. The contextual understanding of simulational media’s relation to a lived 
reality explains why, for example, a flight simulator set in New York City where planes 
pass effortlessly through buildings could engender states of anxiety, as this modeling 
disagrees fundamentally with the user’s understanding of physics (as well as rekindling 
thoughts of the September 11 terrorist attacks).   
Simulation fever is not an existential ailment restricted to video games; indeed, 
simulation fever affects non-mediated games too. Bogost states: 
Instead of standing outside the world in utter isolation, games provide a two-way 
street through which players and their ideas can enter and exit the game, taking 
and leaving their residue in both directions. There is a gap in the magic circle 
through which players carry subjectivity in and out of the game space. If the 
magic circle were really some kind of isolated antithesis to the world it would 
never be possible to access it at all. (2006, p. 135) 
 
Hence, “Standoff"’s depiction of a spontaneous Assassin game proves simulation fever’s 
nascent potentialility in all physical and virtual social games, which is especially 
problematic given the ad’s playful representations of violence in a public space after 
9/11.  According to Bogost: “The idea of simulation fever insinuates seriousness back 
into play and suggests that games help us expose and explore complicated human 
conditions, rather than offering mere interruption and diversion” (2006, p. 136).  The case 
of “Standoff” likewise demonstrates that simulation fever and moral panics are serious 
                                                
87 Note: media modality is partly an “attitude toward an activity and how that activity is 
situated in relation to what is understood to be the real world” (King, 2008, p. 53). 
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considerations for game marketing efforts since undesirable gameplay associations 
jeopardize potential sales by laying bare the medium’s representational limitations.  All 
games, mediated or otherwise, must correlate – however incompletely or incoherently – 
with the player’s lived reality (games that fail to communicate are not only unplayable, 
they are also meaningless).  It is this necessary connection to a player’s reality that is 
perpetually threatening to break the magic circle’s seductive spell. Thus, during those 
moments when gameplay processes fail to match a gamer’s understanding of similar 
worldly actions, players may consider difficult or complicated aspects of reality and the 
game’s failure to render it accurately.  
Combat video games wherein one can shoot their friends and be shot at, however 
fantastic and absurd the depiction of violence, is mediated play that threatens to force 
gamers into a consideration of actual shooting and actual dying.  Thinking about taking 
another’s life demands deep and personal introspection – an activity that is most certainly 
not within the typical purview of commercial shooters.  It is this potential that the 
marketers of combat games must guard against, lest their products be seen as raising 
unpleasant, complicated, and ultimately less profitable questions or feelings for their 
audiences.  The “Standoff” ad, by depicting a scenario in which everyone is an armed 
enemy, is a type of play that too easily forces considerations of paranoia and violence in a 
post-9/11 urban space. 
REALISM VS. “REALISTICNESS” 
Simulation fever in the case of military-themed gameplay highlights dramatically 
that military realism is not military reality.  The former is an aesthetic and discursive 
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category; the latter is a factual state of affairs.  As Alexander Galloway argues in 
Gaming: Essays on Algorithmic Culture (2006), near-photo realistic digital 
representations should not be confused with existential realism.  Moreover, video game 
studies should (following film studies’ categorization of realist and neorealist films) be 
careful to define realist games as those that “reflect critically on the minutiae of everyday 
life, replete as it is with struggle, personal drama, and injustice” (p. 75).  This chapter 
adopts Galloway’s useful term of “realisticness” understood as a “yardstick held up to 
representation” (p. 73).  Commercial military video games use technological and 
representational realisticness to deliver viscerally affective experiences.  These design 
attributes do not transform them into realist texts, however, because these games often 
fail to acknowledge soldiers’ lived experiences.  Galloway states: “Realisticness is 
important, to be sure, but the more realisticness takes hold in gaming, the more removed 
from gaming it actually becomes, relegated instead to simulation or modeling” (p. 73).  
For a game to be socially realistic, there must be congruence (what Galloway calls his 
“congruence requirement”) between the game’s content and the player’s subjective 
context; “some type of fidelity of context that transliterates itself from the social reality of 
the gamer, through one’s thumbs, into the game environment and back again” (p. 78). 
Galloway illustrates his argument with the anti-Israeli occupation combat games Under 
Ash (produced in Syria) and Special Force (published by Hezbollah).  Unlike most 
military games produced in the West, these games are realist texts because Palestinian 
gamers can play through their political battles on the screens before them.  Realism, for 
Galloway, is more dependent on an invested sense of contextual congruence than any 
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textual fidelity.  That is, these Palestinian first-person shooters are not realist texts 
because they critique the first-person shooter genre; in fact, they are fairly standard in 
their gameplay designs.  They are instead realist games because they enjoy a deeply 
meaningful and personal correspondence between what is played and who plays them.  
The marketing materials examined presently take the opposite tack; they argue 
only for the fidelity of the text. The advertised pleasures of playing wars past, present, or 
future is, in actuality, the pleasure of playing with a delimited textual realisticness, and 
not elements of a contextual realism that connects the gamer and game to the lived, 
everyday realities of an outside world.  Video game marketing of commercial military 
shooters largely works to collapse the divide between textual realisticness with any lived 
understandings of “realism” to argue that their game’s attention to technical detail offers 
the necessary representational and simulational bona fides to engender an immersive 
reality available to any who might buy their electronic wares. Thus, the marketing 
campaigns for post-9/11 military shooters are overwhelmingly concerned with selling 
only select elements of military realisticness: sophisticated enemy artificial intelligence, 
military weapons and vehicles that act and look like the real thing, and combat that 
unfolds in authentic theaters of war both historic and those “ripped from today’s 
headlines.”  The games industry promises its dedicated players and its would-be 
consumers a near-real combat experience, irrespective of the gamer’s personal play 
context. Said differently, a game that promises military realism purports to tell one all 
they need to know about war.     
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Post-9/11 shooters’ advertising rhetoric of military realism cuts across its varied 
marketing materials.  This chapter examines how three paratexts – game production 
personnel interviews, press reviews, and online video game advertisements – prefigure 
how military realism is ideally understood for Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare. This Call 
of Duty installment presents a valuable case study because not only is the game an 
extremely popular title across gaming platforms and online gaming services – selling well 
over 11 million units as of February of 2009 for the PC, Xbox 360, Playstation 3, and 
Nintendo DS systems88, becoming the second most played multiplayer game on Xbox 
Live in 2008 after Halo 3 (Klepek, 2009, n.p.) – but (as was noted in Chapter Two) it is 
also the first of the franchise to be set in the twenty-first century, inviting players to 
combat today’s post-Cold War terrorists around the globe. The marketing paratexts that 
circulate around Call of Duty 4 not only generate excitement for the game and work to 
drive sales but they also suggest particular readings over others, hoping to inoculate the 
pleasures of their ludic wars from the threats of game-based moral panics.   
THE POLITICAL ECONOMIC UTILITY OF VIDEO GAME PARATEXTS 
In The Meaning of Video Games (2008), Steven Jones offers media studies one of 
its first sustained analyses of gaming paratexts. Building on Gerard Genette’s concept of 
the “paratext,” or the “multilayered system of frames around a text that helps determine 
its reception,” Jones ably demonstrates that players understand video games as much by 
                                                
88 According to Video Game Chartz [vgchartz.com], Activision has sold over 11 million 
Call of Duty 4 units for the Xbox 360 and Playstation 3 consoles.  The sales numbers are 
higher if one includes the PC and Nintendo DS numbers. In the games industry, any title 
that sells over a million copies is considered a “blockbuster.” 
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the external material conditions of the title’s publication and marketing, as by its internal 
narration and gameplay design (p. 7).  This inclusion of marketing efforts, fan texts, 
walkthroughs, game modifications, and other associated media ephemera that swirl 
around a central gaming artifact underscores how meaning-making is always the result of 
“complex reception histories” (p. 93). Jones is not the first to recognize the utility of 
Genette’s concept, or the power of paratexts in shaping how the center text is interpreted.  
Television scholar Jonathan Gray assesses how marketing hype (2008) and press reviews 
(2010) initiate processes of meaning making before media consumers ever lay their eyes, 
ears, or fingers on advertised goods.  Gray states:  
In other words, paratexts guide our entry to texts, setting up all sorts of meanings 
and strategies of interpretation, and proposing ways to make sense of what we 
will find ‘inside’ the text. When viewed as paratexts, hype and synergy become 
inherently textual and interpretive, therefore, working, as I have said of ads, to 
create structures of meaning for texts-to-come. (2008, p. 38) 
 
As Gray later quips of the paratext, it is the “text [that] begins before the text” (p. 46).  
And because paratexts include such a wealth of objects from different producers – from 
officially sanctioned trailers, to fan-authored art, to third-party action figures – they have 
the potential to foreclose and/or open up readings for different constituencies.  
Marketing paratexts are of particular value to the culture industries’ media 
producers because they help mitigate against a variety of business risks endemic to new 
media production. This is especially true for a concentrated and oligopolistic video game 
industry where it is estimated that only a scant 3 percent of games ever turn a profit 
(Kerr, 2006, p. 45). Video games must depend on paratexual buzz to entice consumers 
into parting with $50-$60 dollars for a new console title because the industry producers 
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do not rely principally on ad revenue like the television industry, subscription fees like 
mobile providers, nor can they expect that ancillary products will make their games 
profitable over time, as is the case with some Hollywood properties.89  These industry-
specific pressures result in a more conservative production environment where design 
choices often conform to tested generic formulae and appeal to reliable gamer 
demographics.  The military shooter is, along with sports and role-playing games, one of 
the stalwart generic categories of console and PC gaming because these titles have been 
popular among the industry’s young, male “hard core” consumer base. Stephen Kline et 
al. (2003) underscore the pressure to produce sequels like Call of Duty 4, stating:   
Software development is a risky business.  Most products fail.  There are fortunes 
to be made with pioneering games that break new cultural ground.  But for each 
successful experiment scores crash and burn, taking with them companies and 
careers. This creates a powerful incentive to stick with the tried and true and ride 
on the coattails of proven success. The repetitive pattern is reinforced by the fact 
that game developers are recruited from the ranks of game players. Such asexual 
reproduction gives game culture a strong tendency to simple self-replication, so 
that shooting, combat, and fighting themes, once established, repeat and 
proliferate. (p. 251) 
 
The industry remains comfortable with making its products for and marketing its wares to 
its hardcore male gaming constituency despite the recent success of the Nintendo Wii 
console, and family friendly game franchises like The Sims (2000), Rock Band (2007), 
and Wii Sports (2006) to attract more diverse game playing audiences.  
Game marketing campaigns are often as homogenous, safe, and one-dimensional 
as the titles that have been produced by guys, for guys; ads like Microsoft’s “Jump In” 
                                                
89 Some game franchises are produced with subscription services and expansion modules 
in mind, such as the popular massively multiplayer game, World of Warcraft (2004). 
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campaign remain industry anomalies.  In The Business and Culture of Digital Games 
(2006), Aphra Kerr calls the myopic discourse that dominates games publications and 
forums – such as magazines, web sites, and conventions – “hegemonic heterosexual 
masculinity” (p. 100).  In a similar vein, Kline et al. (2003) argue that game production 
has long been dominated by a state of “militarized masculinity” which is evident in 
games across genres and platforms (pp. 254-255).  The authors note:     
This complex interweaves ingredients that range from shooting and fighting skills 
to magical spells of destruction, strategic and tactical war games, espionage, and 
scenarios of exploration and progress culminating in the ability to conquer alien 
civilization.  The elements are dispersed across a very wide variety of genres of 
gameplay – “shooters,” “action,” “strategy,” “role playing” – and are often 
combined in “metagenre” syntheses – “role playing plus strategy,” “sports plus 
shooting.” But taken together they constitute a shared semiotic nexus revolving 
around issues of war, conquest, and combat that thematically unites games 
ranging from Soulblighter to Shogun to SpecOps.” (Kline et al., 2003, p. 255) 
 
Kerr’s “hegemonic heterosexual masculinity” and Kline et al.’s “militarized masculinity” 
accurately characterize the prevalence of violent and sexist tropes across the game 
industry’s texts and paratexts, and explain how the economic imperatives constrain 
gameplay design experimentation and reproduce the restricted discourse. This chapter 
goes beyond these useful though broad descriptions of military game culture to outline 
the specific marketing strategies behind the military realism discourse being sold. 
Video game marketing generates hype and primes gamers on how they should 
derive their ludic pleasures.  Video game marketing also functions as the preliminary 
textual interface between producers and consumers. Thanks to a wealth of professional 
gaming websites and fan sites, players often have access to early gameplay footage, 
advanced interviews with production personnel, and press previews by game critics 
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before they ever play the game being hyped. Kline et al. underscore the critical discursive 
and economic roles played by this paratexual vanguard:  
To say that cultural intermediaries like marketers and designers “dialogue” and 
“negotiate” with the gaming consumer may seem perverse. But from the point of 
view of capital, it makes good sense to open up channels to consumers, respond to 
their criticisms, adapt to their ideas and interests, and translate the information 
into products. We call this mediated-marketing nexus a negotiation in recognizing 
that cultural industries especially have been at the forefront of audience and 
market segmentation research, forging a reflexive circuitry of audience 
surveillance and an acute awareness of, and responsiveness to, changing 
preferences, tastes, and subcultures. (2003, p. 252) 
 
Provided there is sufficient time and resources, early gamer feedback may be 
incorporated into the game design, or the marketing materials may address or preempt 
outstanding concerns collected from beta play sessions or feedback posted on online 
forums.  This vital interplay between producers and consumers underscores that 
production and consumption are not monolithic categories but exist in a dialectical 
relationship, and are connected by a porous techno-social membrane that allow paratexts 
to move bi-directionally: from producer to consumer, and from consumer to producer. 
One can cite numerous cases of this productive back-and-forth dynamic in video 
game culture.  For example, Counter-Strike (1999) remains one of the most celebrated 
computer game modification tales. Originally a community-developed game modification 
(or mod) for the PC hit Half-Life (1998), Counter-Strike became such a popular 
download that Half-Life’s publisher Sierra Entertainment bought the project and later 
packaged the game for retail release, and the game’s development studio Valve Software 
later hired the mod’s designers.  The Halo-based machinima series Red vs. Blue is 
another example of an unofficially produced fan paratext that was later co-opted by the 
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game’s marketers to hype the release of Halo 3 (2007).90  One additional “feel good” 
example of a company responding to its community is the inclusion of the “N0M4D” 
control scheme in Call of Duty 4.  Randy “N0M4D” Fitzgerald is an avid gamer and 
competes on the Major League Gaming circuit. Fitzgerald has been afflicted with the rare 
muscle and joint disorder Arthrogryposis since birth, and is paralyzed from the neck 
down.91 With the aid of a modified controller, Fitzgerald plays video games with his 
mouth.  The game’s developer, Infinity Ward, responded to Fitzgerald’s request and 
programmed a control scheme into the game to meet his unique gameplay needs.  
The “N0M4D” game controller setting suggests just how valuable maintaining 
strong ties to a fan community is to video game producers, and the Counter-Strike and 
Red vs. Blue examples illustrate how popular fan paratexts are meaning-making (and, in 
time, could be money-making) texts in their own right. These cases are not just pre-
textual window-dressing.  Fan paratexts produced by users and advertising paratexts 
crafted by marketers open channels for communicating concerns valued by each group, 
and may over time, be co-opted by the other for economic or community-building ends. 
Yet the important fact remains that the official publisher-driven game marketing is 
valuable precisely because it is disseminated before a game title hits store shelves, and 
                                                
90 Beginning in 2003, Rooster-Teeth Productions began creating satirical videos using the 
Halo game engine, and distributed these shorts online. The series had become such a fan 
favorite that by 2007 Microsoft commissioned Rooster-Teeth Productions to create ads 
hyping the release of Halo 3, which grossed over $170 million during its first 24 hours 
(Geddes, 2007, n.p.). 
91 See Martini, 2008, for an interview with Randy Fitzgerald. 
 208 
because it is the first word on how the public should understand the interactive 
experience.  Gray (2008) argues:  
Ads and hype cannot merely demand our consumption: they must buy it with 
textuality, creating some form of script and meaning for the product or text in 
question, giving us some sense that this product or text will offer us something in 
particular. However, if this is so, then many interactions that we have with texts 
will be set up and framed by the hype that we consume; more than merely 
pointing us to the text at hand, this hype will have already begun the process of 
creating textual meaning, serving as the first outpost of interpretation. (p. 34) 
 
Call of Duty 4’s personnel interviews, press reviews, and viral ads build excitement for 
the product by prefiguring how would-be players should expect the game to look and 
operate according to an advertised aesthetic of military realism, while also attempting to 
avoid or contain potential interpretive “externalities” like the simulation fever affecting 
Microsoft’s Standoff ad.  
 “…[CALL OF DUTY 4 IS] GONNA MAKE A WEAK GAMER SOIL HIMSELF…”  
It is standard practice for game producers to grant gaming websites and 
magazines advanced coverage and “sneak peaks” of products under development during 
the months and weeks leading up to a game’s retail release.  Such techniques build buzz, 
generate interest, and allow the producers to extol their wares’ virtues before game critics 
and consumers pass judgment in their columns and with their dollars. The marketing 
efforts for Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare began in earnest well before its November 5, 
2007 North American release date because it was the first of the franchise to deviate from 
the previous games’ popular WWII setting, representing instead contemporary armed 
conflict in international hotspots.  In a host of interviews conducted for game sites, 
magazines, and cable programs, Infinity Ward’s production personnel hyped the game’s 
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aesthetic of military realism and visceral gameplay, while promising gamers that Call of 
Duty 4 would remain faithful to the franchise’s successful design formula.      
In a series of interviews, Grant Collier, one of the Studio Heads at Infinity Ward, 
discusses wide-ranging aspects of the upcoming game, but spends considerable time 
describing Call of Duty 4’s near-real world setting and political narrative. Collier works 
to strike a balance between the game’s fictional content and the lived reality of 
contemporary warfare.  For instance, he stresses that the game is not “about the war in 
Iraq … [but instead, Call of Duty] is a global conflict” and that the gamer is charged with 
hunting down a “fictitious villain in a fictitious setting” (Collier, 2007).  Collier also 
rebuffs any characterization of the game as a “tactical shooter,” which typically connotes 
slower pacing and the need to obey strict procedural demands (for example, the Rainbow 
Six and Ghost Recon franchises discussed last chapter are tactical shooters).  Instead, he 
frames Call of Duty 4 as a combat-oriented action game in the same visceral vein of the 
previous titles.  He states: “It’s going to be an action-packed modern game with rapid 
redeployment of forces…players being in multiple locations, being able to see multiple 
types of conflict.  It’s the battlefield from the soldier to the satellite, and everything in 
between” (Collier, 2007). During a co-interview with Collier and Hank Keirsey, Call of 
Duty’s military advisor who will be discussed shortly, Keirsey asks Collier on behalf of a 
Russian journalist why the Russians are “still” the bad guys since they’re “not the 
communists anymore” (Collier and Keirsey, 2007).  Collier downplays the negative 
gamer feedback, saying that this narrative choice has irritated a few who have posted on 
the site’s forums, but that it is important to remember that the game is fictionalizing a 
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Russian separatist group.  It does not, according to Collier, negatively represent Russians 
citizens or the Russian military. In these promotional videos, Collier leverages his 
insights on the game’s design and his authoritative status as a knowledgeable production 
head to prefigure the expectations of gamers and critics alike; essentially reassuring 
would-be consumers that the brand’s celebrated style of ludic war remains firmly in place 
even as Infinity Ward takes their franchise and loyal gamers into the twenty-first century.  
Having outlined the fictional aspects of the title’s enemies and the non-specific 
locations of the urban firefights in the Middle East, Collier argues that the game’s 
essential military realism is based on the production team’s attention to details like 
combat tactics, gear, dialogue, and the game’s sophisticated visual and audio design. In a 
particularly striking promotional video that chronicles Infinity Ward’s research process, 
Collier describes how the production team took an educational field trip to the “Marine 
Air Ground Combat Center” in Twenty Nine Palms, California (it is one of the few 
training installations where tanks engage in live fire exercises). This video shows marines 
training in a mock town alongside the game’s artists who are taking notes and recording 
audio and visual data.  The clip then alternates between the recorded live-action 
exercises, and the game development process unfolding on PC monitors to attest to the 
fidelity between these two worlds. Collier declares emphatically:  “Our guys are diehard 
about being as authentic as possible.”  
The final segment of this promotional video shows a group of marines visiting the 
Infinity Ward studio to play a beta version of the game.  As Collier tells the story, the 
visiting marines were defeated easily during their first few matches.  However, once they 
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began communicating and coordinating their assault tactics, they easily outwitted the 
opposing team of beta testers.  Apocryphal or not, the rhetorical power of this final 
anecdote suggests that even though Call of Duty 4 was produced outside of the defense 
community proper, that Infinity Ward has engineered a title that nevertheless enjoys high 
degrees of military realism because of the generous input of the armed forces, and which 
has even been Beta-tested by a group of approving soldiers. 
Military advisors and subject matter experts play a critical role in the development 
of war entertainment in general, and in video games in particular.  They are not only the 
members of a production team who ensure that military terminology and protocols find 
accurate digital expression (see, Payne, 2009), but they are also useful for marketing 
purposes.  Hank Keirsey, Call of Duty 4’s military advisor, is a good case in point.  Like 
Collier and the other Infinity Ward creatives, Keirsey is the subject of numerous 
promotional videos posted before and after Call of Duty 4’s release.  Keirsey, who has 
decades of experience with the Army infantry and who has taught history at West Point, 
began working with Infinity Ward during their creation of their first Call of Duty title in 
2003. Keirsey’s testimonials about the game’s two-year development cycle and team’s 
meticulous data collection methods lend credence to the marketing materials’ claims of 
authenticity.  In one of the more colorful interviews, Keirsey (2007) remarks:  “The game 
has approached a level of intensity that’s gonna make a weak gamer soil himself.  It is 
that good. It’s really got a feel for it.”  His praise continues: 
Someone asked me, “Could you use this game as a rehearsal tool?” And I actually 
said, “Absolutely. You could, but it’s not the intent of the game.” The last thing 
on the mind of the developers was making anything that could be used by the 
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Department of the Army or anybody else.  But what they did by making the game 
so authentic … By getting all the physics exactly right, getting the weapons 
exactly right, the ballistics right, frankly – you know – if you had a hit squad to go 
in on Osama bin Laden … you could do a hellacious rehearsal. Headset-to-
headset, man-to-man. [You] still got to go do it…But the commands, the 
coordination between people, rehearsing contingencies – [Call of Duty 4 is] a 
tremendous engine to do that with.  Again, it’s unintentional. It just happens to be 
because [Infinity Ward] made it so close. 
 
Keirsey’s testimonial is all the more compelling because of his outsider status as an 
advisor and because of his personal military experiences.   
Another noteworthy theme in Keirsey’s interviews is his belief that the Call of 
Duty games appropriately memorialize soldiers’ sacrifices.  He was reluctant at first to 
work for a video game company until he saw their “passion” for creating an authentic 
military past.  Keirsey was also initially attracted to the first Call of Duty game because 
the WWII subject matter “taught something about a generation that did amazing things” 
(Keirsey, 2007).  He does not feel any different about Call of Duty 4’s depiction of 
today’s soldiers, saying: “I enjoy working with these games because I think they’re a 
tribute to the guys that are doing this for real.”  This suggestion amplifies the supposed 
military realism by promising players a way of virtually paying tribute to soldiers by 
buying and playing the game, and it is quickly becoming a rhetorical motif in the 
marketing of contemporary military-themed games (e.g., Davison, 2010, n.p.). 
These promotional interviews connect technical elements of military realisticness 
with the promised experiential pleasure of playing ludic war, while also containing 
simulation-based anxieties that could result from the dissonance between knowledge of 
how modern combat is conducted and how it is modeled in Call of Duty 4.  Marketing 
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materials generally hold out the promise for some future reward, but press reviews are 
another kind of paratextual fare entirely and need not establish such commitments.  The 
reviews of Call of Duty 4, while mostly favorable, allude to the anxieties of simulation 
fever that are largely elided in the developer interviews.   
“…MOMENTS [IN CALL OF DUTY 4] ARE ALMOST TOO REAL AND PAINFUL TO BEAR…” 
If the personnel interviews for Call of Duty 4 are paratextual testimonies that 
narrate the developers’ commitment to military realism during the game’s production 
phase, then the press reviews are the paratextual evaluations by gaming’s official taste 
experts on how the designers have executed their craft. Call of Duty 4 earned high 
aggregate scores of “94” for both the Xbox 360 and PS3 platforms on MetaCritic.com, 
placing the game in the top 10 of the best reviewed games for both systems (as of 
February 2009).  But professional critics and reviewers do far more than score and rank a 
game based on in-house rubrics.  Press reviews, which are usually penned before the 
game’s release date but are often not published until the game goes on sale, join the 
chorus of other information that influence how gamers understand a title’s place within a 
genre and marketplace, and whether the player ought to part with their money.  
Furthermore, as elite and experienced players themselves, game critics also suggest how 
to best interpret titles’ content and gameplay experiences.  This section surveys how high 
profile reviews posted within days of Call of Duty 4’s November 2007 release offer 
strategies for understanding the game’s ludic pleasures of military realism and how 
gamers might appreciate the technical sophistication of the simulated violence without 
succumbing to the game’s negative affective elements. 
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The reviews for Call of Duty 4 are nearly uniformly pleased with Infinity Ward’s 
decision to transport the franchise from its WWII theaters to modern day combat zones.  
Making the title’s armed conflict timelier also makes the game more relevant to players’ 
social experiences (potentially increasing its social realism).  As Gamespot.com’s former 
editor Jeff Gerstmann (2007) puts it, “By bringing things into a fictionalized story that 
still seems fairly plausible, the developer has made a much heavier game” (n.p.). 
“Heavier” in this context probably means that the game is more personally affecting for 
gamers who may know soldiers serving overseas, or for those who may have served or 
are currently serving.   
Besides the diegetic universe’s fictional but no less horrifying terror plot, this 
game saw graphical and gameplay improvements over Call of Duty 3 (2006).  The 
reviewers seem most comfortable with praising the game’s technical achievements.  For 
instance, in Hilary Goldstein’s review for IGN.com, the critic writes: 
This is a gorgeous game from top to bottom. It runs almost perfectly, with only a 
few rare frame rate hiccups, and offers rich details, great texture work, excellent 
animations for your allies, awesome particle effects, and some stellar lighting. 
The sound is equally impressive. Combat is loud. The shouts of your allies, the 
curses of your enemies, the ominous clink of a grenade falling at your feet, all go 
to creating an immersive experience. You may well lose yourself in combat, 
drawn in by the visuals and the sound. This is a technically excellent effort that 
won't disappoint. (2007, n.p.) 
 
And Gamedaily.com’s Chris Buffa (2007, n.p.) strikes a similar note in his review: 
To play COD4 is to admire it. Not only does it play remarkably well, but it looks 
and sounds gorgeous. Its powerful scenes of civilians getting executed and 
buildings crumbling strikes deep in the hearts of anyone that pays attention to the 
daily new [sic]. The way soldiers clear rooms and the mission in which you safely 
bomb terrorists from hundreds of feet in the air reminds us of the shows on the 
Discovery Channel. We find ourselves both amazed and terrified at the detail, 
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how characters move like actual human beings, how weapons look and sound 
exactly like their real-life counterparts and the screams of pain, anger and joy. 
 
But perhaps the most literal game review is a video feature produced by IGN-Australia 
that compares the virtual Call of Duty 4 guns to their real-world counterparts at a Las 
Vegas gun store (IGN, 2007). In this video, the IGN reporter test fires numerous pistols 
and assault rifles, as the video alternates between the live action demonstration and the 
game’s firefights.  The host explains the pros and cons of each weapon (e.g., accuracy, 
power, recoil, etc.), and how Infinity Ward brought their digital weapons to life. 
 
Figure 4.2: IGN.com correspondent at a gun range92 
 
This video’s quite literal comparison between worldly arms to their ludic proxies assumes 
an unproblematic correspondence and fidelity between the real and the virtual.  What 
comparisons like this and, indeed, the marketing efforts of military realism ignore are the 
implications for how players understand the experiences of the game’s virtual soldiers, 
and how that understanding informs what they know of actual soldiering.  This is, in 
other words, the key difference that Galloway strikes between textual realisticness and 
                                                
92 Image from: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H2LCB9228uY 
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social realism; it is the fiction between textual and contextual modalities. Marketing 
paratexts are far more likely to advertise how the game represents the details of modern 
war machinery – the physical setting, the political era, or the ability of the development 
team to craft a compelling ludic war experience (i.e., the military realisticness) that 
closely resembles other war entertainment – than it is to sell the gamer on the equally 
boring and horrifying social reality of conducting war. The parodic news source, The 
Onion, offers perhaps the keenest and most humorous insight into Call of Duty’s inability 
to model the social reality of war when they reported on the, then, fictional Modern 
Warfare 3, in which players will spend most of their time “hauling equipment,” “filling 
out paperwork,” and “complaining about how bad the cell phone reception is” (Onion, 
2010, n.p.). Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3 is, however, no longer a fictional joke; it 
will hit store shelves on November 8, 2011. 
 
Figure 4.3: Soldiers complain about poor phone reception in The Onion’s fictional 
Modern Warfare 393 
                                                




Unlike the personnel interviews, the game reviewers did grapple with the 
subjective discomforts of playing a military game during a time of war, and how Call of 
Duty 4’s more haunting moments engender moments of simulation fever.  Chris Buffa of 
Gamedaily.com echoes Keirsey’s comments about the game’s brutality as being an 
interactive testament to the valor and sacrifice of today’s soldiers. Buffa states: 
Combat is visceral and unrivaled. You've never experienced anything more 
vicious and unforgiving. Rockets zip past your head, attack choppers shred nearby 
houses with gunfire, jets carpet bomb an area, tanks blast through walls and 
soldiers fall by the hundreds. The insanity, coupled with your character's inability 
to absorb as may hits as in other games (Halo 3, Bioshock), causes you to 
question your actions and rethink strategies. Bottom line, if this game represents 
even just a fraction of the hell actual soldiers deal with on a day-to-day basis, we 
have a newfound respect for the armed forces. (2007, n.p.) 
 
Call of Duty 4 has been praised for introducing particularly stark battles and scenes into 
the single-player narrative that underscore the ugliness of war.  Recall the game’s bleak 
credit sequence as described in Chapter One when the gamer plays as President Al-
Fulani, the kidnapped leader of an unnamed Arab county, who is escorted to his televised 
execution. The player is powerless to do anything other than to look helplessly around 
during this sequence. “Through the eyes of Al-Fulani, you watch as [the terrorist, Khaled] 
Al-Asad raises a gun to your face; a gunshot rings out and the screen quickly fades to 
black” (Moses, 2007, n.p.).  Gamepro’s Travis Moses punctuates his description of the 
execution, stating, “Because of [Call of Duty 4’s] near-photorealistic visuals, moments 
such as this are almost too real and painful to bear but it again reinforces Infinity Ward's 
ability to expertly engage both the body and the mind” (2007, n.p.).  Andrew Pfister of 
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EGM/1up.com argues similarly that despite the potential for an unpleasant approximation 
of current military action in the Middle East – a “delicate issue being addressed in a 
medium best known for ‘dude, blow something up’” – that because of Infinity Ward’s 
past experiences in making WWII games, that they have struck the right tone of military 
realism for playing the current Global War on Terror.  
But as any Call of Duty fan can tell you, the people at Infinity Ward are skilled 
storytellers and masterful scenarists. It's because of this that Modern Warfare 
finds itself in the company of movies like Black Hawk Down, rife with intense 
portrayals of serious and complicated situations that, though perhaps not entirely 
realistic, still convey to the rest of the nonenlisted world how war might feel: 
completely f***ed up. (Pfister, 2007, n.p.) 
 
The sacrifice and professionalism of the Marines and British S.A.S. forces (the 
two squads the gamer plays as in the single-player campaign) are presented in the press 
reviews as morally righteous actors even if the limited military interventions themselves 
fail to enjoy the same mythological gravity as WWII campaigns.  The press reviews 
recognize elements of simulation fever that attend to playing wars ripped from today’s 
headlines, and the need for smart design when crafting ludic wars based on recent events. 
However, the game journalists diffuse any concerns over this subjective tension by 
celebrating the moral virtues of armed service personnel, and the efficacy of Infinity 
Ward to update their award-winning franchise without falling prey to simulation fever.  
The major press reviews largely reinforce the claim delivered in the Call of Duty’s major 
TV spot: “Wars change. Weapons change. Soldiers don’t.” 
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 “VERY FUN GAME, AMERICAN SCUM.” 
Call of Duty 4’s “World Leaders” web videos illustrate just how important fan-
authored paratexts have become to the efforts of video game marketers. The amateur-
looking “World Leaders” videos star five international politicians typically vilified by the 
mainstream U.S. news media offering their own reviews of Call of Duty 4. Like most 
video reviews that alternate between a talking head and game footage, these satirical 
shorts contain archival footage of a leader at a press conference, alongside gameplay clips 
from Call of Duty 4. Conspicuously poor broken-English voiceovers play in these off-
color spots, and they closely resemble any number of fan videos posted to video sharing 
sites like YouTube, or bits from late night comedy programs like The Daily Show with 
Jon Stewart or The Colbert Report. Indeed, the “World Leaders” videos testify to the 
assumed value of fan-authored texts to help assure a game’s success precisely because of 
what these videos are not – namely, fan-authored texts. These pieces were not crafted by 
a die-hard Call of Duty fan, as is suggested by the host site’s somewhat dated appearance 
(the page’s simple layout and repetitive wallpaper background call to mind a MySpace or 
Geocities page).  Rather, the site was engineered by DDB Los Angeles, a successful ad 
agency and bankrolled by the game’s publisher Activision.94 Additional downloadable 
content such as the desktop wallpaper graphics and AIM buddy icons featuring the URL 
hint to site’s origins, as do the links to Infinity Ward and Activision.  There is no reason 
to think that this is or will become a popular strategy for marketers.  It is more likely one 
form of viral marketing that firms can surreptitiously deploy to build product buzz.  
                                                
94 Conducting a WhoIS request of the website’s URL reveals that the site is registered to 
Activision Publishing. 
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The pseudo-fan created “World Leaders” project impressed the advertising 
community.  The campaign won numerous awards at the 2008 Belding Awards 
competition, and it garnered the “Most Attention Getters” and “Don’t You Wish You’d 
Thought of This” awards at the 2008 MI6 Video Game Marketing Conference. 
According to a blog entry by Paul Sears, an account supervisor with DDB LA, the 
advertisement’s goal was to: “Raise awareness of the game and give gamers a reason to 
believe that Call of Duty's move from a WWII game to the arena of Modern Warfare was 
going to make the game even better.”  Sears continues, posing the rhetorical question: 
“Who better to endorse Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare than the experts - war hungry 
world leaders?” (Sears, 2009, n.p.).  
The videos feature Russia’s Vladimir Putin, Libya’s Col. Muammar al-Gaddafi, 
Cuba’s Fidel Castro, Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and a media report issued on behalf 
of North Korea’s Kim Jong-Il.  The short pieces are bookended by mock broadcasting 
slates, most are accompanied by some grandiose nationalistic orchestral score, and these 
absurdist caricatures assume a familiarity with how these leaders are typically 
represented by the mainstream U.S. press. Unlike the other Call of Duty paratexts, these 
parodic game reviews acknowledge the centrality of play in game culture – a recognition 
that is largely absent from the earnest military realism discourse, including the 
aforementioned interviews and the press reviews.   
Play, humor, and textual experimentation are not all that easily commensurable 
with an advertised military realism that supposedly pays tribute to real soldiers and 
closely models ballistics and combat tactics.  Indeed, play is often disruptive, subversive, 
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farcical, and irreverent.  These videos acknowledge what the gaming community already 
knows – that gamers engage in all manner of playful behavior during virtual war sessions 
that are neither realistic nor particularly militaristic.  Despite Sears’ blog assertion that 
“war hungry” world leaders make for the best Call of Duty advocates, the videos’ 
repurposed archival footage deflate the production personnel’s seriousness rhetoric of 
military realism, and they acknowledge the vibrant fan community that is absent from 
Call of Duty’s major television spots.  The World Leaders project signals that fan-
authored paratexts are such a critical component for AAA game marketing campaigns, 
that producers can manufacture fan-look-alike paratexts for themselves and for their fans.  
Beyond suggesting a politically aware and creative fan community, the World 
Leaders pieces also complicate the issue of simulation fever.  If this form of moral panic 
is the subjective discomfort caused by some disconnect between the manner in which a 
process is represented or simulated, and the way a gamer understands that process to 
operate outside of the game, then how might such obviously parodic paratexts contribute 
to any state of simulation anxiety? The answer lies in the paradoxical nature of play 
itself; a dynamic interplay of reality and fantasy that is manifest in the World Leaders 
project. First, these videos inject timely political knowledge into the frames of meaning 
that circulate around the Call of Duty franchise, offering players worldly referential 
pleasures external to the fictitious game characters and nebulous settings (interestingly, 
the game’s sequels unfold in real-world locales).  The production personnel and the game 
make it abundantly clear that Call of Duty 4’s story and characters are fabricated. Yet the 
parodic game reviews assume more than a passing familiarity with these leaders’ 
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personas.  This crafty piece of advertising delivers contemporary political references in 
the absurd package of game reviews from world leaders-turned-game critics.   
The videos are thus playfully ambivalent about how the paratextual political 
truths and the textual representations of military realism offer potentially oppositional 
readings about the game’s depiction of international conflict after 9/11.  The videos make 
this friction clear because the driving, fictional conceit is the leaders’ mixed reviews of 
Call of Duty is due to the game’s near-real narrative and setting.  For example, Putin 
gives the single-player mission a negative review because he believes that the idea of 
stolen Russian nuclear weapons is a “very implausible story” and that he finds the notion 
“disgusting, like Polish vodka.” Similarly, the state-run media correspondent for Kim 
Jong-Il reports that while the “glorious leader” enjoyed certain aspects of the game – 
saying “Very fun game, American scum” – that because the game has nukes, “there is no 
saving Korea.  One star.”  In Castro’s review, the Cuban leader says that he has been 
absent from public view because he has been playing Call of Duty.  Castro praises the 
game, saying: “Not since baseball has America given us something this exciting.”  But 
due to his health problems and the game’s high levels of excitement, his brother Raul is 
not permitted to play at the same time.  
 223 
 
Figure 4.4: Castro playing Call of Duty 495 
 
The fictional “complaints” levied about simulation anxiety is most pronounced in the al-
Gaddafi’s video.  The Colonel exclaims:  
Game developers! Come on, you say this is an unnamed Arab country? Fictional? 
This is Libya.  It’s obviously Tripoli. Pretending this isn’t Libya is as stupid as 
pretending Liberty City isn’t New York.  If this isn’t Libya, then a camel doesn’t 
poop in the desert.  [Silence. Person coughing.] Camel? Pooping in the desert? 
Like a bear? Nevermind.  
 
Al-Gaddafi continues to identify people and places as the game footage plays.  Near the 
end of the review, he freezes the action and circles Tripoli’s beach with a telestrator tool, 
exclaiming: “You can practically see the hot babes in their tropical-print burkas!” 
The Libyan leader’s reference to Liberty City, the NYC-look alike in Grand Theft 
Auto IV (2007), is not the only intertextual allusion to game culture in these videos.  
These reviews repeatedly acknowledge a playful game culture largely ignored by the 
game’s “official” marketing materials.  For instance, Putin (whose online gamer handle is 
                                                
95 Image from: http://www.worldleaderreviews.com/reviews.php 
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“ShootinPutin187”) praises the game’s multiplayer design, saying that he has designed 
his own class of sniper the calls the “Russian Bear.” He boasts: “I am silent but deadly, 
like a Boris Yeltsin fart.”  According to President Ahmadinejad, Iran has also used the 
game’s multiplayer customization options to develop a new ability to defeat “the Great 
Satan.”  Their army’s newest order is that of the “anti-tea-baggers” which will protect 
their soldiers against having their posthumous faces squatted on by their victors.96 
Ahmadinejad’s announcement of this new ability is accompanied by a provocative image 
of a military medal made from twin tea infuser balls.   
 
Figure 4.5: “Anti-Tea-bag” Perk from Ahmadinejad’s World Leaders Video97 
 
CONCLUSION 
The off-color jokes and insider humor that characterize the World Leaders videos 
is in keeping with Kerr’s hegemonic masculinity and Kline et al.’s militarized 
                                                
96 “Teabagging” in video games is when one player places their avatar over another and 
repeatedly squats over the dead avatar’s face.  Because many shooter games allow the 
defeated player to be a spectator after their virtual death, victorious players can add insult 
to injury by performing this act of dominance. 
97 From: http://www.worldleaderreviews.com/reviews.php 
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masculinity, as this gendered and sexist discourse is aimed at appealing to a reliable, 
target demographic. Moreover, the celebrated liminality between worldly facts and 
gaming fiction lessens the potency of any critical protests against Call of Duty’s 
representation of postmodern war.  These parodic videos are a preemptive volley by 
Activision against those who might criticize war games for profiting from contemporary 
armed conflicts.  These advertising paratexts argue that even if the advertised game were 
about real people and places, that there is still nothing to be concerned about because Call 
of Duty is a “game.”  In effect, these spoof reviews complicate the game’s ambivalent 
politics so as to obscure the game’s varied strategies of producing its ludic war pleasures.  
The World Leaders videos do not eliminate the potential for simulation fever to occur as 
much as it stigmatizes any allegations of moral panics resulting from taking video games 
too seriously, or confusing the modality of simulations for reality itself.  
Simulation fever, however, is not only some cognitive disconnect or textual ludic 
anxiety that impacts sensitive gamers during gameplay.  These simulation-based moral 
panics can negatively impact promotional buzz and sales, making it a concern for game 
developers across game genres98 (hence the rich variety of publicity paratexts like 
                                                
98 One non-military shooter example is the outcry over the publicity materials for the 
survival horror game, Resident Evil 5 (2009). The early trailers for this cross-platform 
and multimedia franchise show Chris Redfield, a white Special Operations officer, 
shooting Africans who have been infected with destructive parasites. Fans and non-fans 
voiced their concerns about the game’s depiction of a white American shooting diseased 
black Africans. The game’s Japanese publisher Capcom denied any malicious intent and 
quickly introduced light-skinned infected into subsequent game trailers. The moral panic 
in this case erupted because game footage was read as allegories of colonialization and 
the African AIDS epidemic. For a longer discussion this PR dilemma, see Kramer, 2009. 
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personnel interviews that attempt to foreclose public relations problems). Comically 
presenting world leaders as Call of Duty gamers injects political levity into a game that is 
purported by its production personnel to be distinctly apolitical but viscerally affecting.  
The logic of Infinity Ward’s personnel seems to operate as follows: if military realism is 
the sum total of all the military details programmed into the game, then omitting key geo-
political facts such as real locations and bodies politic means that the game must be 
politically neutral. The game’s marketers, however, understand that meaning making, 
hype creation, and sales can be amplified by giving the game community paratexts that 
acknowledges their insider jokes and affords them the license to disregard the complex 
politics of representation.  For all of its advertised military realism (i.e., its technical 
realisticness and positive framing of U.S. service personnel), the marketers of Call of 
Duty and other shooters would have you remember that it is, in the end, “just a game.” 
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SECTION III:  























“F*ck You, Noob Tube!”: Learning the Art of Ludic LAN War 
 
INTRODUCTION 
“F*ck You, Noob Tube!”99 Wait.  Me?  Oh, no. A gamer had called me out 
publicly in this, my very first night in the field.  Evidently, I had committed some 
unwritten gameplay foul that marked me as different from the dozens of other video 
gamers playing Call of Duty 4 (2007) during LANopolis’ all-night gaming session.100  It 
would take me some time to finally comprehend what I had done to elicit such a barbed 
response from a fellow gamer – a young man who I would later come to know as Lee.  I 
will return to this story in the chapter’s latter half to answer the related questions: just 
what is a “noob tube” exactly; and more significantly, why does something like a “noob 
tube” exist, or need to exist in this venue?    
In these two final contextual play chapters, I relate the foremost “lessons” culled 
from participant observations of numerous gameplay sessions at a commercial computer 
gaming center, and a focus group conducted at that same site.  This first context of play 
chapter examines the manner in which gamers relate to one another while playing 
modern military shooters (games like Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare [2007]; Modern 
Warfare 2 [2009]; Call of Duty: Black Ops [2010]; Battlefield: Bad Company 2 [2010]; 
and Counter-Strike [2000]) during all-night gaming marathons.  The next chapter 
                                                
99 A preliminary version of this chapter appears in my 2010 co-edited anthology, Joystick 
Soldiers: The Politics of Play in Military Video Games (Routledge). 
100 LANopolis is the pseudonym for my research site. The participants’ names, as well as 
the gaming center’s title, have been changed to protect partipants’ identities. 
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examines what avid war gamers think makes one a “good” virtual soldier.  I am 
restricting my remarks about the public gameplay at this center to military shooters 
because these games are among the most popular titles played there (as they are at similar 
establishments), and it productively limits my observations to the ludic war activity 
examined over the preceding chapters.  It bears underscoring, however, that this is not the 
only play activity that unfolds in this multi-media gaming center.  As it will be explained 
momentarily, the site supports a variety of gaming configurations for a range of media-
based activities.  This chapter’s observations come from field notes collected over eight 
“all-night” (10 PM to 10 AM) gaming marathons where I participated in various 
multiplayer video games, numerous afternoon visits during non-peak hours, and from 
informal interviews conducted with the patrons and with the management of LANopolis.  
The unofficial rules of waging ludic war in a LAN setting – those play behaviors that 
avid gamers take for granted – are practices that in some ways reflect the concerns of the 
shooters game texts explored earlier, as well as those social values promoted by the 
marketing paratexts.  It would be incorrect, though, to suggest that the LANopolis’ play 
conventions that dominate its all-night festivities only result from the shooter texts and 
their paratexts.  This is the part of the ludic war experience where we talk about the 
gamers and their gameplay.  But before discussing my field observations, I should narrate 
– if briefly – the research lessons I have gleaned from media scholarship about 
researching video game communities. 
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STUDYING VIDEO GAME COMMUNITIES 
In the inaugural journal issue of Games and Culture, Tom Boellstorff makes the 
case for sociology and anthropology’s potential contributions to game studies: in 
particular, providing frameworks for the cultural theorization of play and the 
methodology of participant observation (2006, p. 30).  Boellstorff contends, citing the 
work of famed anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski, that the value of participant 
observation (oxymoronic as the term might sound) is it “allows the researcher to study 
the gap between what people say they do … and what they actually do” (p. 32).  Staking 
these kinds of knowledge claims tempers analyses that might otherwise treat game 
culture as a structuralist schema radiating from the titles’ rules of play.  “Such 
theorizations of culture also further the idea that culture is to game as context is to text, 
making it difficult to ask how in some circumstances games can act as contexts for 
culture” (emphasis in original, Boellstorff, 2006, pp. 31-32).  It is precisely for this 
reason that this project has not framed the context of play (or any paratext for that matter) 
as emerging out of the text, but as overlapping constellations of social practices.  These 
mutually constitutive forces exert pressure on the other, but they are rarely, if ever, 
directly causal.  In other words, the text unquestionably shapes gaming culture, but it is 
not the first and final word; the war game technology is not the base to the ludic war 
superstructure.  Fortunately, a handful of studies have answered Boellstorff’s call by 
using participant and ethnographic methods for describing in careful detail the ways in 
which technology, imagination, and play practices work together to produce uniquely 
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affecting mediated experiences which form the basis for the establishment and 
maintenance of particular gaming communities.   
My thinking on how best to conduct my own study of a war gaming community 
and to what critical end has been shaped by game scholarship that: refutes claims of 
technological determinism without neglecting questions of power and ideology (Turkle, 
1984; Kinder 1991); acknowledges the researcher’s interactions with gamers during the 
fieldwork and its subsequent reporting (Taylor, 2006; Pearce, 2009); looks at ways 
gamers generate social capital through play (Castronova, 2005; Consalvo, 2007), and the 
means by which extra-textual elements shape gaming culture (Taylor, 2006; Jones 2008).  
Although these works do not exhaust the scholarship on the topic, I suspect that they have 
been formative for a number of games researchers because they share compelling critical 
and methodological themes. Curiously, it is a classic study of a “paper and pencil” 
fantasy role-playing community – an ethnographic work that is neither about video 
games, nor about electronic mediation – which has most shaped my thinking about how 
the ludic war experience represents its own distinct cultural realm. 
In Shared Fantasy: Role-Playing Games as Social Worlds (1983), Gary Alan Fine 
argues that fantasy role-playing game communities (i.e., “paper and pencil” games like 
Dungeons and Dragons) represent an identifiable subculture because these players use 
cultural elements to construct their own cultural systems.  The sociologist justifies his 
object of study:   
I researched fantasy role-playing gamers because they seek to develop new and 
unique cultural systems.  Whereas all groups create culture to some extent, most 
of these cultural systems are limited in scope. Fantasy gamers, on the other hand, 
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are explicitly concerned with the development of a cultural system; they judge 
their satisfaction with the game by the vigor of the culture they created and by the 
degree to which they can become personally engrossed in it.  For a sociologist 
interested in the interactional components of culture, few groups are better suited 
to analysis. (p. 229) 
 
He later clarifies this point, stating: “It is not that groups have culture, rather they use 
culture to imbue the events in their world with meaning and to create newly meaningful 
events” (emphasis in original, p. 239).  Fantasy gamers, therefore, draw from meaningful 
personal events and cultural phenomena to make their shared adventures resonant and 
evocative. Video war gameplay, unlike open-ended fantasy role-playing, is at all times 
mediated by commercial technologies, which are themselves bolstered by expansive 
advertising campaigns.  It is partially for these reasons that this project has recognized 
how texts and paratexts contribute to the cultivation of their ludic war cultural system.   
Shared Fantasy is also an inspired piece of research (and is an inspirational work 
for the current project) because it both takes gaming pleasures seriously, and interprets 
said experiences critically.  Fine (1982) remarks: 
For the game to work as an aesthetic experience players must be willing to 
“bracket” their “natural” selves and enact a fantasy self. They must lose 
themselves to the game.  This engrossment not total or continuous, but it is what 
provides for the “fun” within the game.  The acceptance of the fantasy world as a 
(temporarily) real world gives meaning to the game, and the creation of a fantasy 
scenario and culture must take into account those things the players find 
engrossing. (emphasis in original, p. 4) 
 
For as rule-bound as gaming experiences are, they are not defined solely by their rules.  
Were this indeed the case, scholars would need only consult a rulebook to understand a 
given ludic experience.  Instead, all social games are potentially rich research sites 
because they provide analysts with “natural laboratories” for studying how cultural forces 
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“play out” in a series of fictional scenarios (paraphrase from p. 233).  This is why 
participant observation and ethnographic approaches have proven useful for making 
sense of gaming culture.  Rules say what players can do in a game; they do not say what 
those gamer actions mean.  Again, Fine: “Only through ethnographic investigation and 
in-depth interviews can we discover the rules for such games in their behavioral – rather 
than formal – contexts” (1983, p. 236).  For these reasons, the current chapter attends to 
the “lessons” I, as an outsider, learned from playing virtual war with others in a shared, 
physical space.  
Fine reminds us that, “Fantasy gaming is…a unique social world, treasured for its 
uniqueness, but like any social world it is organized in ways that extend beyond its 
boundaries” (p. 242).  This is also the case for video war gaming.  For the would-be ludic 
soldier, learning the art of virtual war means recognizing and internalizing the practices 
that dedicated shooter gamers value and enforce in their community of play.  And, for the 
would-be game critic, it is necessary to connect these play values to a non-ludic world 
outside of the single gaming center.  Welcome to LANopolis. 
THE LAY OF THE LANOPOLIS 
Entering LANopolis for the first time can be a disorienting experience. The 
gaming center, which is sandwiched between a liquor store and a dentist office in a strip 
mall in a medium-sized Texas city, does not welcome the uninitiated with directions for 
participating in its arcade-like venue.  The signs on the front door state simply, “PC 
Repair, Upgrades” and “XBOX 360 & PC Gaming.”  More telling are the interlocking 
tapestry of faded game posters that cover the large windows on either side of the front 
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door.  Not only do these sun-bleached advertisements signal that this is a gaming 
establishment, but they also function as ad hoc blinds, keeping the sun and heat out of a 
room that requires limited illumination and a cool climate.   
Inside, LANopolis’ main room is a 1,000 square foot “L-shaped” open space with 
concrete floors, yellow walls (which are largely unadorned with pictures or artwork), and 
high ceilings with exposed ductwork and ceiling fans.   The reason for the Spartan décor, 
and for the lack of illumination generally, is because the room privileges the one device 
that truly populates the space – video screens.  Upon first entering the room late one 
evening, I was immediately stunned by the range of concurrent gaming activities and the 
amount of ambient light emanating from video screens throughout the room.  The 
disparate gaming activities, coupled with the lack of signage or a greeter, does little to 
guide the uninitiated on where they should go, whom they should approach, or directions 
that might otherwise put them at ease.    
It is even difficult for LANopolis’ veterans to navigate through the throng of 
bodies during the center’s peak hours: there are friends playing at the stand-up arcade 
games near the front door, patrons seated shoulder-to-shoulder at card tables supporting 
their own desktops and laptops101, and on-lookers peering over the shoulders of gamers 
playing with the Xbox 360 and Wii against the room’s back wall.  Once I squeeze my 
way to LANopolis’ main desk and cash register at the “elbow” (and thus center) of the 
“L-shaped” room, I encounter one of the center’s few pieces of signage.  It is a dry erase 
                                                
101 Patrons bring in their own computers during BYOC, or “bring your own computer,” 
events to use their own hardware while taking advantage of the site’s fast connectivity 
and social forum.   
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board that lists upcoming events, the prices of snacks and drinks (no outside food or 
beverages allowed), and fees for the various services. Along the room’s longest wall are 
twenty high-end PCs (personal computers) loaded with a bevy of popular games across 
genres.  This PC bank is one of the few features that cannot move, and it is the main 
hardwired attraction for many of LANopolis’ clientele.  Along the shorter walls are a pair 
of flat screen monitors, and a large video projector screen, each of which sport oversized 
beanbag chairs for gamers to lounge and nap on.  LANopolis’ general design and range 
of services match accounts of LAN cafés elsewhere (see, Beavis et al., 2005; Jansz and 
Martens, 2005; Beavis and Charles, 2007). 
While the expensive equipment (e.g., PCs, high-definition LCD monitors) is 
tethered to the room’s perimeter, the open floor plan can be easily reconfigured for the 
clientele’s changing needs.  For example, card tables and power strips are brought out for 
the all-night marathon sessions, and other events, such as tournaments and private parties, 
can easily be hosted at LANopolis. Such spatial malleability serves at least two needs.  
First, because LANopolis is not always running at peak hours, the company supplements 
its income by accommodating a variety of requests.  According to the owner, Thomas 
Christopherson, a life-long video gamer himself, LAN centers must provide a diversity of 
services and maximize their space in order to remain financially viable.  As if to confirm 
this business truism, LANopolis’ closest competitor (located 20 miles to the North), went 
out of business during the writing of this chapter.      
The second benefit to the space’s multiplicity of uses is that it permits the players, 
especially during the all-night marathons, to make themselves comfortable in this 
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otherwise austere space.  Moving small tables around, logging onto computers next to 
their friends, and watching movies and sports on the big screens while sprawled out on 
beanbag chairs encourage gamers to consume a wealth of media together and at their 
leisure.  Such a dynamic and emergent room also complements the liminal nature of the 
gaming experience itself; the movement between worlds is mirrored in the gamers’ 
transition between a host of mediated activities in a transformable room.  Beavis and 
Charles (2007) draw a connection between the LAN café’s physical space and the 
gamers’ identity work, stating: “As ‘real life’ physical locations, LAN cafés provide sites 
where on- and off-line presence, identities and communities overlap and merge as players 
engage in online play and tournaments with seen and unseen others, and participate in the 
jointly constructed textual world of the game” (p. 693). LANopolis, like the game modes 
and control settings in video games, is customizable, and the space is thusly what the 
players make it – physically and socially. 
The foregoing description of LANopolis mirrors similar reports about LAN cafés, 
but what about the site’s physical connection to ludic war?  As should be clear, there is 
no necessary connection between LANopolis’ multipurpose spatial configuration and the 
activity of ludic war.  Said differently, virtual warring is not some foregone consequence 
of playing video games in a LAN setting.  Yet this is not the whole story either.  Unlike 
other commercial businesses, LANopolis facilitates emergent play (i.e., social context) 
with and through a range of games, including shooters, providing the right conditions for 
ludic LAN wars to unfold.  Ludic war is therefore a contingent social activity that is 
militarized through specific gameplay practices. Ludic LAN war is, therefore, an 
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amplified version of ludic war play where avid gamers have that either self-organized (in 
the case of home LANs) or have sought out a commercial setting for optimal mediated 
battles. It is to these games and its players that this chapter now turns.  
LESSONS FROM THE VIRTUAL TRENCHES 
The Call of Duty, Battlefield, Medal of Honor, and the Counter-Strike franchises 
are modern-era military shooters that may be played alone and offline, or with others 
online from remote locations, or together in LAN settings.  These shooters are especially 
popular among the regular gamers at LANopolis.  Players select game modes in these 
titles that set the objectives for that play session.  Popular multiplayer game modes 
include “team deathmatch,” where teams work to rack up more kills than the other; 
“capture-the-flag,” where teams move an item from one location to another; and 
“tactical” or “hardcore” where players cannot re-spawn (are not allowed to play again) 
after they are killed, thereby dramatically increasing the challenge.  Success in any of 
these team-based modes is predicated largely on adept hand-eye coordination, possessing 
more than a passing familiarity with the games and their maps, and quickly and 
effectively communicating with teammates. After playing alongside LANopolis’ best 
players for many, many hours, I can relate some of the foremost lessons of playing ludic 
war at this LAN center.  Intriguingly, only some of these “lessons” have to do with the 
games proper, as others are about communication and social comportment. I learned, 
what I am labeling here, ludic collaboration, techno-ludic literacy, and the discourse of 
domination.  These observational headings are not a priori in nature, but have emerged 
out of my 70+ hours of playing popular shooters with and against others at this venue.  
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Ludic Collaboration 
There is arguably no gameplay “lesson” more evident than the need to 
communicate with teammates when engaged in ludic war.  One can opt to play solo 
missions in shooters (as was discussed in Chapters Two and Three) and there are plenty 
of single player game options available at LANopolis.  However, this gaming center’s 
overwhelming attraction (and others like it) are the high-end PCs that support the 
resource-demanding, multiplayer combat-oriented games.  Ludic collaboration is defined 
here as the chatter and strategizing that occurs between gamers before, during, and after 
their virtual firefights.  The overwhelming majority of my initial conversations with 
fellow gamers concerned matters immediately related to the combat tasks at hand.   
During my first multiplayer battle in Call of Duty 4, I teamed up with a young 
man of a slight build who sported small round glasses and messy brown hair named 
Germ.  Many players in LANopolis use their online handles, and Germ is no different.102  
After inviting me to join his team, Germ, who was seated immediately to my left along 
the long row of networked PCs, and without taking his eyes off his own screen, coached 
me through what equipment choices I ought to make to best complement his (now) four-
man force.  We were competing against a proficient two-person team, led by Lee (his 
gamer handle), a portly man in his early 20s.  Lee, who is no stranger to LANopolis or 
Call of Duty 4, enjoys boasting of his virtual exploits to his dispatched enemies, his 
teammates, and anyone within earshot. During our pitched battles with Lee’s 
                                                
102 My personal gamer moniker is Ludology, meaning “the study of games.”  No gamers 
have yet called me out on this “meta” nickname, but they also do not address me as 
Ludology.  They all seem to prefer the shorter, “Lude,” instead.   
 239 
outnumbered but well-coordinated team, Germ would often lean over and point to 
various elements on my screen suggesting where I might hide, find good firing positions, 
and otherwise try to outmaneuver Lee and his teammate.  I was surprised to find that 
knowing your opponent is almost as useful as being familiar with the game and its 
control system.  Our team’s on- and offline communications are in line with Manninen’s 
(2003) observations concerning the diversity of peer-to-peer communications in a 
multiplayer setting.  Throughout this and the following battles, we would often find 
ourselves celebrating our team play.  Phrases like, “Dude, nice kill!” and “Thanks, you 
saved my ass!” are common exclamations during LANopolis’ pitched battles. 
Another notable example of ludic collaboration occurred when two teenage 
friends, Sam and Max, who were both deeply immersed in a combat game that they had 
never played before, tried to best an obstacle together.103  Max was certain that he could 
move his character into a more advantageous spot on the map by using his rocket 
launcher as a propulsion device.  Sam, who was not initially convinced of this seemingly 
suicidal scheme, scooted his chair to Max’s computer so as to solve this riddle together. 
After a few minutes of experimenting, the earlier trials of which resulted in Max killing 
himself repeatedly, the pair successfully launched Max’s avatar onto a narrow, hard-to-
reach ledge.  This success was celebrated with raised fists, and with Sam’s shouting, 
                                                
103 I believe that the game they were playing was Unreal Tournament 3, a fantastic 
combat game that is both similar to and different from military-themed games.  While 
there are important textual and generic differences, I believe that the shared, collaborative 
learning is not necessarily game- or genre-specific.   
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“F*ckin’ sweet rocket jump!”  Together, the two had explored the affordances of a 
weapon for something other than cyber-maiming.  
Techno-Ludic Literacy 
The second major lesson of playing virtual war is that having the right equipment, 
or knowing what equipment one ought to have, is perceived as a vital, if not sacred, 
knowledge.  Techno-ludic literacy in the case of LAN gaming pertains to the specific 
strategies of collaborative gameplay as well as the PC hardware and technologies that run 
these games. Because you can equip yourself with increasingly better equipment, either 
by leveling up in Call of Duty or Battlefield, or through buying yourself more powerful 
arms in Counter-Strike, understanding what weapons are ideally suited for a map and 
game mode is a prized and respected knowledge.  For example, there is an definite 
advantage to knowing: which maps are better for long-range weapons and those that are 
better for close-quarters weapons; when to use certain munitions and when to conserve 
them; and how to outflank and find cover in a variety of combat scenarios.  These games 
demonstrate, round after round, that all warfighting technologies are not created equal, 
and that they afford different benefits in varying situations.   
This is the reason why, on my first night in LANopolis, I was accused of being a 
“noob tube,” or someone who improperly uses a grenade launcher. I had deployed it in an 
unconventional setting – namely, inside a narrow hallway.  My tactical miscalculation 
was not labeled as a form of experimentation, like the Sam and Max example, but as a 
decision that called into question my knowledge of war gaming and my identity as a 
“proper” team player. Thus, in additional to drawing attention to my blunder, this public 
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labeling censures and marks the accused as one who either does not belong in that setting 
(virtual and/or physical), or is ignorant of unofficial (but no less operative) ludic war 
protocols.  This latter point receives full attention in the chapter’s final sub-section.     
I was surprised to find that the attendees’ collective preoccupation with 
understanding weapon technologies and team tactics extends beyond the virtual 
battlefields to the PC hardware that supports these wars.  This interest is, at least in part, 
motivated by wanting to maximize one’s pay-to-play investment at LANopolis.  There 
are (at most) only two individuals, the owner and the manager, who field the various 
technical questions and requests.  Knowing how to troubleshoot a PC, or navigate a 
complex setup screen is useful knowledge in a setting where help is not always 
immediately available.   
Yet this shared interest in understanding high-end PC gadgets and celebrating the 
latest and “greatest” wares reflects a deeper cultural and class issues as well.  Not unlike 
the military-themed games’ basic play logics, this often unreflective adulation of newer 
and “better” consumer wares suggests that for every problem there is a technological 
solution – be it a better video card, or a smarter weapons system.  At least some technical 
rationality exists, then, on both sides of the video screen: that is, both on the fictional 
battlefield (e.g., one should have the “right” weapon selected for the “right” scenario), 
and in the climate-controlled space of LANopolis (e.g., this hardware is “naturally” better 
for this particular game). The instrumentality that is endemic to ludic LAN war play is 
accompanied by the incessant drive to constantly outfit one’s computer with additional 
gadgets, thereby weighing technological advances (and “progress”) over critical 
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reflection about said upgrades or their related techno-social processes (e.g., planned 
obsolescence, technological rationality).  This tendency is especially pronounced among 
PC gamers, since their computer rigs can be outfitted with newer and newer pieces of 
hardware. Console systems, on the other hand, are overwhelmingly “plug-and-play” 
technologies. Although it outside this chapter’s focus, it bears underscoring that PC 
gaming is a particularly classed leisure pursuit.  
A quick qualification about technological rationality is in order.  Like the perhaps 
too simplistic ideology transfer in Luckham’s “armament culture” concept, I am reluctant 
to fully embrace a totalizing technological rationality for fear that it might predetermine 
my future field notes, and that it may introduce an unduly deterministic concept into the 
analysis.  Taking these caveats seriously, this analysis moves forward cautiously with a 
belief that techno-ludic literacy is a prized skill when military shooters are played in this 
particular, competitive techno-social configuration, and that this valued literacy too often 
privileges technological power for its own sake.  I offer two examples of how 
technological rationality and war play go hand-in-hand.  The first example comes from an 
interview with LANopolis’ owner, and the second is from a conversation where a young 
gamer tries to impress his peers with his PC knowledge.   
Thomas Christopherson has been LANopolis’ owner-operator since the company 
opened its doors in June 2006. A broad-shouldered white man in his late 30s, 
Christopherson wanted to fill what he saw as his city’s need for a full-time computer 
gaming center. Christopherson, who is believed to be overly gruff by some of the gamers, 
is a self-assured businessman who frequently looks for corporate alliances with PC 
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hardware and software companies.  Scratching his small, dark goatee, he explains 
LANopolis’ ability to survive when similar businesses have failed, stating directly: “I 
know what I’m doing.  I know what’s involved.” Christopherson claims that LANopolis 
has just over 4,000 open accounts, with only a handful of duplicates, and that the all-night 
events typically attract 30-40 gamers – an estimate that agrees with my observations.  
Christopherson believes that PC gaming is unique amongst gaming platforms, and 
that there is something inherently special about the technology that makes it more 
appealing to dedicated gamers. He states: “PC gaming is more complicated.  There’s 
more to do.  PC games migrate to the consoles. They always have, they always will.  If 
you’re serious about gaming you play on a PC.  You don’t play on a Mac or a 
console.”104 This sentiment was echoed more forcefully by a gamer late one night when 
he mocked another gamer’s computer saying, “Your computer sucks.  Macs are gay!” For 
Christopherson, and for many of LANopolis’ patrons, quality multiplayer gaming 
happens on PCs because the technology can support the most resource-demanding games, 
and thus, the “best” ludic LAN war experiences.  
Christopherson sees PCs and PC gaming as quasi-therapeutic tools for working 
through anxieties and natural (though primarily male) desires to exact violence.  The 
owner asks rhetorically:  “But what do [war video] games do?  They take the pain out of 
fighting.”  He pauses, then continues, “But what you can’t do is take the fight out of 
                                                
104  Christopherson blames the public relations beating that PCs have taken on journalists 
who he sees as ardent Mac devotees.  “The Mac elite are also popular journalists. They 
love their Macs.  It’s a cult.  That’s why PCs are so disparaged.  But they don’t know 
what they’re talking about.  Gaming doesn’t happen on Macs.” 
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people.  We’ve been doing it for far too long.  It’s going to come out somehow.  At least 
this way it’s safe.”  He points to the gamers playing behind him during our mid-afternoon 
interview, noting: “These guys play these games all the time, but we’ve never once had 
an act of violence [at LANopolis].  It just doesn’t happen.  If you’re being annoying 
someone might tell you to shut-up, but that’s it.”  Violent video gaming is a healthy, if 
not natural, pursuit for Christopherson.  Surprisingly, the owner’s intuitive beliefs mirror 
Jeffrey Goldstein’s work on violent toy play.  After mapping out the general approaches 
to the topic, Goldstein advocates that scholars ought to conduct more research in natural 
settings (e.g., like a LAN center) to test the variety of ways in which war toys are taken 
up. Goldstein (1995) notes:  
We can see that many needs may be satisfied in war play, most of them having 
little or nothing to do with aggression per se.  Among them we have suggested 
curiosity; exploration; coping; anxiety and fear reduction; self regulation of 
cognitive, emotional, and psychological states; and social identity. All social play 
occurs simultaneously at different levels of explanation and activity (p. 141). 
 
Moving off topic slightly, Christopherson opines about public officials’ preoccupation 
with violent games: “You know, people like Tipper Gore and Hillary Clinton, they want 
to cut off our balls. What we need is less government regulation, not more. [Military and 
war video games are] an easy target.  That’s why the press and politicians attack violent 
video games and gamers.”  Not surprisingly, the gaming center’s owner speaks forcefully 
about gaming critics and to a moral panic that threatens his business, livelihood, and 
lifelong leisure pursuit.    
The second example of techno-ludic literacy occurred when I overheard Scott, a 
young teen with seemingly boundless energy, trying to impress his fellow gamers with 
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his knowledge of PC hardware and his family’s affluence.  Resting on his knees while 
propped up on a beanbag chair, Scott addressed his peers’ backs as they all stared at their 
respective monitors while engaged in virtual combat.  Scott did not allow this collective 
sign of disinterest dissuade him from his task at hand, and – with detail that I am unable 
to reiterate because of its technological specificity – Scott launched into an argumentative 
foray explaining exactly how he planned to “mod” (or modify) his family’s home 
computer which was purportedly worth, “at least, $5,000.”  To no one in particular, Scott 
proposed an alternative plan that would allow him to transform an existing “Alienware” 
computer, a PC brand designed for high-performance gaming, for just under $10,000.  
His plans were met by polite if perfunctory “okays” and “yups” as the elder gamers did 
not pull themselves away from their screens.  Scott was not deterred by their collective 
disinterest.  Although, he might not have noticed this fact either, as he was lost in 
thought, preoccupied with counting out on his hands the various components he needed 
to build his ideal gaming rig.  It is remarkable that Christopherson and Scott, among 
LANopolis’ oldest and youngest players, each speak to the skill needed to fit into a social 
scene that values the instrumental knowledge needed to facilitate “proper” ludic wars. 
Discourse of Domination 
Playing video games in LANopolis also teaches players how to perform as 
players, and how to police and mark others when they deviate from presumed norms.  
The obvious demographic characteristic of the all-night gamers is that they are almost all 
white and male.  And because LANopolis is such a markedly homo-social space, it plays 
host to tacit and explicit displays of braggadocio, machismo, sexism, racism, and 
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homophobia.  In Die Tryin’: Videogames, Masculinity, Culture (2008), Derek Burrill 
examines the digital subjectivity of boyish masculinity that is cultivated across a variety 
of video game texts and gameplay interactions. I do not wish to pursue Burrill’s approach 
because he focuses on subjectivity as it is re-inscribed across texts and spaces, not 
gamers’ practices in a shared gamespace (his Chapter 3, for example, examines the 
theoretical aspects of arcade space but he does not engage gamers about their 
experiences).  Moreover, I would do a disservice to my descriptive account, to say 
nothing of gender studies’ theoretical insights, were I to attempt to rehearse the literature 
and shoehorn in its critical commitments at this late juncture. Fortunately, such focused 
analyses of masculinity in video games and game culture exist – see, the work of Derek 
Burrill (2008), Carly Kocurek (sparklebliss.com), and Tanner Higgin (tannerhiggin.com). 
At no point in my fieldwork have I seen more than six women or girls in the space 
at any one time.  One evening I did watch three women playing World of Warcraft 
(2004), a massively multiplayer online role-playing game, with one another.  But like 
most women at LANopolis, they left well before midnight.105  The paucity of women at 
LANopolis reflects similar accounts of other LAN sites.  For example, Beavis and 
Charles (2007) state: “Within LAN cafés and LAN gaming, girl gamers stand out by 
virtue of their rarity and physical presence” (p. 693).  Upon first entering LANopolis, 
women and girls are met with protracted male glances. Girls and women who do not play 
                                                
105 Perhaps the least scientific but nevertheless telling physical marker in LANopolis was 
the state of toilet in its single, unisex bathroom.  At no point after midnight did I ever see 
it with the lid in the down position, and by the early morning hours some of the gamers 
did not even feel the need to shut the door. 
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generally spend their time watching their boyfriends play, or relaxing before one of the 
many screens and watching a movie or television program. More than once I found 
myself seated on the couch next to the only girls in LANopolis while taking periodic 
breaks from the frenetic team-based fighting.  Tracy, a late-teen with long brown hair and 
a love of texting, and I both sighed audibly as the LCD monitor that we were watching 
was changed from TBS’s running of Bridget Jones’s Diary (2001) to an input channel for 
another Xbox 360 setup.  Tracy sighed because she lost her show. I sighed because it 
meant I had to return to the ludic warring.  When asked about LANopolis’ conspicuous 
lack of female gamers, Christopherson responded: 
Some women come in here, but not many.  Often they’re either girlfriends, or 
they’re mothers dropping off their kids.  They’ll hang out and play the arcade 
games--Dance, Dance, Revolution or Rock Band--but no they’re not playing Call 
of Duty or Team Fortress [another team-based, first-person shooter game]. That’s 
combat, that’s what the guys play.  With women and gaming, they’re into the 
more exclusively social games.  They want to talk and trade and strategize.  Yeah, 
they want to talk … they’ll probably talk you to death. [Laughs to himself.] 
 
Because women, girls, and gamers of color are so notably absent, certain social 
conventions are jettisoned to make room for a gendered, LAN-specific discourse that 
privileges domination to egalitarianism.  LANopolis’ gamers deal with infractions of 
gaming etiquette, as well as more general social violations, in ways that reveal the 
concerns that this gaming configuration values.  The extent to which ludic war is or is not 
replicated in the exchanges I have witnessed is not entirely clear to me yet. However, it 
stands to reason that the quickly alternating defensive and offensive postures in war 
games, along with the gameplay hierarchies that are established after repeated battles, 
escape their virtual bounds and are articulated in the gamers’ exchanges with one another.  
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Of course, when asked about it, the gamers say that they are “just playing,” “being silly,” 
or that they are simply “having a good time.”  The following description seeks to 
complicate this common refrain, arguing that the barbed LAN discourse communicates 
more than gamers purport, and that their exchanges are a means of policing one another’s 
gameplay.  There are at least three social violations that I have witnessed at LANopolis – 
playful, tolerable, and inviolable – which are categorized according to the response to the 
infraction, not the infraction proper.  
Playful transgressions are virtual and real-world exchanges where gamers 
humorously irritate or provoke one another.  These verbal and virtual sparring matches 
are understood to be joking by all parties, and are part of the experience of playing 
against one another generally (i.e., the equivalent of “trash talking”).  For instance, during 
a warm-up round of Counter-Strike, Sam yelled “Knife Fight!” indicating that all the 
participating combatants were to only use their knives.  The rest of the players quickly 
parroted the call. However, this self-imposed edict was quickly abandoned after Sam’s 
opponent shot him with an assault rifle.  Incredulously he yelled, “You shot me, bitch!”  
To which, Lee responded, “Well, don’t bring a knife to a gun fight!”  “But we’re playing 
knife fight!,” Sam pleaded.  This exchange was met with collective laughter.   
Another playful transgression is the mocking (or “flaming”) of games that are not 
sufficiently masculine, or those deemed to be substandard. “Hard core” gamers – a label 
that many of LANopolis’ regulars wear proudly – are known for deriding Nintendo 
games, which often cater to “casual gamers” (a marketing demographic) because of their 
accessibility and their typically lighter subject matter.  One evening a young man began 
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playing Super Smash Bros. Brawl (2008), a popular cartoonish fighting game for 
Nintendo’s Wii system, against LANopolis’ back wall.  After a few moments he was the 
target of ribbing from nearby PC users who contend the game and its system is for 
“babies and sissies.” 
Tolerable transgressions are off-color conversations and banter that are generally 
not heard or sanctioned in public settings.  The majority of these expressions are, on their 
face, little more than name-calling. Yet what makes these exchanges “tolerable” is that 
gamers are labeling each other as marginalized or presently absent groups. And because 
nearly all the players at the all-night gaming sessions identify as young, white, straight 
men, the verbal jabs are often racist, homophobic, and/or sexist.  I will offer one example 
of each, in respective order.   
When playing Call of Duty 4 as the “Op-For” (the opposing force) whose avatars 
are depicted as Arab, Lee and his team often erupt in a celebratory Arabic Zalghouta 
chant (sounds like “Yalalalalalala!”), mimicking the impassioned cries of Middle 
Easterners often depicted in films and in news coverage.  Obviously, this performance 
bears strikingly close resemblance to kids making stereotypical Native-American “hoots” 
in games of  “Coyboys and Indians.”  A second example happens late into the night as the 
younger boys become self-conscious and hyperaware of the space’s increasingly homo-
social constitution.  The younger gamers describe LANopolis as a “sausage porkfest,” 
and warn one another not to fall asleep for fear of being “made gay” (i.e., sexually 
assaulted).  One last troubling example is that the verb “rape” is often used to describe 
the complete domination of one player at the hands of another. As Lee was divvying up 
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the available players while spearheading an informal Call of Duty 4 tournament, he 
quipped to a teammate, “I’m glad we’re together. I don’t like to rape my friends.”  As one 
who participates regularly in online games played from my home, I can confirm that this 
verbal threat is neither an isolated incident, nor is it restricted to LAN gaming.    
The third category – inviolable transgressions – include expressions that are a 
direct affront to the in-group (the LAN gamers themselves), or violate sacrosanct play 
principles.  Bobby, a black teen with shiny short dreadlocks, confronted an acquaintance 
when he overheard the latter boy say, “F*ck dat nigga!”  Although this charged phrase 
was not directed at Bobby, he nevertheless interceded and asked the white boy, “What do 
you mean?” Realizing quickly what he had said, the white boy replied, “Nothing.  
Nevermind.”  To which Bobby said, “Alight, but watch it.”  Wanting to put the issue to 
rest, the white boy responded, “We’re cool, we’re cool.”   
Another sacrosanct rule is the prohibition against cheating, either by performing a 
software “hack,” or by surreptitiously watching someone else screen (known as “screen 
peeking” or “screen hacking”), to gain an unfair play advantage.  Periodically, shouts of 
“Hack!” and “Hacking!” spread in LANopolis, at which point gamers stationed at PCs 
turn around to see if anyone holds an unfair advantage over what is perceived to be 
private information. There is a similar unofficial ban on “griefing” or purposefully 
ruining the game for all involved by wildly deviating from the rules (e.g., purposefully 
getting killed, or killing one’s teammates).  In all likelihood, Lee called me a “noob tube” 
because he thought that I was purposefully trying to cause trouble when I fired my 
rocket-propelled grenade in a narrow hallway. Although I did not know what I was doing 
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at the time, I was shocked at how quickly I was called out for my online behavior in this 
offline space.  I continue to be stunned by the behaviors that elicit pointed criticisms, and 
the manifold slurs that fly under the proverbial radar precisely because they are about 
people outside of LANopolis.    
“FRIENDLY FIRE” 
This chapter offers an ethnographic description of a social environment in a 
single, commercial gaming space.  Clearly, the foregoing discussion is particular to 
LANopolis and is not generalizable to other venues or populations.  One can easily 
imagine, and some have no doubt played at, arcade-like venues that differ considerably 
from LANopolis.  It also bears repeating that there were and continue to be gaming 
opportunities besides the popular FPS games at my research site.  Yet what makes the 
study of shooters in LANopolis so intriguing is the way in which the publicly performed 
ludic warring dominates the space – effectively marginalizing the other gaming 
experiences – during the all-night marathons, and substantially prefiguring how virtual 
combatants ought to play with one another. In LANopolis, ludic war commonly escapes 
its mediated bounds to find expression in this shared space, becoming an operative and 
regulatory force in the attendees’ play lives. The games, the players, and the mode of 
technological connectivity and mediation (i.e., the LAN itself) coalesce at this gaming 
site to overdetermine a social milieu that is highly gendered, classed, and hetero-
normative.  
I conclude with a gamer’s somewhat failed attempt at humor. As Lee returns to 
his PC with another energy drink in hand during one of the summer’s all-night gaming 
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sessions, he tells a joke to the gamer sitting next to him.  “You know,” begins Lee, taking 
a conspicuously loud slurp from his tall beverage, “I like my C4 [an explosive device 
popular in many combat games], like I like my women….” He pauses for dramatic effect, 
but then blanks.  He fumbles unsuccessfully for the punch line, evoking premature 
laughter from his small audience. “Wait, hold on,” he protests, as he struggles to 
formulate the joke’s conclusion, while wiping excess energy drink from his lip.  “I 
know,” he continues, “I like them in small, tight packages that are ready to blow.”  He 
then punctuates this belabored finale by using his hands to mimic a mushroom explosion 
with its accompanying sound. Donning a self-satisfied grin and his oversized earphones, 
Lee returns to his gaming menu and preps for the next firefight.  This clumsy and off-
color joke encapsulates many of my field findings to-date about the power of the three-
way nexus of military games, technology, and a hard-core, male gaming community to 
engender a social space that operates under an unwritten but nevertheless understood 
code that polices play inside and outside of its virtual battlefields.  The following chapter 
asks these same LAN gamers what they think makes one a good virtual soldier, what they 
do to improve their personal gameplay skills, and how ludic warring relates to their 








The Promotion of Self in Everyday Strife: Gaming Capital of the Ludic Soldier 
     “Making war your bitch.”  
-- David, 23-year old LAN gamer on the pleasures 
of command and control in military shooters  
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter continues the work of the last by examining in detail what gamers 
think makes one a “good” ludic soldier across a range military shooters (in franchises like 
Call of Duty, Medal of Honor, Battlefield, Counter-Strike, etc.), as well as how they 
ascend in rank in their games and play groups.  Based on interview data drawn from a 
focus group with seven of LANopolis’ most avid gamers, and like the previous chapter’s 
focus on contextual gaming practices – i.e., gameplay “lessons” – the current analysis is 
concerned with assessing players’ diverse actions for constructing and maintaining their 
identities as “hardcore” gamers (as defined within their play community and in contrast 
to outsiders) when earning their gaming capital in a shared play space.106   
This chapter’s focus group107 was held in the multi-purpose room of LANopolis – 
the one commonly referred to by patrons as “the Rock Band room” because it houses the 
menagerie of plastic equipment used in popular music games.  The session lasted from 
10:00 PM until midnight, ending before the beginning of that evening’s adult “all-night” 
                                                
106 Please note: I am not interested in explaining the pleasures of identity formation vis-à-
vis a traditional media psychology approach. For behavioral research on the pleasures of 
first-person perspective and gaming control from a media psychology perspective, see the 
works of Jeroen Jansz (2005, 2007) and Peter Vorderer et al. (2003, 2006), respectively.  
107 The focus group’s discussion prompts are available in Appendix B. 
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LAN party (running from midnight on Saturday until noon on Sunday).  The focus group 
participants are all male, and ranged in age from 22 to 51, with an average age of 28.  
These gamers are all regulars at LANopolis, and represent the business’s core game-
playing constituency. 
This chapter’s title gestures to its two major points of theoretical and 
methodological inspiration.  The first is a tongue-in-cheek reference to Erving Goffman’s 
seminal The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life wherein the famed sociologist argues 
for a dramaturgical view of symbolic interactionism.  This approach to understanding 
micro-scale social interactions contends that people perform for one another like actors 
on a stage (e.g., choosing their props, costumes, etc.).  Yet unlike most stage plays, 
individuals perform simultaneously as actors and audiences, and are therefore engaged in 
dialectical exchanges in which actions are constantly being accepted, discredited, or 
ignored.  To look like a gamer, the participant must perform like a gamer, and this play 
performance must be recognized as such by one’s peers.   
This performance alone, however, is not enough to qualify one as “good” ludic 
soldier.  Players must also generate and utilize “gaming capital,” or the knowledge of 
virtual worlds, fan discourse, commercial culture, and social rules of play (Consalvo, 
2007).108  In the case of military shooters, gaming capital includes a knowledge of 
seminal franchises, the proper use of weapons and equipment, strategic understanding of 
battle maps, winning combat strategies for various game modes, an appreciation of 
gaming etiquette, accessing online resources, and knowing the underlying game 
                                                
108 Consalvo [2007] is in debt to Pierre Bourdieu’s [1984] schemas of symbolic capital. 
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technologies, among other skills.  The cultivation of gaming pleasures in the context of 
the LAN is predicated in large part on players’ abilities to prove their play competencies 
– i.e., not to play as a “noob tube” – by leveraging their textual, paratextual, and 
contextual gaming knowledges for themselves and for their peers.  
This chapter seeks to answer the following interrelated questions: first, what 
exactly is a “hardcore” gamer?  Second, what competencies and practices makes one a 
“good” ludic soldier?  And, finally, to what extent (if any) does the ludic soldier’s 
gaming capital depend on knowledge of worldly combat? Examining what constitutes 
gaming capital for hardcore players and how they build their bona fides as legit gamer-
soldiers in a LAN setting will disclose how ludic war’s pleasures are integrally connected 
to the broader domain analyzed in the earlier chapters, notably the game text, the 
marketing environment, and the context of worldly warfare. 
WHAT’S SO “HARD” ABOUT HARDCORE GAMING? 
There exists in the minds of gamers and non-gamers alike the image of the 
hardcore gamer.  It is not a flattering one.  Using the screen capture below (Fig. 6.1) as 
our introductory guide to this stereotype, we can posit that the imagined hardcore gamer 
is obese.  He is white.  He is slovenly.  He is straight, though one might hasten to add, 
usually single.  He is, not incidentally, a he.  And, according to South Park’s critically 
acclaimed episode on obsessive World of Warcraft players from which the image below 
was taken, the hardcore gamer “has absolutely no life.” 
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Figure 6.1: The “hardcore” gamer in South Park’s “Make Love, Not Warcraft” (2006).109 
 
The hardcore gamer is thus the antithesis to the casual gamer.  In his book on 
casual gaming, Jesper Juul (2010) sets the gaming types against one another as follows: 
There is an identifiable stereotype of a hardcore player who has a preference for 
science fiction, zombies, and fantasy fictions, has played a large number of video 
games, will invest large amounts of time and resources toward playing video 
games, and enjoys difficult games. The stereotype of the casual player is the 
inverted image of the hardcore player: this player has a preference for positive 
and pleasant fictions, has played few video games, is willing to commit little time 
and few resources toward playing video games, and dislikes difficult games. 
(emphasis in original, p. 8) 
 
Game scholars Nick Dyer-Witherford and Greig de Peuter strike a similar note, stating:  
The hard core is a demographic stratus well recognized in game marketing: young 
men who play intensively, have disposable income, adopt new hardware 
platforms early, buy as many as twenty-five games a year, are literate about 
games and conventions, read the game magazines, and forum opinions, through 
word of mouth or online, about games and machines. (2009, p. 80) 
 
                                                




I also used the South Park image (Fig. 6.1) as an icebreaker for my focus group.  
When I shared it with the informants, the screen capture evoked instant laughter, with all 
but the eldest participant recognizing its origins.  The gamers agreed that the episode was 
obviously mocking those “hardcore” gamers who could not or would not moderate their 
obsessive gameplay (with a few adding that they know gamers like the one satirized).  
Stereotypes or not, gamer identities do not emerge out of the ether – they are not 
Platonic ideals.110  Rather, gaming experiences and player categories characterized as 
“hardcore” or “casual” (or points in-between) 111 emerge from specific design, marketing, 
and play practices.  It is useful to ask, what sets of interlocking practices (borne out of the 
aforementioned design, marketing, and play choices) put the “hard” in hardcore gaming? 
Colloquially speaking, we might say that hardcore players are “fans” of video games.  
Yet I have avoided invoking this specific term and issues of fandom thus far because 
                                                
110 See, Boyer (2009) for an extended analysis of the casual-hardcore divide. 
111 Curiously, the group referenced a segment of gamers between the “hardcore” and 
“casual” categories that has seemingly escaped the critical literature.  They call this 
moderate group “core gamers”; or, simply “the core.”  This is a catchall for those players 
who are conversant generally with video games, but who do not self-identify as either 
casual players or heavy users.  According to “Doyle,” a short, 23-year old, who plays 
regularly with “David” and “Kevin” at LANopolis (and who have been playing video 
games together since middle school), there are three major player categories.111  Doyle 
enumerated these groupings: “‘Casual gamers’ are those who play on a whim. ‘Core 
gamers’ are guys who play games regularly.  And ‘hardcore gamers’ are those who have 
dedicated themselves to a single game, a few games, or a particular genre.”  The six other 
gamers at the tabled nodded in agreement with this typology, and concurred that they 
would see one another around the table as prototypical hardcore gamers. 
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hardcore or power gamers112, as they are sometimes called, are not necessarily 
synonymous with video game “fans.”   
As popular a subject as any in media studies, fans and fandom are generally 
understood within the critical literature to refer to media consumers and audiences that 
evidence some productive output.  Yes, all media audiences are active (at some basic 
psychological level), and all media audiences produce meanings and interpretations 
(Fiske, 1992).  However, fans invest their time, energy, and emotions (Sandvoss, 2005) 
into the creation of some novel, textual artifact, including modifying or “poaching” 
existing texts (Jenkins, 1992), constructing their own unofficial advertising paratexts  
(Gray, 2010a), participating in fan communities (Abercrombie and Longhurst, 1998), and 
by embodying their adoration through impersonation or “cos-play” (Hills, 2002). 
My intent in citing but a modest sampling of this subject area’s major works is to 
distance myself from it for this discussion of hardcore gameplay.  I do not wish to argue 
that hardcore gamers cannot be fans, only that they need not be fans.  Military shooter 
gamers often, quite purposefully, do not self-identify as “fans.”  Or, as Rooster opined: 
“I’m not a ‘fan’ of the term ‘fan.’”  LANopolis’ hardcore gamers draw fine lines of 
distinction between their gameplay style and that of others, thus a vague term like “fan” 
is thought to be fairly meaningless by these players.   
                                                
112 Interestingly, the “hardcore” label is usually applied to masculine game genres, while 
“power gamers” often describes dedicated MMO players (who are assumed to be more 
social and female).  With the exception of Kevin, the gamers in the LANopolis focus 
group did not prefer the term “power” (or “grinders”) to describe themselves, but they did 
not think it necessarily pejorative either.   
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Justifying his own gameplay practices, the 23-year old and currently unemployed 
David noted colorfully: “There is a certain enjoyment of getting really good at a game – 
at beating the snot out of it.”  David is referring specifically to perfecting one’s gameplay 
actions within the virtual world.  He is not referring to all the disparate acts of creativity 
typically associated fandom, such as modding, writing fan fiction, or performing cos-
play. Game scholar Hanna Wirman (2007) argues rightly that it is not useful to 
understand all instances of “productivity” in games as being commensurate with fan 
productivity.  As an alternative, Wirman suggests the following categories to parse out 
types of fan productivity in games: (1) textual productivity: play acts and game choices; 
(2) instrumental productivity: creating a text or item that assist self/others with gameplay; 
(3) and expressive productivity: creating a text or item that speaks to game culture (that 
need not have any in-game utility).  This is not the mere analytic splitting of hairs.  
Striking this medium-sensitive distinction makes it clear that consumptive and productive 
practices do not convey from one entertainment medium to another without slippage, 
making medium-specific reassessments of dedicated users’ actions necessary.  If 
modality changes across entertainment mediums, it stands to reason that activity and 
productivity likewise change.113  
It stands to reason that the more “co-creative” or “textually productive” one is in a 
virtual realm, the more gaming capital that player stands to acquire. Virtual soldiering in 
                                                
113 Gamers in multiplayer settings have also been called “co-creative” (Morris, 2003; 
Dovey & Kennedy, 2006) agents because their acts contribute to the co-creation of 
unique gaming experiences; for example, a massively multiplayer role-playing game is a 
palpably different experience when the server is full than when it is not. 
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LANopolis is, by and large, expressed as a deep engagement with the games and, less 
frequently, as instrumental productivity (e.g., level creation, additional game mods).  
Curiously little game productivity that might read as traditionally fan-ish behavior (i.e., 
“expressive productivity”) occurs in this play space because of its thoroughgoing 
emphasis on gameplay114, the feminized gendering of fandom115, and because shooter 
games do not typically enjoy robust and complex in-game economies that allow gamers 
to create and trade items.  The latter difference partly explains why scholars interested in 
updating and applying Bourdieu’s schemas of capital to gaming have clustered around 
role-playing titles, especially persistent massively multiplayer worlds like Everquest and 
World of Warcraft, and virtual worlds like Second Life where gamers can craft their own 
digital commodities (Castronova, 2005; Malaby, 2006; Williams et al., 2006).  These 
conspicuous objects of labor add value to the player’s online profile and are clear 
embodiments of market capital.  But as Thomas Malaby (2006) observes, there are whole 
“economies of practices” in games that are not articulated as user-created content but that 
still constitute a type of capital. Malaby states:   
                                                
114 Because gamers pay-to-play in LANopolis, they usually focus on gaming and not on 
creating expressive or instrumental fan production. 
115 Although these particular players do not shy away from labeling themselves 
“hardcore” or “avid,” they overwhelmingly detest the so-called “fanboy.”  In their minds, 
the fanboy differs from the average fan insofar as the former is perceived as being too 
close to the media object, and as guarding the property with an unhealthy, quasi-religious 
fanaticism. The fanboy is simply, for Doyle, “someone you just don’t want to deal with.” 
Wirman (2007) observes that, “While fandom has been seen as a feminized identity in the 
Western societies, power and hardcore gaming is usually related to rather masculine 
issues such as high technical competence, competition and ‘hard work’” (p. 382). This is 
certainly the case for this group of players who see fanboys (and presumably fangirls) in 
a negative light.  Being unable to moderate one’s affective state or “mothering” a media 
object too much has uncomfortable gendered connotations for LANopolis’ gamers.  
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Cultural capital is the realization of what a given cultural group finds to be 
meaningful or important in bodies, objects, and offices. It includes those 
competencies and credentials that individuals or groups acquire over time within a 
particular historical context and also the objects that become valuable through 
their association with such meaning. It has three forms: embodied, objectified, 
and institutionalized (Bourdieu, 1986). (2006, p. 155) 
 
I am interested in examining the less conspicuous acts of dedicated gamers – 
those embodied competencies that enable LANopolis’ patrons to call themselves and 
their comrades “hardcore” – because there is a clear investment in proving one’s status as 
a competent gamer, not as competent fan.116  Or, as Wirman observes, “Power gamers 
tend to find themselves more like professional players than hobbyist game fans” (2007, p. 
382).  What then, borrowing Wirman’s terminology, are the textually productive 
gameplay acts that take precedence in this space and allow hardcore gamers to be 
identified and to self-identify as such?  Gaming capital is a useful concept for thinking 
about how a constellation of gaming practices around a set of similar games that are 
played in a common space contribute to the construction of a unique gaming identity – in 
this case, that of the ludic soldier.    
“GETTING HARD”: FIGHTING FOR GAMING CAPITAL 
  What does it mean to be a “good” ludic soldier?  And what do avid gamers do to 
promote themselves in their multiplayer sessions?  We are not just talking about gaming 
                                                
116 One could extend Malaby’s analysis of shooters to include Bourdieu’s other two sub-
categories of cultural capital by looking, for example, at how Major League Gaming 
sponsors elite players conferring on them “institutionalized credentials”; or, the cultural 
capital that accrued to the amateur design team behind Counter-Strike, originally a fan-
authored level modification, after Valve Corporation game studio purchased their work, 
making it an officially sanctioned “objectified artifact”). 
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capital generally, but are concerned with those conspicuously displayed skills and 
competencies that are meaningful for gamers of military shooters.  Sarah Thornton 
(1995) coins the term “subcultural capital” for discussing the value placed on “hipness” 
for dance cultures.  Thornton’s term is conceptually relevant because it resembles gaming 
culture in several respects: the groups share similar demographics (teens and young 
adults); the subcultural capital of both are borne out of middle-class leisure pursuits; and 
media plays a constitutive role for each group.  This final point is especially key.  
Thornton states:  
For, within the economy of subcultural capital, the media are not simply another 
symbolic good or marker of distinction (which is the way Bourdieu describes 
films and newspapers vis-à-vis cultural capital), but a network crucial to the 
definition and distribution of cultural knowledge.  In other words, the difference 
being in or out of fashion, high or low in subcultural capital, correlates in complex 
ways with degrees of media coverage, creation and exposure. (1995, pp. 13-14) 
  
In the case of video game culture, or the LAN/shooter subculture (if we adopt Thornton’s 
terminology), the games are the centerpieces for the creation, maintenance, and 
circulation of gaming capital because they attract gamers to gameplay and are the 
communicative means by which gameplay becomes meaningful.  The implication is that 
games are not just an expressive medium qua games (as I have argued in previous 
chapters), but games are an expressive medium qua gameplay (practice), qua their 
gaming capital (aggregate practices).117  
                                                
117 Studies by Heather Mello (2006) and Christopher Walsh and Thomas Apperley (2009) 
have been useful guides for this chapter’s operationalizing of gaming capital as focus 
group prompts, and for thinking about whether the embodied competencies and cultural 
capital expressed and earned in a play space might contribute to human or social capital 
outside the LAN’s virtual battlefields. 
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Although cultural capital’s immediate value is context dependent, it does not 
necessarily follow that the knowledge and skills exercised in that setting also do not then 
convey in other parts of a person’s life (although tracking and assessing that extra-gamic 
capital is outside this project’s concerns).118 To the first point about its context 
dependence:   
Cultural capital is distinctive for its specificity to a context of meaning and 
practice, such as existing ones associated with nation, class, region, or sources of 
social separation, and thus its acquisition is not amenable to immediate and 
isolated transactions. Instead, cultural capital is acquired through the culturally 
embedded practices of learning, in the informal sense, and authorization, in the 
official sense. Such exchange generates a feeling of belonging, of identification 
with a cultural group. (Malaby, 2006, p. 155) 
 
And as Mello (2006) observes in her study of fantasy role-playing gamers, in addition to 
the sense of community that collaborative play engenders, there is learning – what 
literacy and education scholar James Paul Gee (2003) calls “situated cognition” – that 
transpires that may be useful outside of that original site of social interaction.  The 
remainder of this chapter explores what these gamers think shooters tell them about war, 
what the games ignore, and what varying gameplay styles reveal about this community. 
                                                
118 For example, Joseph Straubhaar, Viviana Rojas, and colleagues examine how minority 
and working class groups in Austin, Texas use techno-capital. Like other researchers 
focusing on technology practices, they extend Bourdieu’s forms of capital. The authors 
state: “‘Techno-capital/competencies’ as a product of techno-dispositions, provides 
certain resources to interact and negotiate within the techno-field.  As a structured space, 
the technofield will be analyzed as an arena where the human agency is enacted and 
negotiated in relation to all other social forces (political, economic, social, cultural, and 
so forth).  The logic of techno-field is contingent upon the interaction between techno-
competencies/capital and other forms of social forces” (Rojas et al., n.d., p. 10). 
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The Pleasurable “Lessons” of Ludic War (Textual Modality)  
Juul (2010) observes that traditionally hardcore titles and genres – like the first-
person shooters examined in the previous chapters – demand much of would-be players.  
Indeed, in privileging a certain inflexibility of design, the textual difficulty alienates those 
players who are either unwilling or unable to dedicate the time and energy needed to 
achieve textual mastery.  The typical hardcore game likewise assumes that players come 
to it with an extensive knowledge of gaming culture and aesthetics (e.g., a familiarity 
with dominant narrative concerns, control conventions, etc.), and a willingness to invest 
the many, many hours needed to conquer its computational logic (see, Juul, 2010, 
Chapter 2).  Hardcore players, in other words, are purposefully seeking out titles that will 
capture their attention for days, weeks, months, even years.119  Indeed, LANopolis’ 
gamers expressed a strong desire to master the textual machinery of their games, but they 
also want to learn from them.  
The informants’ desire to learn from military shooters is tempered by their belief 
that these lessons – especially as they concern warfare – are almost certainly limited in 
scope.  Most of their war “education” (and more than one gamer used “air quotes” to 
describe the learning that takes place in these games) concerns the basic war instruments 
and field tactics.  David remarked: “When I’ve learned about [new weapons, and new 
technologies], like customizing a firearm, things like that. I didn’t learn about it so much 
from reading. I learned from playing these games.…This is [also the case for] old, WWII 
                                                
119 Interestingly, Juul observes that hardcore gamers and casual games are flexible with 
respect to available time and design; whereas casual gamers and hardcore games are less 
forgiving in terms of the their time demands and ease of use (2010, Chapter 2). 
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games. I know what a ‘grease gun’ is because I’ve played [WWII shooter games].” 
Flashing a knowing smile, Rooster chimed in similarly: “Hell, if I hadn’t been playing 
Counter-Strike for over a decade, and you were to ask me – “What is a Colt M4A1 
carbine?” – I’d probably tell you that it’s a kind of Mustang!”  This exchange precipitated 
an intense moment of crosstalk where the participants rifled off their own pieces of 
historical tidbits concerning current and historical equipment, and various nations’ 
Special Forces units. 
These gamers also readily acknowledge that military gameplay’s lessons are only 
partly about weapons and historical groups.  For these hardcore gamers, gameplay is 
equally about learning about the functioning of the computational systems that mediate 
those battles.  Kevin, 23, the soft-spoken childhood friend of Doyle and David, noted: “I 
like that moment when I ‘get’ the game [referring to experiential flow of gameplay]… 
after that, I find the ‘blind-spots,’ the places on the map where people just don’t know 
that they’re going to be attacked.”  This comment excited Doyle, who then launched into 
an extended critique of Modern Warfare’s small multiplayer maps that privilege “quick 
twitch” reflexes and software exploits over time-tested combat strategy.  Such games are, 
in his view, neither fun nor realistic.  Doyle proclaimed: “I like a game if, where you die, 
and you can see [the reason]…You learn those lessons.  And it’s not about having twitch 
reflexes.  And it’s not about knowing the map.  It’s about having this rudimentary 
knowledge about how things work [in war]…” Later in the conversation, Buddy, 22, 
piggybacked on Doyle’s point, noting that well-made games should teach you whether 
you can – at any one moment – commit to a battle, select another approach, or wait for 
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backup.  Buddy is skeptical, however, that military shooters – even tactical titles like the 
Tom Clancy-brand shooters – can relay complex military lessons.  He enumerated the 
following field tactics that most military shooters’ underscore:  
Flanking an enemy is always going to take them by surprise.  Suppressing fire is 
going to keep someone occupied, while someone else outflanks them.  High 
ground is always preferable to being at the bottom of the hill.  Those are the very, 
very basic [tactics].  If I’m a sniper, I want to be up high where I can see 
everything.  A machinegun in cover is better than one out in the middle of a field.  
But that’s keeping it really basic. 
 
Buddy emphasized that these gameplay practices are standard in military shooters, but 
they are not exclusive to them.  One can find similar strategies in any number of action-
adventure and role-playing games. 
Basic as they may be, there is nevertheless an undeniable pleasure that is bound 
up in the process of enacting these field tactics because they forge a affective connection 
between one’s identity as a hardcore gamer, and as one’s virtual identity as a ludic 
solider. The emergent linkage between gameplay, tactical knowledge, and martial 
identity is evident in the stories that the gamer tell one another around LANopolis’ 
backroom table.  Pointing to his friends Kevin and David beside him, Doyle reminisced:  
We actually have war stories.  Like, I can literally go into the story as if we were 
in Vietnam…We’ve had times where we’d secure an area, and we’d “go hunting.”  
And that’s what we call it: “hunting.”  I’d say, we know that there are two guys in 
the area – “hunt them down!” And then we’d herd them into areas and shoot them 
down. 
  
The gaming capital that shooter players enjoy is necessarily bound up in the ability to 
assess the situation at hand and coordinate plans with others to act, in other words, as a 
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grizzled (if virtual) field general.  I will return to this point shortly, but I want to conclude 
this section with the second half of Doyle’s story.  He continued: 
[David and Kevin] hear me yell at them because I go into a different mode.  I 
literally go into “squad commander.” One time I shot one of them in the back of 
the head when he wandered off and wasn’t following orders...In these games, it’s 
not just playing the game, it’s not fighting everybody.  [You know] shooting guys. 
That’s not the excitement.  The excitement is taking a chaotic situation like [war] 
and putting an order to it that I command.  Going into a situation where we might 
be losing, and then all of a sudden though a series of orders and through my own 
actions…I’ve just had a plan perfectly implemented to wipe out an area and seize 
it as my own.       
 
David punctuated his friend’s story, stating emphatically: “Making war your bitch.” 
David’s off-color turn of phrase illustrates the premium that hardcore gamers 
place on to the ability to control the textual and technological contours of their virtual 
experiences.  The focus group participants remarked more than once about the connection 
between their support for a hardcore title and the felt sense that game producers were 
implementing their collective design suggestions, especially as it pertains to issues of 
customizability.  For example, David, stated: “When [game design] allows for full 
customization – and I’m not talking about perks sh*t or load-outs (referring to in-game 
weapon selection) – but about your settings … basically, I’m talking about the complete 
ability to tool your experience to how you see fit.  Those are the games that are going to 
[succeed].” Sitting across the table, Buddy echoed David’s point: 
It doesn’t matter what game style you like … When you find one game that you 
really like, and then the sequel comes out and it’s even better … and the third one 
comes out and you’re like, “Holy f**king sh*t!”  You can tell that [the game 
producers] took the advice [of gamers] … And when they take the time going into 
the second or third game, hearing what was said about it and making it into 
everything you thought it could be…. [It’s great] that they really, really kept in 
tune with the players. They really listened to [us].  
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The Modern Warfare and Clancy-brand games franchises examined in Chapters Two and 
Three, respectfully, are two such franchises that have been designed primarily for 
hardcore audiences like those in LANopolis’ focus group.  One of the affective “lessons” 
that military shooters communicate stress to their hardcore game buyers is that their 
virtual wars are designed “for us, by us.”    
The Pleasurable Omissions & Conflations of Ludic War (Contextual Modality) 
If LANopolis’ hardcore gamers are suspicious of shooters’ ability to teach 
anything more than basic field tactics, then they are categorically dismissive of their 
ability to convey the emotional and mental toll of real warfare.  And they are thankful for 
this fact.  On the one hand, the “good” ludic soldier identity hinges on the gamer’s ability 
to demonstrate core competencies on the battlefield (to perform like a proper ludic 
soldier), which includes a working knowledge of the game’s items and play strategies 
(i.e., modality of gaming text).  But the ludic identity is, on the other hand and perhaps 
especially for this play group, predicated on the gamer’s ability to articulate complex 
distinctions about how warfare gains its simulational representation (i.e., modality as 
relating to reality).  Keep in mind that modality is a complex and contradictory set of 
claims about the world – including the necessarily incomplete simulation of a world at 
war.  The participants simultaneously recognize their own incommensurability of desires 
– between wanting a game to be more “real” (in terms of physics, for instance), and 
wanting it to sidestep or elide war’s nastiest, existential horrors for the purposes of 
pleasurable gameplay.  A critical line of separation, then, between the hardcore gamer 
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and the “fanboy,” according to these gamers, is the presence of a critical perspective that 
one applies to adored media texts.   
During our discussion, LANopolis’ players questioned their favorite games’ 
representation war’s innumerable horrors.  Speaking to war’s horrors, David, noted: “I 
don’t want [military shooters] to be too realistic. Then it’s intense for the wrong reasons.”  
He elaborated on this point:  
Video games will always romanticize violence. Always.  I don’t think playing 
[shooters] is really like being in war.  That’s total horses**t. It’s like, “that [game] 
was really competitive and good.”  It’s not so competitive in war.  [War is] like, 
“please God let me live to see another day.” And then, the day after that. And the 
day after that. There is [pauses for effect] considerably less pleasure [in war].       
 
Doyle seconded his friend’s point stating: “Unless it’s scripted, you’ll never see a guy 
lose a limb and live. If the guy looses a limb, he’s probably dead…[In a shooter] you 
either come back perfectly fine, or you’re dead.  Those are the two polar opposites that 
you can live with.”  David then replied, “Two [first-person shooter] archetypes: living or 
dead.”  To which Doyle responded: “Right. Death is grizzly. But surviving death and 
missing something from it, is worse…To have a player come back and be missing 
something – an arm, no legs – that is more grizzly for people to see. That is something 
[game developers] avoid.”   
These players are clearly aware of game producers’ constraints and pressures as 
they relate to the commodification of war (including the issues explored earlier in 
Chapter Four).  O’Brien, a short 28-year old man with a thin beard and a penchant for 
understatement, noted, “Throwing in all the actual atrocities of war into a game just isn’t 
fun.”  Rooster seconded this point, saying: “There’s a fine line that all these companies 
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that produce these games have to walk. …There’s a limit, but you have to still sell the 
product to the masses.”  To which O’Brien responded: “Well, preying on people’s fears 
and what’s relevant is a good marketing tool.”  
O’Brien is correct.  Hardcore game marketing largely hails those players seeking 
competitive gaming experiences and emotionally difficult environments – what Juul 
(2010) calls a negative “fiction preference.”  These negative fictional preferences include 
violent, frightening, or competitive gameplay elements (e.g., the “sci-fi genre” and 
“zombies” that Juul alludes to).  As was argued in Chapter Four, shooter ads do not – as a 
rule – hail a casual game playing audience. 120   
This carefully targeted advertising strategy is not lost on LANopolis’ gamers.  
Rooster, 29, a long-time Counter-Strike tournament player and part-time LANopolis 
employee stated:  
As game companies, they obviously have to [create their titles] in a way that 
appeals to Americans, and depicts us as the victor, the silent hero, the underdog, 
whatever the situation is, there’s that mystique. And that’s what they sell.  I don’t 
care if it’s real or not.  I just care about the enjoyment.  There’s always going to 
be those who are offended by everything, especially the cutting-edge military 
[games].  But that’s also how [the companies] sell it.…Who doesn’t want to 
imagine themselves as a part of a battalion fighting back invaders?   
 
In addition to promoting the software’s fictional content to avid male players, 
hardcore game marketing often celebrates the hardware technologies required to run the 
most resource demanding titles (reflecting the “techno-ludic literacy” lesson discussed 
                                                
120 An exception to this marketing truism is a broadcast TV spot for Modern Warfare: 
Black Ops (2011) – titled, not insignificantly, “There’s a soldier in all of us” – that shows 
a diverse group of people playing a live-action shooter game.  See: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pblj3JHF-Jo  
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last chapter). Take for example the print advertisement below (Fig. 6.2) that appeared in 
the March 2009 issue of Wired magazine.  The ad’s schema-like design reveals that the 
gaming laptop’s technical innards are not hardware components, but are made up instead 
by the iconic elements from action-adventure and war games.  The laptop is powered, 





Figure 6.2: A revealing print ad of the connection between technology and war play 
appearing in the March 2009 issue of Wired magazine 
 
David’s earlier conversational thread about war’s horrors led to a telling exchange 
that revealed the group’s negotiation of game technologies and gameplay’s two 
modalities covered in Chapter One – the linkage between an immersive narrative’s 
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conveyance (game as mode of transport), and its articulation of a world at war (the 
game’s connection to a shared reality).  David was reminded of uncomfortable feelings 
generated by a mission in the single-player campaign of Call of Duty: Black Ops (2010).  
He described a level where the player creeps through underground Vietcong tunnels 
armed with a handgun and flashlight.  The level is dark and claustrophobic, and features 
enemy soldiers who leap from the dark armed with guns and knives.  It is a haunting 
level; one that the group agrees is not “fun.”  David stated:   
The thing that Black Ops did was it took all the violence and made it grizzly to the 
point where, well not really realistic … [he is interrupted by crosstalk from others 
about the game engine’s ability to render high resolution graphics]… [David 
presses on] But you can still throw a grenade in a pit and blow a guy’s arm and 
leg off and he’s still there alive, rolling on the ground.  And that’s a lot more 
disturbing, dark [content]. It’s not necessarily ‘bad,’ but … [trails off in thought]. 
 
The crosstalk that slightly derailed David’s point illuminates the group’s simultaneous 
engagement of the game technology that powers the game alongside its representations.  
Jumping somewhat to Call of Duty’s defense, but also post-9/11 military shooters 
generally, Doyle argued that these games can – despite their technological and design 
limitations – nevertheless convey a sense of existential horror and embodied history.  
Referring the to the Vietcong “tunnel run,” Doyle reminded the group that: “Guys had to 
go down there with a pistol and a flashlight, and pray to God that there wasn’t going to be 
a guy around the next corner with a knife.  And that was something people had to deal 
with.  And, sure, [game developers] can’t replicate it perfectly, but that’s part of the 
realism.  The trick is [developers] have to find that line.”  Later, Doyle argued that even if 
these games fail to replicate the visceral anxiety of hand-to-hand combat, they might 
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better simulate the perspectival and affective remove of postmodern warfighting 
technologies.  He reflected: 
You learn certain things about perceptions of [those in] the military…When 
you’re doing that AC-130 scene [a well-known level in Modern Warfare] – it’s 
cool, blowing up sh*t with a 150mm, 100mm, and a 50mm chain gun.  But if you 
pay attention, you notice, [the computer controlled AI] don’t give a shit.  They’re 
like: “Shoot that guy.” Bang! “Shoot that guy.” Bang!…They don’t care because 
they’re in a plane a couple miles up … [The game producers] are making a 
statement.  [They are saying] “That’s what [war] is like now.”  There are no guys 
in the field screaming, “Oh my God! We’re on fire!”…Now there are Predator 
drone [pilots] in California bombing guys in another country.  You have guys who 
are two miles up, blowing up things casually because it’s just not an issue for 
them.”         
 
Thus, one’s gaming capital depends on knowledge of shooters and a willingness to forge 
critical distinctions between modalities of gameplay – between ludic war’s textual and 
contextual interfacing.  These competencies and practices are however, as the next 
section attests, less important for these gamers than playing with others in good faith.   
From “Griefing” to Support: Play Styles of the Ludic Soldier  
There are diverging play styles that elicit vociferous responses from the focus 
group participants.  These hardcore players complain about having to “babysit” novice 
players (i.e., “noobs”); coping with players who are feigning idiocy to engender 
everything from humor to ill-will (i.e., “trolls”); coping with teammates and opponents 
who cannot deal with losing (i.e., “rage quitters”); and having to game with those who 
wait at key map points to take advantage of unsuspecting players (i.e., “campers”). Still, 
none of these play styles are as irksome for LANopolis’ convened discussants than 
“griefers.”  A “griefer” is one who deliberately harasses and provokes other players, and 
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does little else.  In shooter games they might destroy their team’s vehicles, kill teammates 
on purpose, or allow themselves to be easily killed by the enemy force, thus inflating that 
team’s score (a despised practice known as “feeding”).  Rooster sees griefing as a severe 
and, ultimately, unacceptable form of trolling, and says of it: “[Griefing] is not tolerated. 
You know, you can call me a bitch, a snitch, a whatever.  But I’m going to report your 
ass [to the server administrator or online game service] because you’re making my game 
experience and others un-enjoyable.”  David agreed with Rooster’s distinction, stating, 
“Griefing is unforgivable as opposed to light trolling.”   
There is a persistently blurry line between failing to exercise situational 
awareness in the gamespace – i.e., playing as a “noob” – and purposefully performing 
like a novice.  (This, again, was what I was accused of during my first foray into 
LANopolis).  Fox, the silver mustachioed 51-year old, and one of the gaming center’s 
oldest players, offered this note about novice war play:  
My excruciating pet peeve is when you’re in the main tank [in Battlefield Bad 
Company 2], and you switch to the machine gun, and some jackass jumps in and 
rips [the tank] out there [into battle].  [That player] doesn’t understand 
Guderian,121 or any other [war] theory.  And so he goes through all the infantry 
way far too far, and gets blown up in ten seconds.  
 
To which, Rooster quick added: “Which usually results in Fox screaming some type of 
invective at the monitor for about a minute.”  The gaming center’s elder readily conceded 
this addendum, clarifying only that he generally yells, “F*cking idiots!” Fox’s anecdote 
syncs up with my general observations around the shared antipathy towards “noobs,” 
“griefers,” and cheating discussed in the last chapter.  Despite its inherent difficulties, 
                                                
121 Heinz Guderian was a WWII German general and armored warfare theorist. 
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LANopolis’ gamers believe that experienced players should be able to differentiate new 
players from those who are, in David’s words, “just dicking around.”   
Griefing is anathema to cultivating good will in multiplayer game spaces, 
including LANopolis’ ludic battlescapes.  Cooperative play is, instead, the gameplay 
style that these patrons value most, and it is the clearest route to earning and maintaining 
one’s gaming capital.  According to the focus group participants, they prefer reliable 
teammates to those who might be better players but poorer communicators.  This 
suggests that for LANopolis’ hardcore gamers, their gameplay (i.e., their textual 
productivity) is not a strictly instrumentalist endeavor since they would rather grow social 
bonds and interpersonal connections than be guaranteed wins round after round. The 
group’s gamers look for at least three elements in others that indicate a sense of personal 
investment: communication skills, an ability to discriminate among other gamers and 
their play styles, and a willingness to support teammates.  
As I noted in Chapter Five’s participant observations, “ludic collaboration” and 
keeping clear lines of communication are of paramount importance for virtual 
combatants.  But critical as it is for coordinating virtual attacks, these attributes are not 
exclusive to first- or third-person shooters, or even combat-oriented games.  Doyle voiced 
what he looks for in others in these terms: “If I could put it in one simple phrase: “Give a 
sh*t.…Give a sh*t about what you’re doing.”  He continued, stating: “Doing fan fiction, 
making mods, that’s kind of like an unrelated thing that you enjoy about the game.”  This 
is yet another sign that these hardcore gamers privilege in-game skills to other 
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expressions of game-oriented productivity.  David offered his own definition of the 
cooperative or support gamer, saying: 
A support gamer can go into any category – they can be casual, they can be 
hardcore, power gamer – but it’s the kind of person who plays a game with a 
headset, and doesn’t use it to blare music, or mouth-off, or swear constantly 
throughout the game…Someone who really actually works together and tries to 
find other gamers who have that respect and actually have good enough 
communication skills to work together as a cohesive unit. 
 
Buddy punctuated this point, saying: “It’s all about communication…[It’s like] hey, 
there’s a sniper over there I need you guys to run around there, throw a grenade in, and 
f*ck his sh*t up.” 
Encouraging skillful communication during these battles is not only a means to an 
end – i.e., players facilitating situational awareness for one another – rather, thoughtful 
player-to-player communication is perceived as a necessary component for displaying 
compassion for others and for growing one’s own capital as a good teammate.  Doyle 
stated:  “You’ve got to have that empathy as if you are there.  Because you are wasting 
everyone’s else time if you are focused on being goofy.”  And later: “[Video gaming] is 
like any other sport…You want everybody to be ‘in’ the game…It may be ‘just a game,’ 
but people want to actually play in the game.  Not, play in the game and have [some guy] 
do whatever he wants.”  
Logging innumerable hours of gameplay enables players to make increasingly 
fine discriminations between their preferred play style and that of others.  According to 
Fox, “Real players will start to discriminate and try to classify themselves [from other 
gamers].”  His early “tank” anecdote illustrates that in an environment where 
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communication cues are not always clear (e.g., not all players have headsets, there are 
gameplay accidents and misunderstandings, there are varying levels of competencies and 
knowledge concerning best practices and strategies) hardcore gamers can, over time, read 
others’ play styles and make choices to group-up accordingly.  O’Brien enjoys 
discovering players of a similar caliber online, or meeting them in LANopolis for the first 
time.  The game gives them a set of shared experiences that becomes the foundation for 
their relationship. But for veteran shooter players like Fox and Rooster, who are more 
interested in the game proper than making friends, discrimination is the key reading 
strategy for not being hamstrung by teammates and for insulating one’s own gameplay 
pleasures and productivity from, as Rooster noted, “all the trash.”     
The ability to discriminate between play styles and communicate fluidly with 
teammates are key traits that hardcore gamers cultivate in themselves and seek out in 
others.  Yet these characteristics are not as prized as those rare players who raise the 
performance of others.  Buddy summarized his feelings on this point: “I think what 
makes you a good player, is to take that little dipsh*t that’s on your team and to pull out a 
victory.”  Fox, who is more taciturn than his effusive, younger squad mates said this 
about his own performance as a “good” virtual soldier in his favorite shooter, Battlefield: 
Bad Company 2: 
[It’s fun] when you find something that you can exploit…or that you can use to 
dominate the field, to bring success to the team – that’s a good experience … [For 
example, in Battlefield] you can use the [tank’s] machine gun to dominate two or 
three of the four flags.  You know, and just rack up the kills, but also annihilate… 
the [other players’] strategy. You’re above average as a player, so that other 
average players [on your team] can come through and play and succeed … 
[participant crosstalk]… [If you’re playing well,] two or three players who would 
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outrank you now have to team-up…and come across the map to get to you, to try 
and overcome the apparent advantage of the team.  
 
Selfless gameplay is perceived to be a rarity in competitive games.  And perhaps this is 
especially the case in military shooters where the objective is to rack up more kills than 
your opponents.  Even if a title’s game modes are not strictly zero-sum scenarios, many 
players act as if they are.  Rooter reflected about the dearth of selfless players, saying:    
It’s a really rare breed [of gamer], I wish there were more of them…The people 
that derive their enjoyment of the game not from their killstreak [their number of 
consecutive kills], not from how awesome they did, but they know…at the end of 
the match, when their team won, they know that they were badass.  They say: “I 
kept this guy alive. I did this, I did that.  [Sure,] my KDR122 is in the pits, but my 
team won and I helped out.”  Those kind of people...that don’t want to go for the 
gold and are totally happy to be in the background and help everybody else, those 
kind of players, I wish there were more of them.  
 
Rooster’s extended response clearly struck a chord with the other gamers seated around 
the table, with a few of his peers saying, “amen.” 
CONCLUSION: “CONSOLIDATE THE COMMUNITY” 
For LANopolis’ dedicated gamers, the pleasures connected to the promotion of 
self and the cultivation of one’s own gaming capital is inextricably tied to the promotion 
of like-minded gamers.  Skillful on- and offline player-to-player communications, sharing 
detailed knowledge of games and play strategies, the ability to read diverse gameplay 
styles, and being a selfless teammate are valued competencies of the collaborative, 
“hardcore” player. Indeed, these players value these competencies especially now that 
gaming is a mainstream phenomenon. As Rooster noted of video gaming with a distinct 
                                                
122 KDR stands for “kill-death ratio,” and is a common shorthand metric by which gamers 
judge their performance in multiplayer shooter games. 
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tone of derision, “Everybody does it.”  The influx of new players to LANopolis and to 
online gaming spaces have underscored the need for these avid gamers to surround 
themselves physically (in the LAN) and virtually with like-minded players who are 
willing to foster close-knit communities of practice.  These gamers build their gaming 
capital as a virtual band of brothers to keep the dregs of multiplayer shooters at bay 
(players that O’Brien colorfully referred to as, “all your assholes, dicks, and pussies”). 
After playing alongside and speaking with LANopolis’ “regulars,” it is evident 
that playing first- and third-person military shooter games is in many ways commensurate 
with other multiplayer game experiences – both mediated and non-mediated.  There are 
valued rules of play that transcend genres and gaming platforms that speak to shared 
ideals of social etiquette and public comportment (e.g., not cheating or griefing).  There 
are, however, genre and medium-specific characteristics that make the military shooter 
gameplay a distinctly charged media experience – textually and contextually. There are 
the manifold ludic pleasures of war spectacle itself. As Buddy readily admitted: “I like 
explosions. I like grenades, C4, calling in air strikes, everything…big booms. [Repeating 
for emphasis] Big booms!”  There are also ludic pleasures of not seeing the realities of 
war, and the games’ connections to other militainment.  David spoke to these points:  
Beyond the obviousness of the fact that playing war will never be like living war 
… The big differences are – the huge explosions, the plane crashes, chases, tank 
sequence, infiltrating underground bases – sh*t like that, it’s not particularly 
realistic.  It’s awesome…and it’s fun to be immersed in such a gripping, 
cinematic event … But it’s not realistic.   
 
There are also the pleasures of playing war together.  Moreover, because these games are 
immersive, visceral, and immediate (as opposed to the perspectival and strategic remove 
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of real time strategy games, for instance), communication, coordination, timing, and 
ultimately trust become force multipliers in deciding the outcomes of these virtual wars.  
Working together towards a common purpose in frenetic online firefights also grows 
gaming capital that strengthens social bonds and the shared sense of player empathy.  The 
“good” ludic soldier is not someone who only fights in the game, but someone who fights 
across games to forge a stronger community of play (i.e., Chapter Five’s “lesson” of ludic 
collaboration).  As David noted: “Being a good gamer [is trying to] consolidate the 
community, for whatever game or genre you’re playing in.  It’s not necessarily your 
responsibility, but the hallmark of a good gamer is someone who sees [novice gamers] 
and will help them out, and coach them…it’s something that comes with experience.”  
O’Brien agreed with David, but thought “good gaming” is more rudimentary still, saying: 
“Having a good attitude and being a good citizen – if everyone around you is doing the 
same thing – is going to result to the most fun experience for everyone.”  Being a 
competent, selfless gamer enables the communicative team to dominate in the game and 
protect themselves from the “discourse of domination” that pervades these online venues, 
even when they are the ones engaging in this behavior (see, Chapter Five).123  David 
                                                
123 The gamers did not discuss the ethics of actions conducted within the games’ single-
player, narrative campaigns.  I do not want to speculate too far on this point, but it is 
likely that because players are acutely aware of playing with others versus playing alone, 
that the “patriotic” sacrifices conducted in the single-player campaigns are equivalent to 
playing a role for narrative cohesion.  The actions in multiplayer sessions with other 
humans, however, can contribute potentially to a richer sense of community and are thus 
are held in higher esteem than actions undertaken when nobody is watching.  Sacrificial 
citizenship makes sense as a concept in a narrative setting; it makes less sense – as a 
concept and in practice – for multiplayer games.  
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spoke to these interrelated points, saying: “[It] helps to plant the seed, of really working 
as a cooperative gamer, as a community, as a single unit…the community also [offsets 
the feeling] when you get [insulted] by a twelve year old raggin’ about your mom, or 
whatever.” As we will see next chapter, the hardcore gaming practices popularized in 
venues like LANopolis have begat the professionalization of the ludic soldier, with the 




The Ludification of War Culture 
 
“Army of One” 
-- The U.S. Army’s recruiting slogan, 2001-2006 
 
Pwn (verb): “Pronunciation: (pôn). Originally a misspelling of the word 
“own” as in to totally have a skillful advantage over someone or 
something. Pwn is to more than just own; to pwn.” 
 -- From Urban Dictionary.com  
AN ARMY OF PWN 
I parked a few blocks from the Dallas Convention Center and began making my 
way towards the massive complex.  Unsure of which way to go exactly, I shadowed a 
group of teenage boys who looked like they might be gamers.  My instincts proved right.  
As we neared the public park adjacent to the convention center, our group merged with 
other young men and teens who were here to watch and, in many cases, compete in Major 
League Gaming’s (MLG) 2011 inaugural pro-circuit event.  This Sunday was the third 
and final day of the opening weekend’s competition and, like the thousands of other 
gamer-attendees, I too was eager to see which players and teams would prevail in the 
real-time strategy game StarCraft 2, the sci-fi FPS Halo: Reach, and the military shooter 
Call of Duty: Black Ops – the event’s three sanctioned tournament games.  The MLG is 
LANopolis (Chapters Five and Six) on proverbial steroids.  Instead of facilitating 
networked gameplay for dozens of players, this space accommodates hundreds of 
gamers.  There is another key difference – here, the gamers play for money.   
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The screen-filled convention space hosts three main areas.  The first section 
houses the sponsors’ kiosks and booths.  Gaming hardware companies like Alienware, 
Astro, and Sony invite attendees to demo their newest wares and games, while snack and 
refreshment companies like War Heads candy, Stride gum, Nos energy drink, and Dr. 
Pepper distribute free samples of their sugary goods. The room’s middle section contains 
rows upon rows of networked PCs and game consoles that have been linked for 
competitive play.  The MLG’s red-shirted officials and on-lookers watch from pedestrian 
aisles as gamers compete to ascend through the tournament standings.  And the room’s 
final section along the back wall features three main stages.  Here, hundreds of gamers 
cheer as the nation’s best players compete for thousands of dollars in prize money and 
league sponsorship.  The large projection screens display the players’ adroit skills and 
feature sports-style broadcast commentators who preview the game levels (not unlike 
animated golf announcers describing a given hole’s challenges), and who offer their 
insights on the kinetic, martial gameplay.   
 
 
Figures 7.1 and 7.2: A crowd watches as gamers compete in the 2011 MLG event in 




Figures 7.3 and 7.4: Professional gamers play in teams (L), while announcers narrate 
play-by-play commentary for online spectators (R) 
 
I begin the Conclusion with this brief description of a nascent but growing 
electronic sport league’s commodification of video gameplay because it offers a dramatic 
counter example to the Invaders! art installation described in the Introduction.  These 
antithetical bookends showcase the vast spectrum of affective states and experiences that 
video war games might engender, and how these titles, their play communities, and their 
associated interests – from the artistic to the corporate – have and might yet be co-opted 
for dissimilar ends.  On the one hand, military shooters and other popular combat games 
enjoy such intense fanfare that the amateur tournaments that were once hosted in gamers’ 
homes have given way to professional gaming associations looking to “monetize” the 
ludic war experience by codifying its rules of play and transforming the experience into a 
spectator sport.124  On the other hand, there are Invaders! and similarly sympathetic 
interventions that critique virtual combat’s pleasures by foregrounding the titles’ design 
mechanics and by injecting uncomfortable political realities into their escapist realms.   
                                                
124 The MLG is not the only professional gaming league in existence, though it is almost 
certainly the largest. 
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The through-line that unites these dissimilar endeavors – from organized e-
sporting competitions, to anti-war art pieces, and all the commercially successful and 
failed war game productions in between – are the hegemonic pleasures of ludic war play.  
Recall that one of the initial questions that set this project in motion is: why do military 
shooters succeed in the marketplace at a moment when most militainment fail?  As I have 
argued throughout, it is the shooter’s unique gameplay modality – the interplay between 
the titles’ textual designs (text), the adverting ephemera’s discourse (paratext), and the 
avid gamers’ social practices (context) – that makes these games such a commercially 
viable and reliable militainment format.   
This project has endeavored to interpret the video game critically as an apparatus 
that contains its own medium-specific textual interactions, and one that interacts uniquely 
within broader economic and cultural fields.  I started with the simple precept that 
gameplay matters because it affords us the experiential license and technological means 
to experiment with our choices, our futures, and even ourselves. Culture is an impossibly 
messy thing, and I have endeavored to capture in the preceding chapters’ case studies 
emblematic moments of post-9/11 military shooter gameplay, and to make sense of their 
associated play cultures; I have tried to be empirical without being overly empiricist.   
To review then, I have argued that understanding the “media modality” of video 
games illuminates the manner in which these texts are, first, thought to correspond to 
reality (or not), and second, possess medium-specific traits as expressive and 
communicative vehicles that facilitate states of play.  Modality is a generative term for 
arriving at a historicized cultural and political economic analysis of media pleasures 
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because it highlights the mutually constitutive relationship between the discursive aspects 
of media (modality as context), and gaming’s specific machinations as an interactive 
apparatus (modality as text). The second half of Chapter One compares two military 
shooters produced decades apart to demonstrate the manifold ways that gaming’s ludic 
wars have changed over time, while pointing to those aesthetic structures of form that 
endure – namely, immersion, agency, and transformation (Murray, 1997).  It is an 
admittedly limited snapshot comparison, but one that I hope makes clear the utility of 
media modality as a diachronic tool for critical game analysis.   
Chapters Two and Three bring modality to bear on the best-selling Modern 
Warfare and Tom Clancy shooters.  These games make pleasurable the gamer’s 
inhabitation of multiple soldier characters who commit patriotic sacrifices (Chapter 
Two), and showcase in dramatic fashion the potent efficacy of future technologies and 
battlefield tactics to guarantee the political promises of American exceptionalism after 
9/11 (Chapter Three).  Textually, these games accomplish these feats by emphasizing 
different elements of gameplay.  The changing avatar identities in the Modern Warfare 
games promote an immersive narrative subjectivity that creates an empathetic bond 
between the stories’ characters and the player.  And the Clancy-brand shooters’ 
meticulous modeling of battlefield tactics and space (in Rainbow Six: Vegas), and its 
depiction of its cybernetic soldiers (in Ghost Recon: Advanced Warfighter), demonstrate 
procedurally that America possesses the technology and the political will to, if necessary, 
engage in preemptive but nevertheless righteous war. These series are additionally 
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pleasurable because they connect contextually with the imagery and themes of war 
reportage, and with an established militainment brand known for its exciting action.  
Examining ludic war’s gameplay pleasures, even when those pleasures are 
understood as the dynamic product of formal computational designs and the game’s 
connection to the real, will only take a critical analysis so far.  Fortunately, modality’s 
utility as a novel, analytic concept is not bound to the close readings of text alone.  
Questions of modality can (and, indeed, should) be applied to gaming ephemera, and 
interview protocols for researching players’ ludic pleasures. For this reason, the project’s 
latter chapters assess shooters’ strategic marketing efforts, and how avid gamers engage 
with one another through these games in their raucous multiplayer sessions.  Chapter 
Four explains the balancing act that video game producers and marketers engage in when 
selling the ludic war experience to a world at war.  In particular, this chapter explores the 
advertising strategies Activision pursued to appeal to dissimilar game-buying 
constituencies and pre-frame Call of Duty 4 Modern Warfare to avoid the backlash of 
moral panics.  Successfully advertising the ludic war experience demands that marketers 
rhetorically construct a considerably delimited notion of “military realism” so gamers can 
play their virtual wars with the assurance that war’s grim realities will not short-circuit 
their pleasurable gameplay fictions.   
In Chapter Five, I describe my personal experiences and the gameplay lessons I 
learned while playing alongside avid gamers at LANopolis, a popular computer gaming 
center.  The competitions that military shooters facilitate color significantly the rules of 
social comportment and shared knowledges and values that gain expressions during the 
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all-night play sessions in this computer gaming center. When LANopolis’ avid gamers 
discuss what they enjoy most about military shooters and their cooperative gameplay 
community, they reflect on the play practices that they engage in to maintain their 
“hardcore” gamer identities, and the traits they look for in other gamers (Chapter Six).  
These hardcore gamers are keenly aware of the complexities of enjoying war games 
during a time of international strife, and share their thoughts on how they negotiate ludic 
war play’s complex liminality.  Together, these textual, paratextual, and contextual 
practices bring the ludic war formation into being, capitalizing on medium-specific 
pleasures that other War on Terror militainment fail to produce. 
THE LUDIFICATION OF WAR CULTURE 
This is the point at which we can finally return to Raymond Williams’ “structure 
of feeling” concept first invoked in the Introduction.  Again, Williams’ elusive but 
analytically and methodologically provocative cultural hypothesis concerns how 
experiential processes and events are broadly felt, and why these widely held but 
historically specific feelings are integrally and necessarily connected to society’s 
interlocking social apparatuses and values.  Or, to update Williams’ phrasing in light of 
this project’s concerns and discoveries: the ludic war experience articulates an interactive 
structure of pleasure that enables American consumers to pleasurably take up virtual 
arms against enemies of the state during times of international crises.   
But the interactive structure of pleasure is more than a multifaceted techno-
cultural apparatus that connects with and produces pleasurable textual and contextual 
gameplay experiences that speak to post-9/11 anxieties – it likewise makes available to 
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consumers a form of emergent ludic citizenship that, on the one hand, reflects the 
prevailing mode of postmodern warfighting and, on the other, the thoroughgoing 
economic imperatives of late capitalism.  Critical political economist Dallas Smythe 
proposed the idea of the “audience commodity” to describe the way that media users, 
especially television audiences, were bundled and delivered by broadcasters to 
advertisers as veritable commodities.  Ludic war’s affecting structure of feeling 
accomplishes a similar though less systematic feat by creating an engagine political 
subjectivity that interpellates and coaches gamers on how to be good consumers and 
virtual soldiers.  If Smythe’s audience commodity delivers viewers to advertisers, then 
ludic war’s interactive apparatus – especially those popular games developed after 9/11 – 
delivers gamers to the interests of the military-entertainment complex.  These virtual 
soldiers are not necessarily more susceptible to defense interests, but they are directly 
subjected to the soft power and defense ideologies that these expertly crafted 
entertainment properties wield.  Future research should pursue this line of audience 
inquiry to see if and to what extent avid military-themed video gamers trust and 
internalize the stories and values that American militainment propagate.  
In addition to their affective elements (their near-future, “ticking time bomb” 
narratives, immersive perspectives, navigable storymaps, etc.), post-9/11 shooters are 
compelling experiences for many because they enjoy an epistemological credibility borne 
out of the video game’s basic computational form.  In his summary of play’s competing 
conceptual frameworks, Jonathan Dovey (2006) discusses the power of simulation to 
establish certain truth claims: 
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If each historical age has its own ways of producing truth about the world, then 
probability can be seen as the root of contemporary epistemology. This 
epistemology is at its most obvious in the use of simulation as a way of producing 
knowledge. Contemporary ludic culture produces simulation as a ground of 
knowledge just as 19th century capitalism was based upon observational 
empiricism. The simulation operates in the subjunctive mode of ‘If this 
(action/event/behavior) then what are the chances of that (reaction)’. Moreover a 
simulation and a game are remarkably similar processes, they are both dynamic 
rule bound systems according to whose terms we agree to let a model stand in for, 
or become, reality. Simulation emerges as the knowledge mechanism for ludic 
culture. (p. 136) 
 
This book has endeavored to connect identity, technology, and play practices across its 
case studies because gaming’s simulation-based processes shape our understanding of the 
world around us, the cultural mythologies that color those experiences, and ultimately, 
notions of the self.  The “playful identity”125 at the core of military shooters is the identity 
of the ludic soldier.  But while ludic war’s interactive structure of pleasure is integral to 
the creation of the shooter’s pleasures and the cultivation of its core martial identity, the 
cultural and epistemological logic of this combative play identity and its attendant 
political mythology are not restricted to games alone.  The video game form and the 
shooter genre have spread this ludic subject position to other militainment texts, to non-
game technological platforms, and even to non-play spaces.  That is, instead of 
postmodern war production logics and older military entertainment exercising a single-
directional influence on the content, design, and media modality of shooters, it is worth 
thinking in these few remaining pages about the ways these shooters have, in turn, shaped 
popular culture by increasing opportunities for citizen-soldiers to become ludic soldiers, 
                                                
125 See, for example, Raessens’ “playful identities” project where he and his collaborators 
examine the reflexive construction of identity through different interactive technologies 
(http://www.playful-identities.nl). 
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or how the modern state has changed from hailing its subjects with war spectacle, to how 
it hails its citizenry with opportunities for war play.  Turning our attention at this late 
juncture to the broader “ludification” of post-9/11 war culture has the added benefit of 
widening the analysis beyond gaming culture proper to assess the diffuse but related 
practices by which the twentieth-century citizen-soldier is transforming into the twenty-
first century ludic soldier.126  The following examples are illustrative, not exhaustive.   
As I discovered during my trip to Dallas, today’s ludic soldiers compete shoulder-
to-shoulder in the MLG’s screen-filled trenches, where their firefights are commoditized 
as spectator sport.  The ludic soldier subjectivity is also an adoptable identity at the U.S. 
military’s “Virtual Army Experience” where would-be recruits can sign up to “play 
Army” at this traveling road show (see, “Introduction” in Huntemann & Payne, 2009).   
  
Figures 7.5 and 7.6: Attendees line up to try their hand at virtual war at the traveling 
“Virtual Army Experience”127 
 
                                                
126 Roger Stahl’s work (2010) is valuable precisely because it demonstrates how the 
reigning military mythology is not just a ludic affair.  With that in mind, this project 
maintains that shooters offer the clearest articulation of the how the military and its 
citizenry are imagined in popular culture, and why they are envisioned thusly. 
127 Images: “http://profchristy.typepad.com/.a/6a00d83495e9d569e20120a6007331970b-
800wi” and “http://0.tqn.com/d/phoenix/1/0/E/d/2/virtualarmy02.jpg” 
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And the ludic soldier identity can be purchased by the virtual round at the National 
Infantry Museum in Columbus, Georgia where visitors take their best shot on the 
“Engagement Skills Trainer” – the same rifle simulator used at Ft. Benning (FYI: $7 for 
30 rounds, or $10 for 60 rounds of burst fire).  In a space that is otherwise dedicated to 
memorializing America’s frontline warfighters, museum-goers can vicariously adopt the 
soldier’s identity by assuming their weaponized view.  Of course, looking down the 
barrel of these modified weapons is only the physical analog of the virtual experiences 
that first-person shooter video games have been trading in for decades. 
 
Figures 7.7 and 7.8: National Infantry Museum visitors take their best shot on the 
“Engagement Skills Trainer”128 
 
The ludic soldier subject position is thus a flexible and multifarious identity 
position, but one that uniquely expresses the broader ludification of culture129  – be it as 
                                                
128 Images from: http://www.nationalinfantrymuseum.com/?page_id=1297 
129 Following the lead of Joost Raessens (2005), I prefer the admittedly clunky 
“ludification” to the no less awkward term “gamification” because the former suggests 
how the play spirit is thoroughly imbricated in the everyday practices of cultural 
production and consumption thanks to a spate of digital communication and information 
technologies and a vibrant participatory culture (points covered in the Introduction). 
“Gamification,” meanwhile, is the act of introducing rules and scoring systems to non-
game activities as a motivational prompt (see, Jane McGonigal’s Reality Is Broken: Why 
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for-profit sport, as an immersive recruitment road show, or as codified memory in a 
museum space.  It is likewise a new media identity that maintains ontological roots to its 
citizen-soldier antecedent, and technological roots to the video game’s cultural and 
control logics.  The implication is that even if one never picks up a joystick to play a 
military shooter, or a virtual assault rifle in a museum or at a recruitment event, the ludic 
soldier identity and its attendant nationalistic pleasures inform gamers and non-gamers 
alike about the U.S.’s political promise and military might in the new century, and the 
role that play and fantasy have in mediating the citizen’s relationship to the nation. 
The ludification of culture also reminds us that the affective pleasures of playing 
games are inextricably linked to the participatory nature of immersion, agency, and 
transformation (Murray, 1997) – elements that make multiple demands of the player, 
including a call to action. This is one of the primary reasons why the project has focused 
broadly on studying textual, paratextual, and contextual practices, and how these actions 
gain their cultural meaningfulness and currency when their textual and contextual 
modalities intersect.  Games scholar Joost Raessens supports this complex view of 
gaming, stating: “Computer games are not just a game, never just a business strategy for 
maximizing profit, but always also a battlefield where the possibility to realize specific, 
                                                                                                                                            
Games Make Us Better and How They Can Change the World [2011] for a popularization 
of this term). In other words, ludification is about media culture’s increasingly playful 
processes of being, whereas gamification is applied design; one is about ontology and 
identity, the other hands-on praxis. This is an admittedly generous handling of 
gamification, which some argue represents nothing more than advanced marketing 
techniques that exploit gaming’s reward systems while abandoning any procedural rules 
and mechanics that might draw attention to processes operations (Bogost, 2011, n.p.); 
i.e., gamification is really “pointification” (Robertson, 2010, n.p.). 
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bottom-up, heterogeneous forms of participatory media culture is at stake” (emphasis 
added, 2005, pp. 383-384).  Be they about war or not, all games are proverbial 
“battlefields” because games are always already culture.  And culture is a contested site.  
Or, in gaming’s parlance, culture is a site of contest.  
One of the persistent challenges of working on a project like this has been the 
question of where to begin and where to end, and deciding which sites of contest and 
activities deserve attention from those that must be set aside.  The project’s multi-
methodological design, numerous objects and sites of study, and overall goal of tracking 
something as amorphous as “gaming culture” complicate considerably the task of 
assessing systematically how professional and recreational media practices fit together 
(or do not), and suturing those findings into a compelling, analytic whole.  There are 
unquestionably other tacks one could have pursued to assess the pleasures of military 
shooters, including choosing different games, interrogating different sites of play, 
assessing different paratextual ephemera, and so forth.  One could have also selected 
different historical endpoints.  The titles and gaming moments I study occur between the 
9/11 attacks and the death of al-Qaeda’s founder and leader Osama bin Laden.  The 
question of appropriate periodization is a consequential one for historians, but this 
project’s historical bracketing is one of convenience. I am less interested in the question 
of periodizing gameplay, and wish instead to focus first on unpacking these popular 
playthings (which can then be connected to a historical moment).  If we are searching for 
metaphors, we might think of video games as modern day palimpsests, as interactive 
records that represent layers upon layers of creative practices, and that contain – like the 
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faint and hidden writing on ancient parchment – earlier iterations of code, game 
mechanics, and cultural mythologies. 
This study, which has focused on the manifold pleasures and affective hold of 
military shooters, has to a lesser extent also been a study of mythology.  Following 
Raymond Williams’ lead, my study has endeavored to connect the concerns of cultural 
studies with that of critical political economy by way of video games’ practices – hoping 
to help move game studies beyond formalistic accounts about how the form functions, or 
simplistic critical accounts that disregard player pleasure as another yet instance of false 
consciousness.  There is, I believe, an interlocking apparatus of actions that determine the 
kinds of pleasures that these games attempt to engender for players during a time of war.  
(Williams provided the theoretical framework; I filled it in with a grounded account).  
The interactive structure of pleasure that makes ludic war fun at a time of 
international strife also perpetuates a distinct mythology about the nation-state.  In the 
case of commercially popular post-9/11 military shooters produced in the West, this 
mythology is more often than not about America’s promises and challenges in the new 
century.  I have argued media modality’s utility for thinking about the meaningfulness of 
video games because its careful investigation discloses the ways interactive fictions 
reveal all-too-real truths about prevailing cultural mythologies.  Vincent Mosco (2004) 
tells us that, “To understand a myth involves more than proving it false.  It means 
figuring out why the myth exists, why it is so important to people, what it means, and 
what it tells us about people’s hopes and dreams” (p. 29). Games are powerful vessels for 
the exploration of national (and nationalistic) myths because they make us the centerpiece 
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of that experience: we are the ludic soldier who is the bulwark against the outside 
terroristic forces; we are the engine, driving the game’s narrative and witnessing firsthand 
the consequences of our choices.  In these moments, we do more than reflect on 
battlefield strategies, we reflect on our hopes and dreams.  These political and personal 
aspirations are amplified because they come into direct conflict with – as is often the case 
for the post-9/11 military shooters – our collective nightmares (recall one’s multiple 
deaths in Modern Warfare, or the terrorized residential spaces of the Clancy shooters).   
It took the U.S. military roughly ten years after the attacks of September 11 to 
find and kill its “public enemy #1.”  It took ludic war culture less than a week to recreate 
Osama bin Laden’s assassination.  On May 2, 2011, a team of Navy SEALs assassinated 
bin Laden who had been hiding, perhaps for years, in a large compound in Abbottabad, 
Pakistan.  Five days later, this infamous residence had been transformed into a 
downloadable level for the popular multiplayer first-person shooter game Counter-Strike 
(Fletch, 2011, n.p.).  At the same time, the game studio behind Kuma\War, an online 
game firm which had been publishing levels based on the after-action reports of soldiers 
fighting in Iraq, published its final level – “The Death of Osama bin Laden.”  This free-
to-play level offers gamers a narrative conclusion to the company’s digitized War on 
Terror series (Kuma War, 2011, n.p.).  Soon thereafter, SEAL Team Six – the military 
operatives responsible for storming the Abbottabad safe house – made an appearance in 
the initial marketing materials for Activision’s Modern Warfare 3 (the previously non-
existent game that was mocked by The Onion in Chapter Four) (Totilo, 2011, n.p.).  And 
less than three weeks after the death of al-Qaeda’s leader, defense contractor Raytheon 
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and Motion Reality crafted an immersive 3D simulation of the raid to demo at the 2011 
Special Operations Forces Industry Conference (Ackerman, 2011, n.p.).   
The timeliness of these responses is remarkable, but not unprecedented.  Gamer 
culture had, after all, produced and circulated a wealth of “kill bin Laden” games after the 
September 11 attacks (Lowood, 2008).  What is perhaps notable about the relationship 
between bin Laden and video games this time around is the speed with which his death 
was commodified.  Osama bin Laden’s assassination was an invitation for nationalistic 
grandstanding (with cable news channels broadcasting Americans chanting “U.S.A., 
U.S.A.!” in city streets), and it quickly became a ready-made opportunity to capitalize on 
the conclusion to the War on Terror “story.” 
But this event – celebrated and commercialized as it was – is clearly a convenient 
narrative bookend.  Neither the U.S.’s War on Terror nor the entertainment industry’s 
ludic wars will end with bin Laden’s death.  Indeed, as textured a historical snapshot of 
cultural anxieties as post-9/11 military shooters showcase, video games are equally about 
the future.  This point cannot be underestimated, and it is not a glib truism: it is an 
essential quality of the medium’s form.  These playthings entice gamers into projecting 
their wills into their spaces and stories to shape those events that have not yet obtained – 
be they aligning Tetris’ falling, interlocking blocks, or saving the U.S. from foreign 
forces in any number of military shooters.  Unlike the textual apparatuses of other 
entertainment media, the “game gaze” of the ludic apparatus is always about looking 
towards future possibilities and states of being (Atkins, 2006). The political promise of 
video games lies in the form’s ability to provoke gamers into playing with the present 
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while keeping an eye to the future, so that we might understand the world as it is 




DEFINING THE “MILITARY-ENTERTAINMENT COMPLEX” 
When critics, scholars, and pundits invoke the term, the “military-entertainment 
complex,” they are generally referring to the commercial and non-commercial 
collaborations between the military sector and its defense firms, and the entertainment 
industry and its media companies. These professional collaborations result in wide-
ranging artifacts – from Hollywood films, to “serious games” for military training, to 
computer-based war modeling software, to theme park rides, to TV programming about 
war and the armed forces. The sheer variety of entertainment goods that find their origins 
somewhere in this matrix complicate efforts to produce an easy roadmap of this 
production network, especially when compared to the hyphenate from which it is derived. 
President Eisenhower’s better-known military-industrial complex (sometimes referred to 
as the “iron triangle”), which describes the nexus of power and influence between 
defense contractors, the military, and congressional lawmakers following WWII, became 
a prime target for criticism and scholarship when its power was most evident during the 
height of the Vietnam War (although defense spending itself peaked during the Cold War 
under Regan’s leadership in 1986 [Roland, 2001, p. 47]). By contrast, the military-
entertainment complex is a post-Cold War phenomenon that has considerably more 
opaque linkages between its numerous constituents. The reason for the complex’s 
increased opacity as an object of study is at least three-fold: first, there are wide-ranging 
connections between military interests and everyday objects that are not easily read as 
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military goods per se (see, Turse [2008] for an exhaustive list of these common goods); 
second, because many of these products are cultural and entertainment wares (and are not 
literally weapons systems), they exercise consensual and not coercive power130; and third, 
this production matrix reflects broader shifts in how the military operates and conducts 
war (i.e., the shift from total war to postmodern war), and should be understood as a 
realignment of procurement and combat policies rather than a total break with the past.  
Academics and critics have commented on the complexity of the military-
entertainment complex from a variety of disciplinary perspectives.  For instance, Nick 
Turse (2008) offers the most inclusive and comprehensive (if excessive) hyphenate, 
calling it the “military-industrial-technological-entertainment-academic-scientific-media-
intelligence-homland security-surveillance-national security-corporate complex” (p. 16).  
For sake of ease, Turse refers to the condition simply as “the complex.” Turse’s work 
details the Department of Defense’s innumerable connections to the corporations that 
produce, among others, everyday consumer goods (e.g., Procter & Gamble, General 
Mills, PepsiCo), oil and oil-derived products (e.g., Chevron, BP, Haliburton), and, of 
course, entertainment wares (e.g., Tom Clancy trans-media properties, Microsoft, 
NASCAR). The following 2008 figures speak to the complex’s staggering level of 
economic activity: defense spending approximates a $555 billion annual layout; the U.S. 
toy industry rakes in $22 billion a year; video game software and hardware sales now 
exceed 12.5 billion; and PC Games alone account for $1 billion worth of sales (Turse, 
                                                
130 I am adopting Antonio Gramsci’s (1971) differentiation in hegemony theory between 
consent and coercion in this instance.  Similarly, Joseph Nye (2004) argues that these 
goods exercise a kind of “soft power.” 
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2008, p. 140). Because Turse’s journalistic account offers only an introduction to how 
video games significantly contribute to the constitution of the military-entertainment 
complex, we should look to other critics.  
History of science and technology scholar Timothy Lenoir has arguably written 
the most detailed studies regarding the human and technological linkages between video 
game firms and defense contractors.  Lenoir argues that simulation technologies are 
paving the way for a “posthuman” future (2000), and that video games have constituted a 
critical juncture in, if not the paradigmatic form of, the military-entertainment complex 
(2002-2003).  And Lenoir is not alone in this view.  In Virtuous War (2001) James Der 
Derian labels the complex the “Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network” (or 
MIME-Net), and contends that video games help facilitate “virtuous war” – or the global 
violence that comes from placing “technology in the service of virtue” – permitting 
assaults to be waged from increasingly vast distances (p. xi).  “At the heart of virtuous 
war is the technical capability and ethical imperative to threaten and, if necessary, 
actualize violence from a distance – with no or minimal casualties” (p. xv). Increasingly 
impersonal and hyper-mediated interactions (video games that look like real military 
technologies and interfaces, and vice-versa) not only extend the hegemonic reach of 
digitally advanced nations, but it also conflates simulated deaths with real ones for those 
soldiers who are asked to kill by pushing a button.  Der Derian warns: 
Unlike other forms of warfare, virtuous war has an unsurpassed power to 
commute death, to keep it out of sight, out of mind.  Herein lies its most morally 
dubious danger. In simulated preparations and virtual executions of war, there is a 
high risk that one learns how to kill but not take responsibility for it. One 
experiences “death” but not the tragic consequences of it. In virtuous war we now 
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face not just the confusion but the pixilation of war and game on the same screen. 
(2001, p. xvi) 
 
Building in part on Der Derian’s work, Stephen Kline et al. (2003), describe this evolving 
complex as “the conjunction of advanced military planning, computer simulation, and the 
simulation-designing expertise of film and video game companies,” which is “creating ‘a 
new network of virtual power’” (p. 180).  They also see the long history between defense 
and video game interests as having led to a dominant theme of “militarized masculinity” 
– “a shared semiotic nexus revolving around issues of war, conquest, and combat” – that 
has affected much of gaming content across genres, irrespective of whether or not a game 
has manifest military themes (p. 255).  
Stephen Stockwell and Adam Muir (2003), likewise, critique the sharing of 
resources, ideas, and energy between “computer game producers and the military; … 
between Hollywood producers and the U.S. government on language and concepts post 
September 11, 2001; and between the military’s propaganda machine and the 
entertainment industry’s thirst for manufactured and timely ‘reality’” (p. 2).  They agree 
with Lenoir that the complex’s dynamism is due to its flexibility of digital assets and 
human personnel; meaning, both intellectual property (e.g. gaming algorithms and 3-D 
engines) and industry researchers and creatives move easily back and forth from defense 
firms to entertainment companies.  Again, this intra-industry migration and fluidity 
aggravate attempts to chronicle the complex’s, well, complex configuration and history. 
Breaking from the military-entertainment label, cyber-culture scholars David 
Silver and Alice Marwick (2006) call the convergence of new media with the U.S.’s 
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militarized state a “dot.mil” condition. For example: “Dot.mil can be seen in the president 
dressing up as an avatar from a shoot-‘em-up computer game. It can be seen in defense 
contractors rebranding themselves as ‘systems integrators’ and in dot.bombs morphing 
corporate strategies from business-to-business software to surveillance applications” 
(Silver and Marwick, 2006, p. 47).   
One final conceptualization worth noting is Les Levidow and Kevin Robins’ 
“military-cybernetic complex,” which is a functioning of the “Military Information 
Society” (1989, p. 163).  The authors argue that the pro-military discourse of 
technological invention promotes a kind of interactive or cybernetic freedom even as 
current and future technologies promise to exercise more control over their users.  The 
authors’ “infotech” concept contains strong echoes of James William Gibson’s (1986) 
“technowar,” a failed discourse invoked by the military’s technocratic leadership during 
the Vietnam War. 
Through infotech, military models of reality appeal to widespread illusions of 
omnipotence, of overcoming human limitations, even as they conceal our relative 
impotence. Computer-based models of war, work and learning can promote 
military values, even when they apparently encourage the operator to “think.” In 
all those ways, we are presently headed towards a military information society, 
which encompasses much more of our lives than we would like to acknowledge. 
(Levidow and Robins, 1989, p. 159) 
 
Levidow and Robins rightly criticize some social scientists for neglecting the role that 
war has had on the development of culture and social organization, although the authors 
do credit Max Weber, Lewis Mumford, Anthony Giddens, and Paul Virilio with making 
important contributions.  The scholastic paucity of work on the topic is not terribly 
surprising given the topic’s opacity, ubiquity, and liminality (though it does present a 
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relatively untrammeled research area for game studies scholarship). Gameplay is not just 
elusive in the aforementioned ways, but it is also paradoxical.  As Levidow and Robins 
note about video games in particular:    
“Just look at the child sitting in front of his computer at school,” writes 
Baudrillard (1988). “Do you think he has been made more interactive, opened up 
to the world? Child and machine have merely been joined together in an 
integrated circuit.” Or, rather, the child’s play may have become more interactive, 
but only in relation to a simulated reality. Thus arises the paradox of regulated 
play. (Levidow and Robins, 1989, p. 170) 
 
The paradox of video gameplay is the technological manifestation of a much deeper 
sociological and existential phenomenon – namely the longstanding agency and structure 
dialectic. The interactive control apparatuses of video games include, as Levidow and 
Robins say of military-inflected culture generally, their own “attractions as well as their 
horrors” (1989, p. 176).  
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Appendix B 
FOCUS GROUP INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
Introduction / Welcome 
 
• Moderator introduction 
• Basic guidelines for the group 
• Consent sheets completed 
• Introduction of participants 
 
I. Warm-up  
Mod:  We’re here today to talk about what makes one a good hardcore gamer in military 
shooters, the qualities you look for in teammates, and what gameplay elements make for 
the most enjoyable experiences. 
 
Mod: I’d like to get the ball rolling by (1) asking you all to name one favorite military-
themed shooter from the last few years (e.g., Battlefield, Call of Duty, Metal of Honor, 
Counter-Strike, Homefront); and (2) name one memorable moment from that game – it 
can come from the single-player campaign or a multiplayer session.    
 
Mod: I want to cover three main topics: hardcore gamers, shooter games, and team play.    
 
II. Hardcore Gamers 
Mod: Show the South Park screen grab. 
Mod: What show does this come from?  What stereotype is being ridiculed here? (probe)  
Do you identify with the image from South Park? Is it different for players of different 
genres?  For example are MMO or WoW players different from FPS players? Why? 
 
Mod:  Okay, show of hands: how many here consider yourself to be a “hardcore” gamer?  
What does this label bring to mind?  Good connotations, or bad? (probe).   
Mod:  What makes one a “hardcore” gamer? (probe) Is it the same thing as a fan? (probe)   
 
 
III. Military Shooters  
Mod:  Military shooters are often “under fire,” so to speak, for depicting contemporary 
combat.  Does this bother you?  Do you seek out or prefer these realistic depictions to 
more fantastic games like Crysis, Halo, or Gears of War?   
 
Mod:  What elements make for a “good” military shooter? (probe) Story?  
Customization? Online Community?  Platform specific games?  
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IV. Shooter Gameplay Knowledge 
Mod:  What things should a hardcore military shooter gamer know?  (probe)  What 
makes one a “good” gamer in a LAN or online setting? 
 
Mod:  How do you make yourself a better player? Help others become better? 
 
Mod:  How do you all seek out this information? (probe) Online? Blogs? Clans?  
 
Mod:  Do you active on online boards? Create FAQs? Video walk-throughs? 
 
Mod:  What have these games taught you about warfare – either contemporary or 
historical?  What about international politics?  Bush doctrine of preemptive war?  Our 
wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and air battles in Libya or Yemen. 
 
Mod: What qualities, that we’ve discussed, makes one an expert FPS gamer?  
 
 
V. Final thoughts 
Mod: We’ve covered a lot here today … Is there anything else you’d like to share? 
Anything you want to expand on? (probe) 
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